Corona v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Corona v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/1
California Court of Appeal May 27, 2014 No. D065300Unpublished
Filed 5/27/14 Corona v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FLORENCIO CORONA, D065300
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVRS900287)
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
David A. Williams, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Martin L. Stanley, Martin L. Stanley and Jeffrey R. Lamb for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ronald W. Beals, Linda Cohen Harrel, Jill Siciliano-Okoye, Alexandar D.
DeVorkin, Carol Quan, William H. Rittenburg, Jerald M. Montoya, and Helen Lemmon
Alarcon for Defendant and Respondent.
In this action arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, Florencio Corona, Sr.,
his wife and daughter (collectively, plaintiffs), sued the State of California Department of
Transportation (the State) generally alleging a dangerous condition of public property
(confusing traffic signals) was a substantial factor causing the accident that killed
Corona's ex-wife, Jennifer Corona, and 14-year-old son, Florencio Corona, Jr. The trial
Here, the court initially stated that it was sustaining the State's objections to the
photograph and Crommelin's statements which relied on that photograph but overruling
objections to his statements concerning the cause of the accident and existence of
conflicting traffic signals. After it took the matter under submission, the court issued a
written order which reversed its tentative decision concerning the State's objections to
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Crommelin's statements about the cause of the accident and existence of conflicting
traffic signals. Accordingly, the trial court sustained seven of the State's eight objections.
Based on our review of the record, the court held an extensive hearing on the
matter, giving each party ample opportunity to submit arguments. After hearing from the
parties, the court stated that "[the decision] was really close when [it] gave [its] tentative"
and it would take the matter under submission. Whatever the court's initial impressions
may have been, it was not bound by its tentative ruling. (Silverado, supra, 197
Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) Further, the court did not deprive Corona an opportunity to be
heard on the evidentiary matters as it held an extensive hearing in which it invited
arguments from the parties.
On appeal, Corona does not make substantive arguments regarding the trial court's
evidentiary rulings. He merely makes a blanket statement that he "disputes that any of
the objections set forth by [the State] in the underlying case were sustainable, and this
Court should consider all of the substantial evidence presented by [him] in revisiting the
motion for summary judgment." "Where a point is merely asserted by [appellant]
without any [substantive] argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be
without foundation and requires no discussion." (People v. Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d
768, 783.)
III. Dangerous Condition
Corona contends he presented evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether
the State created a dangerous condition. We disagree.
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A. Standard of Review and General Legal Principles
A trial court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the moving party
establishes there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) On appeal from an
order granting summary judgment, we independently determine whether triable issues of
material fact exist. In making this determination, we view the evidence in a light
favorable to the plaintiff. We liberally construe the plaintiff's evidentiary submission,
strictly scrutinize the defendant's evidentiary submission, and resolve any evidentiary
doubts or ambiguities in the plaintiff's favor. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25
Cal.4th 763, 768-769; Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 565.)
A public entity is not liable for an injury except as provided by statute. (§ 815,
subd. (a).) Section 835 provides the sole statutory basis for a dangerous condition of
public property claim. (Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829;
Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 438 (Brenner).) The essential
elements of a claim under section 835 are (1) the public entity's property was in a
dangerous condition at the time of the injury, (2) the injury was proximately caused by
the dangerous condition, (3) the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable
risk of the kind of injury that occurred, and (4) the dangerous condition was created by
the negligent or wrongful conduct of an employee of the public entity acting within the
scope of employment, or the public entity had sufficient advance notice of the dangerous
condition to protect against it. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th
1121, 1126, 1129-1130; Brenner, supra, at p. 439.)
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" 'Dangerous condition' means a condition of property that creates a substantial (as
distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or
adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable
that it will be used." (§ 830, subd. (a).) If a party shows the property is safe when used
with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to
exercise due care, then such property is not "dangerous" within the meaning of the
statute. (Brenner, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.)
Whether a given set of facts and circumstances creates a dangerous condition is
usually a question of fact and may be resolved as a question of law only if reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion. (§ 830.2; Peterson v. San Francisco Community
College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 810 (Peterson); Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1194.) "Section 830.2 . . . sets forth the criteria for a court
to conclude as a matter of law that a condition is not dangerous within the meaning of
section 830: 'A condition is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter
if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff,
determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor,
trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable
person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such
property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.' " (Peterson, supra, at p. 810, fn. 9.) It is
for the court to determine whether, as a matter of law, no reasonable person could
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conclude a given defect or set of circumstances is dangerous. (Davis v. City of Pasadena
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 701, 704.)
B. Analysis
Corona does not expressly challenge the State's threshold summary judgment
showing on the issue of existence of a dangerous condition at the subject intersection.
Rather, he contends only that his evidence raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether
a dangerous condition existed.
In this case, the State presented evidence to meet its threshold burden to show the
traffic signals at the subject intersection did not constitute a dangerous condition within
the meaning of section 830. Manjarrez's declaration established that westbound vehicles
on G Street approaching the intersection were "given a clear and unmistakable
identification of their right-of-way assignment by the three . . . traffic signal heads."
Further, the signal heads on the overlap signals were shielded, to the extent practical, by
louvers, which thereby directed the attention of drivers stopped at the intersection to the
appropriate signal heads. The State regularly performed maintenance inspections on the
signals. According to Manjarrez, "[n]othing at the subject intersection would prevent due
care drivers from safely traveling through the intersection."
Moreover, the State's records indicate no prior similar accidents occurred at the
subject intersection. The absence of prior similar accidents supports a conclusion no
dangerous condition exists. (See Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th
225, 243; Antenor v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 477, 483; McKray v.
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State of California (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 59, 62; Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71
Cal.App.3d 719, 733.)
Based on the foregoing, we turn to the question of whether Corona met his
responding summary judgment burden. On the issue of whether there was a dangerous
condition, Corona relied on Crommelin's declaration. As we previously noted, the trial
court sustained objections to significant portions of that declaration and Corona did not
show an abuse of discretion on appeal (ante, part II). "[F]or purposes of reviewing a
motion for summary judgment, we do not consider evidence 'to which objections have
been made and sustained.' " (Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 129, 139-140.)
Considering the admitted portions of Crommelin's declaration, we conclude
Corona did not meet his burden on summary judgment "to show that a triable issue of one
or more material facts exists as to [his] cause of action or a defense thereto." (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) Specifically, Corona did not show a
negligent or wrongful act or omission of a State employee created the dangerous
condition or that the State had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
(§ 835.) Although Crommelin indicates that the signal phasing at the subject intersection
"does not utilize signal heads which can be programmed so drivers can see a given signal
but not make it possible to see a conflicting signal," he does not address the State's
evidence that the signal faces were shielded, to the extent practical, by signal louvers
which partially occluded the overlap signal indications to drivers stopped at the
intersection. Further, Crommelin's declaration does not establish a negligent or wrongful
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act by a State employee created a dangerous condition with a risk of significant injury if
not used with due care in connection with the relevant signals.
Crommelin's declaration also does not show that the State had actual or
constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. Crommelin acknowledges the
lack of "a significant crash history at th[e] intersection," yet he fails to address any other
means by which the State had notice of a dangerous condition. Thus, Crommelin's
declaration fails to create a triable issue on this point.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Corona did not meet his burden of
establishing triable issues of material fact on the existence of a dangerous condition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the Department of Transportation created a dangerous condition at the intersection, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sustaining the State's evidentiary objections to the plaintiff's expert declaration?
Did the plaintiff present sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of a dangerous condition of public property?
Did the plaintiff waive appellate review of the trial court's standing rulings by failing to raise them in the opening brief?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the State's evidentiary objections and Corona did not meet his burden of establishing a triable issue of material fact as to whether the State created a dangerous condition.”
“If a party shows the property is safe when used with due care and that a risk of harm is created only when foreseeable users fail to exercise due care, then such property is not "dangerous" within the meaning of the statute.”
“The absence of prior similar accidents supports a conclusion no dangerous condition exists.”