In re Andrew M. CA4/3

Filed 5/21/14 In re Andrew M. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re ANDREW M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, G048430 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. ST001040) v. OPINION ANDREW M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Richard Glen Boire, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * *

INTRODUCTION The juvenile court found that Andrew M., then 15 years old, came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601, subdivision (b), due to 1 habitual truancy. The court declared him a ward of the court. Andrew was not removed from his parents’ custody, but, in its disposition order, the court imposed “usual terms and conditions of probation,” including that Andrew must “[s]ubmit [his] person, residence and property to search and seizure by any peace or probation officer or school official during school hours anytime during the school day, with or without warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion” (the probation condition). Andrew solely argues in this appeal that the probation condition is unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad with regard to its search requirement; he does not challenge the probation condition as to its seizure requirement. For the reasons we explain post, we conclude the search requirement of the probation condition is invalid under the test set forth in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent), because it has no relationship to Andrew’s habitual truancy, it relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and it “‘requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality.’” We therefore direct the juvenile court to modify its order to strike the search requirement of the probation condition, and otherwise affirm the order in its entirety.