California Court of Appeal Apr 28, 2014 No. E056656Unpublished
Filed 4/28/14 Cardiel v. Marquez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
FLORENCIO VARGAS CARDIEL et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, E056656
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC498572)
NICOLE MICHELLE MARQUEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Paulette Durand-Barkley,
On May 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a complaint for negligence against defendants
Nicole Michelle Marquez and Daimler Chrysler Corporation. Plaintiffs allege defendants
caused a collision with plaintiffs’ vehicle on May 5, 2006. Plaintiffs’ 1998 Chevrolet
Astro Van was rearended by Marquez, driving a 2005 Jeep Cherokee. Daimler Chrysler
was a registered owner of the jeep.
In October 2008 and January 2009, the trial court conducted two case management
conferences regarding plaintiffs’ failure to serve defendants with the complaint. Daimler
Chrysler filed its answer on March 19, 2009.
A year after the complaint was filed, on May 4, 2009, plaintiffs filed an
application for publication of summons and complaint for service on Marquez. Plaintiffs
had conducted a search but had not been able to locate an address for service of the
1 Florencio Vargas Cardiel, Elba Diaz, Adrian Cardiel, Edgar Cardiel and Vanessa Cardiel. Two minors are not parties to this appeal.
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complaint. On May 28, 2009, at another case management conference, the court ordered
an order to show cause hearing and sanctions of $150 for failure to serve Marquez. That
hearing was vacated on October 23, 2009.
Daimler Chrysler filed a notice of bankruptcy stay on June 1, 2009. Plaintiffs
were ordered to seek relief from the bankruptcy stay before an order to show cause
hearing set for December 3, 2009, which was eventually continued to June 3, 2010.
On June 3, 2010, neither party appeared. The court issued orders to show cause
regarding dismissal of the case because of the bankruptcy and the failure to prosecute.
Another hearing was set for September 7, 2010. The various hearings were continued
from September 7, 2010 to January 11, 2011, April 8, 2011, and July 12, 2011.
On February 10, 2011, plaintiffs filed proof of service by publication on Marquez.
Marquez filed an answer on March 9, 2011. The minors’ claims were settled on April 25,
2011.
At the hearing on July 12, 2011, the court ordered a private mediation to be
completed by February 29, 2012. A trial setting conference was scheduled for April
2012. In their case management statement, plaintiffs claimed special medical damages of
more than $93,000.
On March 8, 2012, Marquez filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute
because she was not served within two years of filing the complaint and the action was
not brought to trial within three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.320, subd. (a).) No
mediation had been conducted in spite of persistent efforts by Marquez to have it
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scheduled. Marquez argued plaintiffs had not been diligent and she was prejudiced by
the delay.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the grounds of excusable neglect or inadvertence.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473.)2 Plaintiffs’ lawyer, Robert Finn, explained that, in January
2012, he discovered his legal secretary, Zulema Medrano, had been embezzling from
him, hiding case files and documents, failing to calendar dates, and lying to him about the
status of cases.3 Finn generally blamed Medrano’s conduct for the failure to prosecute
plaintiffs’ claims without specifically describing how she caused the delay. The case was
also delayed by the Daimler Chrysler bankruptcy.
On April 5, 2012, the court granted Marquez’s motions to compel discovery and
made two awards of sanctions in the amount of $740 against plaintiffs who ultimately
submitted late discovery responses. On April 30, 2012, the court granted Marquez’s
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The case was dismissed on May 17, 2012,
more than four years after it was filed.
2 Plaintiffs properly cease to rely on Code of Civil Procedure section 473 in their appellate briefs.
3 We acknowledge plaintiffs’ contention that Medrano committed criminal acts. But we decline to take judicial notice of the felony complaint in People v. Medrano, case No. FWV1300031. The complaint, which was filed in January 2013, was never presented to the trial court and it is irrelevant to the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss. (Evid. Code, §§ 350 and 450; Bialo v. Western Mutual Ins. Co. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 68, 73.) Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is denied.
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III
DISCRETIONARY DISMISSAL
Defendant, as the moving party, has the burden to show that a discretionary
dismissal is warranted. Defendant meets this burden by “a showing of some prejudice or
the presence of factors enumerated in the California Rules of Court which when viewed
together militate in favor of dismissal, . . . the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
excusable delay.” (San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist. v. Wheatley-Jacobsen, Inc.
(1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1057; Lopez v. State of California (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
1292, 1295; Putnam v. Clague (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 542, 547.) The plaintiff’s burden to
justify delay requires a specific showing of particular facts and events constituting an
excuse. (Longshore v. Pine (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 731, 737.)
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the reasonableness of plaintiff’s
excuse for delay. (Lopez v. State of California, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295; White
v. Mortgage Finance Corp. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 770, 774-775.) Our review is limited
to the question whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the motion to
dismiss. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We defer to the factual
determinations made by the trial court. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474,
479.)
The relevant factors, enumerated in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1342(e), that
the trial court is required to consider in connection with a motion for discretionary
dismissal include the entire case file and the parties’ submissions; the difficulty in serving
defendant; plaintiff’s diligence in effecting service on defendant; the effect of settlement
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negotiations; plaintiff’s diligence in pursuing discovery or other pretrial proceedings; the
nature and complexity of the case; the nature of any extension or other delay attributable
to the defendant; the interests of justice served by dismissing the action or allowing it to
proceed to trial, or by imposing conditions on such dismissal or trial; and any other fact
or circumstance relevant to a fair determination of the issue.
In applying these factors to the present facts, we conclude plaintiffs have not made
the necessary showing of reasonable delay. It took two years and nine months for
plaintiffs to serve Marquez. During that time, plaintiffs did not act with reasonable
diligence, especially for the one year and nine months between May 2009 (filing of
application for publication of summons) and February 2011 (filing of proof of service by
publication). Even after serving Marquez, plaintiffs did not participate in the mediation
ordered to be completed by February 2012 or timely respond to supplemental discovery,
causing them to be sanctioned by the court. The case was four years old when the motion
to dismiss was granted in April 2012. No showing was made that plaintiffs acted with
reasonable diligence throughout the entire period of time the case has been pending.
(Corlett v. Gordon (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013; Lopez v. State of California,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 1295.)
Although the office problems of a plaintiff’s lawyer may be considered a
reasonable excuse for delay in prosecution, it is only one factor to be considered by the
court. (Farrant v. Casas De La Senda Homeowners Assn. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 221,
226.) The California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110, make a lawyer
responsible for the work of his employees. (Crane v. State Bar of California (1981) 30
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Cal.3d 117, 123; Trousil v. State Bar (1985) 38 Cal.3d 337, 342.) Furthermore,
plaintiffs’ lawyer did not offer the trial court any specific explanation about how
Medrano’s embezzlement and other conduct was a reasonable cause for delay in
prosecution.
Additionally, a bankruptcy stay against a codefendant does not usually excuse
plaintiff’s delay in bringing the action to trial against the other defendant. (Lane v.
Newport Bldg. Corp. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 870, 8743, 445.) In this case, the
bankruptcy stay only applied to Daimler Chrysler, not Marquez. There is no reason
plaintiffs could not have proceeded against her and, in actuality, the case continued for
more than 14 months after she was finally served.
Proof of prejudice to defendant is not essential for a discretionary dismissal.
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 332.) But delay in effecting service is inherently
prejudicial because witnesses’ memories fade with the passage of time and a defendant is
deprived of the opportunity to prepare a defense, to effect discovery, and to preserve
essential evidence. (Lopez v. State of California, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295.)
Since the accident, plaintiffs—whose address at the time was in Tijuana, Mexico—have
apparently moved to Nebraska. Even if plaintiffs bear the increased costs of discovery
for depositions and independent medical examinations, discovery may be more
complicated and plaintiffs do not have a history of willing compliance.
In the case of an accident that occurred in May 2006, where defendant was not
served until March 2011, and the case dismissed in April 2012, Marquez can certainly
make a credible claim of prejudice in trying to defend claims that are now about eight
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years old. In view of the foregoing, there has been no showing of a manifest abuse of
discretion by the trial court in granting the motion to dismiss. (Kuchins v. Hawes (1990)
226 Cal.App.3d 535, 538.)
IV
DISPOSITON
Marquez was prejudiced by the delay in prosecution and plaintiffs did not show
excusable delay. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit and order Marquez, the
prevailing party to recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RICHLI Acting P. J.
KING J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs' action for failure to prosecute, as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence or a valid excuse for the significant delay in serving the defendant and bringing the case to trial.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute?
Does a bankruptcy stay regarding a codefendant excuse a plaintiff's failure to prosecute against a non-bankrupt defendant?
Are office problems caused by an employee sufficient to excuse a lawyer's failure to prosecute a case?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“After our deferential review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss.”
“In applying these factors to the present facts, we conclude plaintiffs have not made the necessary showing of reasonable delay.”
“Marquez was prejudiced by the delay in prosecution and plaintiffs did not show excusable delay.”