entered on that award and thereby fully satisfy the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure sections 724.010 and 724.050.1
In his second appeal (Case No. D063709), Hess appeals a postjudgment order
denying his section 724.050 motion for acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment.
He argues the court erred because the undisputed facts show he satisfied the judgment by
tendering $100,000, plus costs, to Horath. He also argues the court erred by awarding
Horath $5,000 in attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to section 724.080. We
consolidated the appeals and conclude the trial court erred by denying Hess's section
724.050 motion for acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Case No. D063124. Horath apparently was injured when Hess's car struck the rear
of her vehicle, and filed a personal injury action against Hess. On November 18, 2011,
the parties' attorneys entered into a written stipulation (Stipulation) to submit the dispute
to an arbitrator for private binding arbitration. The Stipulation states:
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED . . . that this matter be submitted to private BINDING ARBITRATION.
"The award shall be in writing and signed by the Arbitrator. It shall include a determination of all questions submitted to the Arbitrator the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy. Any party to the arbitration shall be entitled to have the award of the Arbitrator entered as a judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure § 1285 et seq.
"THE PARTIES further agree that Defendant [i.e., Hess] will pay the award of the Arbitrator or $44,000[,] whichever is greater, and Plaintiff [i.e., Horath] will accept the award of the Arbitrator or $100,000, whichever is less but in no event less than $44,000. The forgoing amounts are not inclusive of allowable costs including costs of proof, if applicable, which may be awarded by the Arbitrator and are in addition to the amounts stated above. Parties to share cost of Arbitration equally.
"The terms of this agreement, or the limits of any liability insurance policy which may afford coverage to [Hess,] may not be disclosed to the Arbitrator." (Italics added.)
On February 3, 2012, the arbitrator, Thomas E. Gniatkowski, issued a decision
finding Hess liable and awarding Horath $329,644.61 in damages. Thereafter, per
Horath's request, the arbitrator awarded her costs in the amount of $36,882.61.
Therefore, the total amount of the arbitration award (Award) was $366,527.22.
On May 21, 2012, Horath filed a petition to confirm the Award in the total amount
of $366,527.22. On June 27, more than 100 days after the date of the Award, Hess filed a
motion to limit the judgment to the amount of $100,000, citing the Stipulation's
limitations on the amounts to which the parties agreed. Horath opposed the motion,
arguing it was, in effect, a motion to "correct" the Award and, as such, was not timely
filed within the 100-day limit under sections 1288 and 1288.2. On July 20, the trial court
3
issued an order granting Horath's petition to confirm the Award and denying Hess's
motion. The court stated Hess's motion to vacate or correct the Award was not filed
within the 100-day limit under section 1288.
Hess filed a section 473 motion for reconsideration, arguing again that the
Stipulation limited the amount Horath could recover to $100,000. The court denied that
motion, finding Hess had not shown grounds for relief under section 473. On September
27, 2012, the court entered judgment for Horath in the amount of $366,527.22. Hess
timely filed a notice of appeal in Case No. D063124 challenging the judgment.
Case No. D063709. On December 3, 2012, Hess filed a motion for
acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment, arguing he had paid Horath $100,000 plus
costs and is therefore entitled to an acknowledgment of full satisfaction pursuant to the
terms of the Stipulation and section 724.050.2 He stated he was not challenging the
Award or the judgment, but was instead seeking to enforce the terms of the Stipulation
pursuant to which Horath had agreed to accept $100,000 plus costs, regardless of the
amount of the arbitration award or judgment. He further stated that his motion did not
seek reconsideration of the trial court's prior rulings.
Horath opposed the motion, arguing Hess's attempts to vacate or correct the
Award had already been decided by the court in its prior rulings in the case. She argued
section 724.050 was not a proper procedural vehicle for Hess to collaterally attack the
2 The record in Case No. D063124 shows that on October 30, 2012, Horath's attorney filed an acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of judgment, acknowledging receipt from Hess of the amount of $136,882.61.
4
Award and judgment and, in any event, she did not accept Hess's tender of $100,000 plus
costs as full satisfaction of the judgment.3 Horath also sought an award of attorney fees
for opposing Hess's motion. On March 15, 2013, the trial court issued an order denying
Hess's section 724.050 motion for acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment. The
court stated that Hess "asks the Court to imply terms set forth in the [S]tipulation that are
not apparent on the face of the [A]ward. This . . . would be an unauthorized modification
of the [A]ward." It further stated Hess had failed to timely file motions to modify the
Award as reflected in its prior rulings. It also found Hess had not objected to the
judgment prior to its entry. The court awarded Horath $5,000 for attorney fees pursuant
to section 724.080. Hess timely filed a notice of appeal in Case No. D063709
challenging the postjudgment order denying his section 724.050 motion.
DISCUSSION
Case No. D063709
I
Appealability
Because our disposition of Case No. D063709 will make the appeal in Case
No. D063124 moot, we first address Hess's appeal of the trial court's postjudgment order
denying his section 724.050 motion for acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. In
so doing, we first decide the court's postjudgment order is an appealable postjudgment
3 Horath also argued Hess had not paid postjudgment interest that had accrued since the judgment was entered.
5
order under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). "An appeal . . . may be taken from any of
the following: [¶] (1) From a judgment . . . . [¶] (2) From an order made after a
judgment made appealable by paragraph (1)." (§ 904.1, subd. (a).) Postjudgment orders
granting or denying section 724.050 motions are appealable. (McCall v. Four Star Music
Co. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1398; Pecaflor Construction, Inc. v. Landes (1988) 198
Interpretation of the Stipulation and Application of Section 724.050
The crux of this case involves the proper interpretation of the Stipulation and the
applicability of section 724.050 to enforce its terms. Hess asserts the Stipulation sets
forth an agreement that Horath will accept $100,000 plus costs as payment in full of the
Award and the judgment, regardless of whether he timely sought to vacate or correct the
Award prior to entry of the judgment. In contrast, Horath apparently argues the
Stipulation did not exempt Hess from the requirement that he timely seek to vacate or
correct the Award to reflect the parties' agreement regarding the maximum amount she
would accept as payment.
A
A written stipulation or other agreement to arbitrate a controversy is subject to the
general rules of contract enforcement and interpretation. (Maggio v. Windward Capital
Management Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1214.) Section 1281 provides: "A written
agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter
6
arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the
revocation of any contract." The California Supreme Court stated: "The fundamental
goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.
(Civ. Code, § 1636.) If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ. Code,
§ 1638.)" (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264.)
Another court described the principles to be applied when interpreting a contract,
stating: "When considering a question of contractual interpretation, we apply the
following rules. 'A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is
ascertainable and lawful.' [Citation.] 'The language of a contract is to govern its
interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.'
[Citation.] 'When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone, if possible . . . .' " (WYDA Associates v. Merner
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1702, 1709 (WYDA).) "The mutual intention to which the courts
give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties' intent, including the
words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as
the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the
contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct
of the parties." (Morey v. Vannucci (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.)
"When a dispute arises over the meaning of contract language, the first question to
be decided is whether the language is 'reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation urged
by the party. If it is not, the case is over. [Citation.] If the court decides the language is
7
reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged, the court moves to the second
question: what did the parties intend the language to mean? [Citation.] [¶] Whether the
contract is reasonably susceptible to a party's interpretation can be determined from the
language of the contract itself [citation] or from extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
[citation]." (Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 839,
847-848.) If a contract is susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations, the
contract is ambiguous. (Ibid.) A court must then construe that ambiguous contract
language "by applying the standard rules of interpretation in order to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties [citation]." (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 779, 798.)
On appeal, a "trial court's ruling on the threshold determination of 'ambiguity' (i.e.,
whether the proffered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is
reasonably susceptible) is a question of law, not of fact. [Citation.] Thus[,] the threshold
determination of ambiguity is subject to independent review." (Winet v. Price (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.) If the contract language is determined to be ambiguous and
conflicting extrinsic evidence was admitted on the meaning of that language, "any
reasonable construction will be upheld as long as it is supported by substantial evidence."
(Id. at p. 1166.) If, however, no extrinsic evidence was admitted or the extrinsic evidence
is not conflicting, the construction of the ambiguous contract language is a question of
law subject to our independent construction. (Ibid.) Because the evidence in this case is
undisputed, we construe the Stipulation de novo, or independently, and do not defer to
the trial court's interpretation. (Maggio v. Windward Capital Management Co., supra, 80
8
Cal.App.4th at p. 1214; Vianna v. Doctors' Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
1186, 1189.)
B
Prior to trial, the parties' attorneys signed the Stipulation on behalf of their clients.
Horath does not dispute, and we presume, her attorney had the authority to legally bind
her to the terms of the Stipulation. The Stipulation provided the arbitrator was to
determine all questions submitted to him or her as necessary to decide the controversy.
Importantly, it also provided that any party was entitled to have the arbitrator's award
entered as a judgment in any court with jurisdiction pursuant to section 1285 et seq. The
Stipulation then provided the parties agreed that "Defendant [i.e., Hess] will pay the
award of the Arbitrator or $44,000[,] whichever is greater, and Plaintiff [i.e., Horath] will
accept the award of the Arbitrator or $100,000, whichever is less but in no event less
than $44,000. The forgoing amounts are not inclusive of allowable costs including costs
of proof, if applicable, which may be awarded by the Arbitrator and are in addition to the
amounts stated above." (Italics added.) Finally, it provided that the terms of the
Stipulation were not to be disclosed to the arbitrator.
Because the language of the Stipulation clearly and explicitly states the arbitrator
was not to be informed about its "high-low" or other provisions, the arbitrator was
charged with determining the parties' controversy without any limitations on the amount
of the arbitration award. The Stipulation's language also clearly and explicitly states that
any party (e.g., Horath) could have the arbitration award entered as a judgment pursuant
to section 1285 et seq. (i.e., by means of a petition to confirm the award). However, in
9
the event the arbitration award exceeded $100,000, the Stipulation provides that Horath
would accept a maximum amount of $100,000 plus costs. The Stipulation does not
contain any language requiring Hess, to enforce the Stipulation's "high-low" provision, to
file a motion to vacate or correct the arbitration award or respond to a petition to confirm
the award. Rather, the clear and explicit language of the Stipulation provides for the
filing of a petition to confirm the arbitration award in its full amount and entry of
judgment, without regard to the Stipulation's "high-low" limit on the amount Hess is
required to pay Horath. Horath does not cite any language in the Stipulation, or any
extrinsic evidence that supports any reasonable interpretation, requiring Hess to file a
petition to vacate or correct the arbitration award based on the Stipulation's "high-low"
limitation provision. Because the Stipulation is not reasonably susceptible to Horath's
suggested interpretation to the contrary, we conclude it is unambiguous and therefore
apply its clear and explicit language to the undisputed facts in this case.
Applying the clear language of the Stipulation to the undisputed facts in this case,
there can be only one reasonable interpretation regarding its "high-low" provision. We
conclude the Stipulation's language implicitly, if not expressly, prohibited Hess from
challenging the amount of the Award or the judgment. The Stipulation provided Horath
had the right to have the Award entered as a judgment in accordance with section 1285 et
seq. (i.e., a petition to confirm the Award). Hess could not challenge the amount of the
Award or amount of the judgment pursuant to a petition to confirm the Award.
Therefore, to enforce the Stipulation's "high-low" provision, Hess necessarily would have
the right to fully satisfy that judgment by paying or tendering an amount within the "high-
10
low" provision (i.e., a maximum amount of $100,000 plus costs). Horath expressly
agreed in the Stipulation to accept the amount of the Award or $100,000, whichever was
less (not including costs awarded by the arbitrator). That contractual provision bound
Horath to accept $100,000 plus costs in full satisfaction of the judgment entered
confirming the Award.
C
Because of Horath's refusal to file an acknowledgment of full satisfaction of
judgment, Hess properly filed a section 724.050 motion to require her to do so or, if she
refused, to obtain a court-entered satisfaction of judgment. As Hess asserts, section
724.050 provides the sole statutory procedure to require a judgment creditor to file an
acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment or, if he or she refuses, to obtain a
satisfaction of judgment entered by the court clerk. (Quintana v. Gibson (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 89, 91 ["[T]he noticed motion procedure set forth in . . . section 724.050 is
the exclusive method for obtaining an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment."].)
"The statutory scheme [i.e., section 724.050] provides only a single method for a
judgment debtor to obtain an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment . . . in those cases
in which the judgment creditor refuses or fails to file or deliver a signed acknowledgment
of satisfaction [of judgment]." (Id. at p. 94.)
Section 724.010, subdivision (a), provides: "A money judgment may be satisfied
by payment of the full amount required to satisfy the judgment or by acceptance by the
judgment creditor of a lesser sum in full satisfaction of the judgment." (Italics added.)
Therefore, if a judgment creditor accepts, or contractually agrees to accept, a lesser sum
11
in full satisfaction of the judgment, the tender or payment of that lesser sum by a
judgment debtor will fully satisfy a judgment for a greater amount. (§ 724.010, subd.
(a).) On such satisfaction, the court clerk shall enter a satisfaction of money judgment
when either an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment is filed with the court or the
court orders entry of satisfaction of judgment. (§ 724.020.) When a money judgment is
satisfied, the judgment creditor is required to immediately file with the court an
acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. (§ 724.030.) However, if the judgment
creditor does not do so (as in this case), section 724.050 provides the procedures the
judgment debtor must follow to obtain such an acknowledgment or a court-entered
satisfaction of judgment. Section 724.050 provides:
"(a) If a money judgment has been satisfied, the judgment debtor . . . may serve personally or by mail on the judgment creditor a demand in writing that the judgment creditor do one or both of the following:
"(1) File an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment with the court.
"(2) Execute, acknowledge, and deliver an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment to the person who made the demand. [¶] . . . [¶]
"(c) If the judgment has been satisfied, the judgment creditor shall comply with the demand not later than 15 days after actual receipt of the demand.
"(d) If the judgment creditor does not comply with the demand within the time allowed, the person making the demand may apply to the court on noticed motion for an order requiring the judgment creditor to comply with the demand. . . . If the court determines that the judgment has been satisfied and that the judgment creditor has not complied with the demand, the court shall either (1) order the judgment creditor to comply with the demand or (2) order the court clerk to enter satisfaction of the judgment.
12
"(e) If the judgment has been satisfied and the judgment creditor fails without just cause to comply with the demand within the time allowed, the judgment creditor is liable to the person who made the demand for all damages sustained by reason of such failure and shall also forfeit one hundred dollars ($100) to such person. Liability under this subdivision may be determined in the proceedings on the motion pursuant to subdivision (d) or in an action." (Italics added.)
Contrary to Horath's assertion, relevant case law supports our reasoning. In
Walton v. Mueller (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 161, cited by Hess, a $40,000 default
judgment was entered against a debtor. (Id. at p. 164.) Two years later, following
settlement negotiations, the judgment debtor in a letter purported to accept the judgment
creditor's offer to accept a lump sum payment of $15,000 in full satisfaction of the
judgment, enclosing a photocopy of a cashier's check for that amount. (Id. at pp. 165-
166.) The judgment creditor claimed his settlement offer had been previously rejected by
the debtor during negotiations and demanded payment of $60,000. (Id. at p. 166.) The
judgment debtor filed a section 664.6 motion to enforce the purported settlement
agreement allowing him to pay only $15,000 in full satisfaction of the judgment. (Ibid.)
The trial court denied the motion. (Ibid.) On appeal, after concluding the trial court
properly found the section 664.6 procedure was inapplicable to enforcement of an alleged
settlement agreement after a judgment is entered and there is no pending litigation,
Walton discussed the availability of section 724.050 to enforce an agreement to accept
less than the full amount of a judgment. (Walton, at p. 174.) Walton stated:
"[S]tatutory authority concerning the satisfaction of judgments only confirms that a judgment debtor . . . who wishes to enforce an alleged agreement to satisfy a judgment, whether for full payment or something less than that, is not without a remedy. But it is not
13
section 664.6. Section 724.050, subdivision (d), specifically provides a noticed motion procedure to compel a judgment creditor to furnish an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment through which a trial court may determine whether an agreement for full satisfaction has been reached. The statutory scheme for satisfaction of judgment (§ 724.010 et seq.), which includes this section, has been characterized as providing 'only a single method for a judgment debtor to obtain an order for entry of satisfaction of judgment . . . in those cases in which the judgment creditor refuses or fails to file or deliver a signed acknowledgment of satisfaction. . . . There is no other procedure [than section 724.050] authorizing a noticed motion for entry of satisfaction of judgment.' [Citations.] [The judgment debtor's] alleged settlement agreement is just the kind of agreement for which section 724.050, subdivision (d) is available--to compel the judgment creditor to furnish an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment based on an agreement to satisfy the judgment by payment for less than the full face amount." (Walton v. Mueller, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 174, italics added; see also Yost-Linn Lumber & Finance Co. v. Bennett (1931) 116 Cal.App. 155, 157 [trial court was authorized to find the judgment creditor had "agreed to accept" the sum of $606 in satisfaction of the $839 default judgment].)
Although the language quoted above may be dicta, we nevertheless agree with Walton's
conclusion that section 724.050 provides the method for a judgment debtor to enforce a
judgment creditor's agreement to accept less than the full amount of the judgment and
obtain an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment after tendering or paying that
agreed-on lesser amount. When a judgment debtor files a section 724.050 motion, the
court may determine whether there was an agreement for satisfaction of the judgment by
payment of less than the full amount of the judgment. (Walton, at p. 174.)
Based on our review of the undisputed facts in this case, we conclude Horath and
Hess agreed in the Stipulation that Horath would accept payment of less than the amount
of the Award and the judgment if the Award (and amount of the judgment) exceeded
14
$100,000 plus costs. More specifically, Horath agreed in the Stipulation to accept
payment of $100,000 plus costs if the Award and the judgment entered exceeded
$100,000 plus costs. By filing a section 724.050 motion, Hess properly sought to enforce
Horath's agreement to accept payment of $100,000 plus costs as full satisfaction of the
judgment in the amount of $366,527.22 that was entered confirming the Award. By
concluding otherwise, the trial court erred.
We disagree with Horath's assertion, adopted by the trial court, that Walton is
inapposite to this case because in Walton the agreement arose after the judgment was
entered and in this case the agreement arose before the judgment was entered (and before
the arbitration proceeding and Award). That is a distinction without a difference. The
point in time when a judgment creditor (or potential judgment creditor) agrees to accept
payment of an amount less than the full amount of the judgment (or potential judgment)
is irrelevant to the enforceability of that agreement. Rather, it is the existence of that
agreement alone that leads to its enforceability under section 724.050 and general
principles of contract law. There is no logical reason to preclude a creditor and debtor
from agreeing in advance of entry of a judgment that a creditor will accept payment of
less than the full amount of the judgment entered thereafter as full satisfaction of that
judgment.
In this case, both parties benefited by the Stipulation's "high-low" provision. If the
amount of the Award and judgment was less than $44,000, Horath would benefit by
requiring Hess to pay her $44,000 plus any costs awarded by the arbitrator. On the other
hand, if the amount of the Award and judgment was more than $100,000, Hess would
15
benefit by having to pay Horath only $100,000 plus costs awarded by the arbitrator.
When the latter scenario ultimately resulted and the amount of the Award and judgment
exceeded $100,000, Horath's agreement to accept payment from Hess of only $100,000
plus costs remained enforceable after issuance of the Award and entry of the judgment,
and was properly enforced by Hess pursuant to a section 724.050 motion. As we
concluded above, Hess was not required to first file a motion to vacate or correct the
Award to enforce Horath's agreement by filing a section 724.050 motion.4 On remand,
the trial court shall consider anew Hess's section 724.050 motion and, on a showing he
satisfied the statutory prerequisites for relief thereunder, shall issue a new order granting
relief under section 724.050, subdivision (d), and awarding him any damages that may be
appropriate under section 724.050, subdivision (e), and reasonable attorney fees under
section 724.080.5
4 Also, as we concluded above, the Stipulation provided that the Award (and implicitly the judgment) was not to be limited by the Stipulation's "high-low" provision. Therefore, as Hess asserts, there were no valid grounds on which he could challenge the Award by filing a petition to vacate or confirm it. The fact that he attempted to enforce the Stipulation's "high-low" provision by filing a (presumably untimely) motion to limit the amount of the Award and judgment entered thereon did not preclude him from subsequently filing his section 724.050 motion to enforce Horath's agreement to accept payment of a lesser amount than the amount of the Award and judgment as full satisfaction of the judgment.
5 Section 724.080 provides: "In an action or proceeding maintained pursuant to this chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party."
16
III
Court's Award of Attorney Fees to Horath
Hess contends the trial court also erred by awarding Horath attorney fees in the
amount of $5,000 pursuant to section 724.080. Because we reverse the trial court's order
denying Hess's section 724.050 motion, Horath is not the prevailing party and is not
entitled to reasonable attorney fees as a prevailing party under section 724.080.
Accordingly, the court's award of $5,000 in attorney fees to Horath must also be reversed.
Case No. D063124
IV
Mootness of Other Appeal
Hess apparently contends in his appeal in Case No. D063124 that the judgment
must be reversed because the trial court erred by denying his postjudgment section
724.050 motion. However, in his appellate briefs Hess concedes he did not have any
valid grounds on which to challenge the Award or entry of the judgment. His appeal in
Case No. D063124 apparently was filed as a "protective" appeal to ensure he did not
waive any arguments he raised in his appeal in Case No. D063709. Because we reverse
the court's postjudgment order denying Hess's section 724.050 motion, the appeal in Case
No. D063124 is moot and we need not, and do not, address its merits. Nevertheless,
given Hess's concession the judgment was properly entered, we affirm the judgment and
reverse the postjudgment order.
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The order denying Hess's section 724.050 motion for
acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Hess shall recover his costs of appeal.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.
18
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a pre-arbitration stipulation limiting the amount a plaintiff would accept as satisfaction of a judgment is enforceable via a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050, even if the judgment creditor refuses to acknowledge satisfaction after the debtor tenders the agreed-upon amount.
Issues
Whether a pre-arbitration 'high-low' agreement is enforceable via a motion for satisfaction of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050.
Whether a judgment debtor must move to vacate or correct an arbitration award to enforce a pre-existing contractual agreement limiting the amount of the judgment.
Whether a postjudgment order denying a motion for satisfaction of judgment is appealable.
Disposition. The judgment is affirmed; the postjudgment order is reversed and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Section 724.050, subdivision (d), specifically provides a noticed motion procedure to compel a judgment creditor to furnish an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment through which a trial court may determine whether an agreement for full satisfaction has been reached.”
“The point in time when a judgment creditor (or potential judgment creditor) agrees to accept payment of an amount less than the full amount of the judgment (or potential judgment) is irrelevant to the enforceability of that agreement.”
“We conclude the Stipulation's language implicitly, if not expressly, prohibited Hess from challenging the amount of the Award or the judgment.”