California Court of Appeal May 12, 2014 No. D064915Unpublished
Filed 5/12/14 In re H.M. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re H.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D064915 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J518670A-C) Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
T.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia
Bashant, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna R. Shargel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Carolyn Griesemer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for minors.
T.M. (mother) appeals from the order pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 366.26 terminating her parental rights over her daughter C.M. Mother contends
that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the sibling-relationship exception to
termination under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). We disagree and thus affirm
terminate parental rights' (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1))." (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
614, 620.)
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"The sibling[-]relationship exception [to termination of parental rights] applies
where the juvenile court finds that 'substantial interference with a child's sibling
relationship' is a 'compelling reason' to conclude that adoption would be detrimental to
the child. In making this determination, the court should take into consideration 'the
nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was
raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common
experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing
contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as
compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.' (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(v).)" (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1317.)
Our high court in In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61, explained the sibling-
relationship exception application as follows: "Reflecting the Legislature's preference for
adoption when possible, the 'sibling relationship exception contains strong language
creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the
juvenile court determines that there is a "compelling reason" for concluding that the
termination of parental rights would be "detrimental" to the child due to "substantial
interference" with a sibling relationship.' [Citations.] Indeed, even if adoption would
interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit
to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would
receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption." (See also In re Valerie A.
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014 [noting the "application of this exception will be rare,
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particularly when the proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent,
caring and stable parent are paramount"].)
The sibling-relationship exception contains both factual and discretionary
components. First, the proponent of the sibling-relationship exception, such as mother
here, bears the burden to produce evidence of the existence of a beneficial sibling
relationship, a factual question, which is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Bailey
J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Second, the court must "find that the existence of
that relationship constitutes a 'compelling reason for determining that termination would
be detrimental.' " (Id., at p. 1315.) We review that determination for abuse of discretion,
inasmuch as it is "a 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile
court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact
that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the
benefit to the child of adoption." (Ibid.)
Mother admits that the facts of the instant case are horrific, as father repeatedly
and violently shook C.M. "resulting in emergency brain surgery, the insertion of a brain
shunt and cerebral palsy—a life-long condition." Mother also admits that she did not
protect C.M. from father out of fear of him and the members of his family and that C.M.
"was luckily placed in a loving home capable of meeting her special needs. . . ."
Nonetheless, mother contends that C.M. deserves more—a legal relationship with her two
sisters who "share the same history" of her past and who are "bonded to her by blood."
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In essence, mother's contention is a request that we review the evidence anew,
reweigh the credibility of witnesses, ignore the findings of the court and enter a new
finding that the sibling-relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)
of section 366.26 applies. This we cannot do. (See In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 947 [observing that in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
court's finding the sibling-relationship exception is inapplicable, a court of review must
uphold that finding if there is substantial evidence to support it and in so doing the
reviewing court cannot evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence or
resolve evidentiary conflicts].)
Here, we conclude mother has not satisfied her "heavy burden" (In re Celine R.,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61) to show that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to C.M. due to "substantial interference" (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) with
C.M.'s sibling relationships. Indeed, the record shows that C.M. lived with her sister
H.M. for only about the first two weeks of her life, when they all resided in the maternal
uncle's home; that C.M. lived with A.R. for only about three and a half months before
C.M. was removed and separated from her sibling; that after separation, there were only
12 total visits in which all the siblings were present; that each of those visits lasted about
one hour and 15 minutes; that at the time of the contested section 366.26 hearing, C.M.
was just under 10 months old; and that social worker Julie Walker opined the siblings did
not have shared experiences and noted in her October 2, 2013 section 366.26 report that
neither H.M. nor A.R. cried or appeared upset when leaving visits that included mother
and their sister C.M. We therefore conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to
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support the finding of the trial court that the sibling-relationship exception did not apply
in this case. (Cf. In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 812-820 [noting the
sibling-relationship existed when there was substantial evidence to support the finding
that there were extensive and consistent visits between siblings for over a period of three
years, when the visits would last usually for three hours and included overnight visits on
weekends and when the youngest child was able to call her brother by name and identify
her other siblings].)
What's more, even if we concluded adoption would interfere with an alleged
strong sibling relationship, we nonetheless would conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion when it weighed the benefit to C.M. of continuing that relationship against the
benefit she would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption. (See In Re
Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 61; see also In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 952-953.)
Indeed, here the record shows that C.M. has caregivers who are very committed to
her and are willing to adopt her; that they already have an approved home study with the
Agency because they have adopted once before; that unlike mother who failed to show up
to all but one of C.M.'s medical appointments (and with respect to the one, showed up
late), C.M.'s caregivers are attuned to what mother notes are C.M.'s "special needs," are
bonded to C.M. and are fully committed to providing for her both physically and
mentally; and that there were 21 other possible families in San Diego County with an
approved home study that were potential matches to adopt C.M. In light of such
evidence, we conclude the court properly exercised its discretion in finding the benefit
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C.M. would received by gaining a permanent home through adoption outweighed the
alleged benefit to her of continuing the sibling relationship(s).2
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
2 We note that minors' counsel submitted a letter brief in this appeal and joined in the arguments and the position of the Agency as presented by the Office of County Counsel, County of San Diego. 11
AI Brief
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Holding. The juvenile court did not err in terminating parental rights because the mother failed to meet her burden of proving the sibling-relationship exception, and the court properly weighed the child's need for a permanent home against the benefit of maintaining sibling ties.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in finding the sibling-relationship exception to the termination of parental rights inapplicable?
Did the court abuse its discretion in weighing the benefits of adoption against the benefits of maintaining the sibling relationship?