In re M.R. CA2/7

Filed 5/5/14 In re M.R. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.R., et al., Persons Coming Under B250862 the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK81333) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARLON R., et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite Downing, Judge. Affirmed. David A. Hamilton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Marlon R. Judy Weissberg-Ortiz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant D.T. John Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Judith A. Luby, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________

Marlon R. and D.T., the father and mother of M.R., appeal the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders on the ground that Marlon R. was not adequately advised of his constitutional trial rights. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Infant M.R. came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in March 2013 because of reports that there had been domestic violence between his parents and that his mother, who required medication for mental illness, was not medication-compliant. DCFS filed a petition alleging that M.R. was a dependent child of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The adjudication hearing took place in June 2013. Both parents were present and represented by counsel. The hearing began with the court asking if there were objections to the documents presented by counsel for DCFS. Marlon R.’s counsel objected to one of those documents, and the objection was sustained. DCFS presented no further evidence. Counsel for M.R. and his siblings elected not to present evidence. D.T.’s counsel submitted three documents to the court as an exhibit without objection. Finally, the court turned to Marlon R., whose attorney said that she would not be presenting witnesses or evidence, just argument. Counsel for DCFS submitted on the documents she had presented, subject to rebuttal, and the court proceeded to hear argument from all counsel. Marlon R.’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the section 300, subdivision (a) allegation and to amend one of the two section 300, subdivision (b) allegations in several respects. She challenged the veracity of the evidence in support of the domestic violence allegation and argued that there was no evidence to support allegations of prior domestic violence taking place before the events that prompted the present petition. Counsel argued to the court that Marlon R. denied the specific acts of violence alleged against him, and argued that the evidence showed that he physically restrained D.T. during a tantrum rather than assaulting her.