Lidstrom v. Wilson-Blank CA2/1

Filed 4/30/14 Lidstrom v. Wilson-Blank CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LASSE LIDSTROM, B245298 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County v. Super. Ct. No. BP130982) STEPHANIE WILSON-BLANC, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed. ______ Best Best & Krieger, Kira L. Klatchko, and Christopher Pisano for Defendant and Appellant. Ward & Ward, Alexandra S. Ward; Albertson & Davidson, and Keith A. Davidson for Plaintiff and Respondent. ______

Stephanie Wilson-Blanc appeals from an order determining that the executor of her brother’s estate is a beneficiary of a certain trust. We agree with the superior court’s construction of the trust instrument, and we therefore affirm. BACKGROUND In 1983, Rudolph W. Horstman and Dorothy C. Horstman, husband and wife, executed an agreement creating the Horstman Family Revocable Trust (the Trust).1 Rudolph and Dorothy had two children, Stephanie Wilson (now Stephanie Wilson-Blanc) and William R. Horstman. Rudolph and Dorothy were both the trustors and the original trustees of the Trust, which became irrevocable when either of them died. Dorothy died before Rudolph. The Trust agreement provides that if Rudolph “survive[d]” Dorothy, then within one year of her death he was to “divide the trust estate into two (2) separate trusts, designated ‘Trust A’ and ‘Trust B,’” pursuant to certain instructions. The general provisions of the Trust agreement further provide that, “[u]nless otherwise specifically provided elsewhere herein,” “[a] person shall not be considered to survive another if he or she shall die within ninety (90) days of the death of such other except that if the order of the deaths of the Trustors cannot be established by proof, or if Trustor’s wife actually survives Trustor she shall be deemed to have survived Trustor.” We shall refer to this provision as the “survivorship definition.” The parties to the present appeal apparently agree that Rudolph survived Dorothy within the meaning of both the Trust agreement in general and the survivorship definition in particular. Rudolph died on July 16, 2008. The Trust agreement provides that “[u]pon the death of and in the absence of appointment by the surviving spouse, the Trustee shall divide the balance of the trust estate into as many equal shares as there are children of Trustors then living and children of Trustors then deceased leaving issue then living. The Trustee shall allocate one (1) such equal share to a living child of Trustors and one (1) such equal share to each group composed of the living issue of a deceased child