Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. CA4/1
California Court of Appeal May 15, 2014 No. D063980Unpublished
Filed 5/15/14 Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JOHN YOUNG, D063980
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2009-00099935- CU-WM-NC) TRI-CITY HEALTHCARE DISTRICT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy M.
Casserly, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard M. Wirtz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dicaro, Coppo & Popcke, Carlo Coppo, Michael R. Popcke and Shelley A. Carder
for Defendant and Respondent.
This appeal of a trial court order denying a motion for attorney fees is related to a
previous appeal in which plaintiff and appellant John Young, M.D., successfully
challenged the trial court's decision to grant a special motion to strike his fifth cause of
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute; all statutory references are to
this code unless noted; see Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
35, 58-59 (Young or our prior appeal).) The operative pleading is Young's amended
petition for a writ of administrative mandate that objected to several phases of the
District's decision to terminate his medical staff privileges at its hospital. (§ 1094.5.)
Cal.App.4th 676, 683-684.) An award of attorney fees under those circumstances will be
justified "only if any reasonable attorney would agree that the motion [was] totally
devoid of merit." (Ibid.; Moore v. Shaw (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 182, 199.)
Both objective and subjective standards must be considered, however. "Whether
the sole purpose of the motion is to harass an opposing party or the motion is solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay, in contrast, concerns the subjective motivation of
the moving defendant. [Citation.] The moving defendant's subjective motivation can be
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inferred from the absence of any arguable merit. [Citation.]" (Chitsazzadeh, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th 676, 684.)
B. Decision in Prior Opinion
Before applying the above standards, we outline the conclusions we reached in the
prior opinion about the merits of the District's anti-SLAPP motion. We were initially
required to resolve some threshold procedural questions to determine which decision was
actually under review. That exercise stemmed from a confusing series of rulings by the
trial court in the nature of reconsideration, dismissal and correction orders. We
ultimately reversed its February 2011 order (granting the motion) and essentially
reinstated its October order that had denied the District's anti-SLAPP motion to strike.
(Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 51-59.) Denial was the proper result. (Id. at pp.
58-59.)
However, the resolution of the anti-SLAPP arguments was not simple or obvious,
because of the special nature of Young's mandamus pleading. In Young, supra, 210
Cal.App.4th 35, we summarized the statutory issues presented on the merits of the rulings
concerning the special motion to strike, as follows:
"[W]e consider [the order's] validity in the context of free speech and petitioning concerns arising from hospital peer review, as those concerns are addressed in the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme. [¶] In this factual and procedural context, the merits of any futility exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine of administrative law are also at stake, as asserted by Young in opposition to the motion to strike. The overall question is whether the allegations of his administrative mandamus petition, in the fifth cause of action seeking relief from the December 2008 summary suspension, fall within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statutory definitions. Did Young's court action for a writ of administrative mandate to compel
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a hearing on the validity of his summary suspension necessarily 'arise out of' protected free speech conduct, in the hospital peer review context?" (Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53-54.)
On the anti-SLAPP issues, our prior opinion applied these tests:
"The principal thrust of the claim, in terms of any 'allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct . . . that provides the foundation for the claim,' will determine the applicability of the anti- SLAPP statutory scheme. [Citation.] If the core injury-producing conduct by the defendant that allegedly gave rise to the plaintiff's claim is properly described with only collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity, then the claim does not arise out of protected speech or petitioning activity. [Citation.] [¶] The resolution of these anti-SLAPP issues depends upon the initial definition in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), of the coverage of the statutory scheme, of any 'cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue [that] shall be subject to a special motion to strike . . . .' " (Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 55; italics omitted.)
In the context of hospital peer review proceedings, which may qualify as an
"official proceeding" under anti-SLAPP definitions, we were nevertheless required in our
prior opinion to "determine whether all of Young's fifth cause of action 'arose out of' the
District's protected official activity. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) Young seeks relief in
administrative mandamus against an allegedly wrongful [December 2008] summary
suspension. Under section 1094.5, he has a right to seek such relief, because the
Legislature has recognized that a judicial remedy may be appropriate where an
administrative decision is sufficiently flawed. (San Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 357-358.) Young should be able to attempt to show that the District had an
enforceable duty grounded in its bylaws, and he may assert a right to proper
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performance of such a duty, to allow him the requested review of his summary
suspension." (Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th p. 58; italics added.)
"Similarly, even though a hospital peer review proceeding qualifies as an 'official
proceeding' under another anti-SLAPP definition, we must still determine whether the
basis of his claim arises out of 'any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration' by the peer review proceeding. (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2).) Young's fifth cause of action alleges that he is entitled to judicial review of
the administrative decision, and he does not seek damages on tort theories. He attacks
the [December 2008] summary suspension as not carried out properly by a qualified
committee, and claims the review of his records was done improperly. We think this
claim of entitlement to judicial review of allegedly prejudicial administrative action is
based in and arose out of his statutory rights under section 1094.5, and is separate and
different from an action for damages that arose out of the content of the allegedly
wrongful peer review statements, such as the courts in Kibler, supra, 39 Cal.4th 192 [and
another case] were considering (damages for defamation or business interference). 'The
substance of the [District's] decision was not protected activity.' [Citation.] The claim
here is avoidance of fair procedure or his judicial review hearing rights." (Young, supra,
210 Cal.App.4th at p. 58; italics added.)
In the prior opinion, we acknowledged, "Even if a cause of action was 'triggered'
by protected activity, it does not always arise from it. [Citation.] When we examine the
alleged acts that underlie the fifth cause of action, we conclude Young is principally
seeking judicial relief from actions of an administrative body that denied him a hearing to
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which he was otherwise entitled, and those actions are independent from any protected
elements of the claims. The anti-SLAPP statute should not be interpreted to impose an
undue burden upon Young's right to petition for court review of administrative action
that was in the nature of governance." (Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58-59;
italics added.)
C. Objective Standard
Young's current appeal challenges the trial court's ruling that he had not satisfied
the statutory criteria to obtain an award of fees and costs. We review that statutory
interpretation and decision de novo. (San Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 352;
Carver v. Chevron USA, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.)
At the time of our prior opinion, the merits issues were admittedly confusing and
required clarification, because the Supreme Court had determined in Kibler, supra, 39
Cal.4th 192, 196-197, that the anti-SLAPP procedure could properly be raised by a
hospital district in defense of a lawsuit, in the context of a tort damages action
(defamation, abuse of process, and interference with practice claims). Dr. Kibler, a
hospital staff physician, was suing upon tort causes of action that directly "arose" out of
peer review recommendations. The hospital's peer review proceeding qualified for those
purposes as a type of "official proceeding authorized by law," as defined and protected by
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). (Kibler, supra, at p. 199; Young, supra, 210
Cal.App.4th at p. 57.)
In Young's prior appeal, we decided that such concerns for protection of peer
review proceedings did not invoke the anti-SLAPP procedures of section 425.16, with
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regard to his fifth cause of action for administrative mandamus. That cause of action was
not subject to being stricken as arising from the District's protected activity. It was
important that Young retain his rights to the requested administrative review of the
summary suspension of his practice rights, which was inextricably intertwined with the
termination of his privileges. (Young, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 57-59.)
On the current fees questions, we utilize an objective standard to review the trial
court's finding that the District's anti-SLAPP motion, although unsuccessful, was not
frivolous in nature. We conclude the motion was not "totally and completely" without
merit. (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2).) On the state of the law at the time the motion was brought
and pursued throughout its various stages (reconsideration, etc.), the District and its
counsel could have had a reasonable belief that the substance of Young's allegations in
his fifth cause of action "arose out of" protected activity, as defined by anti-SLAPP
standards. It follows that the trial court correctly determined that Young was not entitled
to an award of attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c).
D. Subjective Standard
Where the trial court makes a finding under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) that
a special motion to strike was subjectively solely intended to cause unnecessary delay,
such a finding would be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. (Chitsazzadeh,
supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 683-684; Moore v. Shaw, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 199.)
To the extent that Young continues to argue that the District's motion was brought for the
"sole" purpose of harassing him or unduly delaying the writ proceedings, he has no
adequate direct or indirect support in the record.
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Certainly, it is regrettable that the anti-SLAPP motion proceedings, together with
the process of appellate review, have consumed so much time and money. Nevertheless,
the principles involved are important and deserving of close attention. As the trial court
cogently observed, the lack of entitlement to attorney fees in a case like this, where the
law is yet unsettled, is unfortunately "just one of the collateral consequences of this
statute."
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Each party to bear its own costs on appeal.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees because the defendant's unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion was not objectively frivolous or brought in bad faith.
Issues
Whether an order denying attorney fees under the anti-SLAPP statute is appealable.
Whether the defendant's special motion to strike was 'frivolous' or 'totally and completely without merit' under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude the trial court was justified in determining that no fees award was proper under the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme, because the District's motion was not objectively frivolous in nature”