People v. Rodriguez CA6

Filed 5/20/14 P. v. Rodriguez CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H039885 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 211203)

v.

EDWARD RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Edward Rodriguez appeals from an order involuntarily committing him as a sexually violent predator (SVP). On appeal, he contends that his indeterminate commitment under the SVP Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) violates his right to equal protection of the laws. As set forth below, we will affirm. BACKGROUND On July 24, 2003, defendant was convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and assault with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a child (Pen. Code, § 220). Subsequently, on December 24, 2007, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to involuntarily commit defendant as an SVP. On June 10, 2013, the trial court found the petition to be true, and it ordered defendant to be committed for an indeterminate term.

DISCUSSION

The SVP Act mandates commitment “for an indeterminate term” when an individual is found to be an SVP. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.) Defendant contends that his indeterminate commitment under the SVP Act violates his right to equal protection of the laws because other civilly committed individuals—namely, mentally disordered offenders (MDO’s) and those found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI’s)—are committed for determinate periods. This issue has been widely litigated. It reached the California Supreme Court in People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I). In McKee I, the defendant argued that indeterminate commitment under the SVP Act violates equal protection guarantees because other civilly committed individuals, such as MDO’s and NGI’s, are subject to commitment for determinate periods with greater procedural protections. (Id. at pp. 1196, 1200-1202, 1207.) McKee I held that SVP’s are similarly situated to MDO’s and NGI’s for equal protection purposes, but it concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether a justification exists for treating SVP’s differently from MDO’s and NGI’s. (Id. at pp. 1203-1207.) McKee I therefore remanded the case to the San Diego Superior Court with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing and determine whether the disparate treatment of SVP’s is justified. (Id. at pp. 1208-1209.) On remand, the San Diego Superior Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the People had demonstrated a constitutionally sufficient justification for treating SVP’s differently from MDO’s and NGI’s. (People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1331 (McKee II).) The superior court’s order was affirmed by the Fourth Appellate District in McKee II, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1350. The Supreme Court denied review of McKee II. Here, defendant contends that the Fourth Appellate District improperly evaluated the evidence and erroneously concluded that indeterminate commitment under the SVP Act does not violate equal protection guarantees. He therefore urges us to reevaluate the evidence presented in the San Diego Superior Court, reject the McKee II holding, and 2