California Court of Appeal Apr 3, 2014 No. D064275Unpublished
Filed 4/3/14 P. v. Shay CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064275
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE328033)
BRIAN P. SHAY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William J.
McGrath Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Kreit, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Alana Cohen
Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Brian P. Shay guilty of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496,
subd. (a)), and Shay admitted a prison prior (id., §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668).1 The trial
court sentenced Shay to a four-year prison term, two years of which was suspended to be
served on probation.
Shay contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to
suppress statements he made at the scene of his arrest in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We conclude that Shay's argument is without merit, and
accordingly we affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While Adam Headrick's truck was parked on the street in La Jolla on the evening
of February 26, 2013, business records and construction tools, including an air
compressor, were stolen from his vehicle. The construction tools were marked with
Headrick's initials.
Returning to his truck shortly after the theft, Headrick drove around the
neighborhood to try to locate the stolen items. He saw a white Ford Ranger pickup truck
with what he thought was his air compressor in the back of the truck. Someone was
riding in the bed of the truck and ducked down as Headrick approached. Headrick pulled
up next to the truck and told the driver that he thought his air compressor was in the
truck. The driver denied the accusation, claiming the air compressor was a grill. Because
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 2
there were at least four people in the truck, Headrick decided not to pursue the
confrontation and instead left the scene and called police to report the crime. At trial,
Headrick did not recognize Shay as anyone he saw in the Ford Ranger truck.
A few hours later, early in the morning of February 27, 2013, a report was made to
police of someone looking into car windows and accessing the contents of a pickup truck
in the parking lot of a Walmart in El Cajon.
Deputy Sheriff Benjamin Chassen arrived on the scene around 2:25 a.m.
According to testimony at the pretrial suppression hearing, Deputy Chassen saw Shay
standing in the parking lot at the back tailgate of a white Ford Ranger pickup truck. The
bed of the truck contained construction tools, including an air compressor, along with a
bicycle that Shay was working on.
Deputy Chassen became suspicious when he ran the license plate and determined
it was not assigned to that vehicle. After noticing several people inside the cab of the
truck, Deputy Chassen called for other officers to assist him. For safety purposes,
Deputy Chassen told Shay to stay where he was and keep his hands visible and told the
occupants of the truck to stay inside. Upon initial questioning, Shay told Deputy Chassen
that he was working on a bicycle in the back of the truck, that he was on parole, and that
he was not employed.
Four other officers arrived at the scene. At some point after the other officers
arrived, Deputy Chassen conducted a patdown search of Shay and located syringes on
Shay's person. Deputy Chassen went to speak to the occupants of the truck's cab while
another officer watched Shay. From the conversation with the people inside the truck,
3
Deputy Chassen determined that the truck was not stolen, but that the driver had switched
license plates with another vehicle because the registration had expired.
Deputy Chassen directed the occupants of the truck cab to exit the vehicle. Upon
being questioned, the driver of the truck stated that the tools in the back of the truck
belonged to Shay. Shay was still standing near the rear of the truck, and Deputy Chassen
asked Shay about ownership of the tools. Shay stated that the tools were his. Deputy
Chassen asked Shay why he had the tools if he was not currently employed. Shay
indicated that some of the tools were from his grandfather who lived in La Jolla. It was
approximately 15 to 20 minutes from the time Deputy Chassen first contacted Shay to the
time he asked Shay about the ownership of the tools.
The truck was then searched, and officers located a passport, a debit card and a
checkbook belonging to Adam Headrick behind a seat. Deputy Chassen suspected those
items were stolen. In the bed of the truck, officers found tools marked with initials
corresponding to Adam Headrick. Deputy Chassen did not see the initials on the tools
before questioning Shay about ownership of the tools. After connecting the initials on
the tools to the name on the passport and other items in the truck cab, Deputy Chassen
placed Shay under arrest based on his claim of ownership of the tools. Headrick later
identified the tools in the Ford Ranger truck as those stolen from him.
Shay was charged with receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) and burglary
(§ 459), with the further allegation of a prison prior.
Shay made a pretrial motion to exclude the statements he made to Deputy Chassen
about his ownership of the tools. The trial court denied the motion to exclude Shay's
4
statements, ruling that the questioning was investigative and Shay was not in custody.
The trial court specifically found that Deputy Chassen did not suspect Shay of
committing any particular crime at the time he questioned Shay about the ownership of
the tools.
The jury found Shay guilty of receiving stolen property and not guilty of burglary.
Shay admitted the prison prior. The trial court sentenced Shay to a four-year prison term,
and suspended two years of that sentence to be served on probation.
II
DISCUSSION
Shay's sole appellate argument is that the trial court prejudicially erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence of the statements he made to Deputy Chassen because he
was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to questions about the ownership of the tools.
A. Applicable Legal Standards
The general rule excluding statements obtained in violation of Miranda is well
established. "Miranda . . . , supra, 384 U.S. 436, and its progeny protect the privilege
against self-incrimination by precluding suspects from being subjected to custodial
interrogation unless and until they have knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to
remain silent, to have an attorney present, and, if indigent, to have counsel appointed."
(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384.) Statements obtained in violation of
Miranda are generally inadmissible to establish guilt. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th
405, 440.) " 'Absent "custodial interrogation," Miranda simply does not come into
play.' " (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.)
5
Shay argues that a Miranda warning was required when Deputy Chassen asked
him about the ownership of the tools because he was both (1) in custody and (2) being
interrogated within the meaning of Miranda. The standard of review that applies to the
trial court's ruling on the issues of custody and interrogation is well-settled. "While a
reviewing court must apply a deferential substantial evidence standard to the trial court's
factual findings, it must independently determine whether the defendant was in custody."
(People v. Bejasa (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 26, 38, italics added (Bejasa).) As it is
primarily a factual determination, "[w]e review the trial court's finding regarding whether
interrogation occurred for substantial evidence or clear error." (People v. Clark (1993) 5
Cal.4th 950, 985, italics added.)
B. Miranda Does Not Apply Because Shay Was Not in Custody
We begin by examining whether Shay was in custody when Deputy Chassen asked
him about ownership of the tools.
"An interrogation is custodial when 'a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' [Citation.] Whether
a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent inquiry is whether there was ' " 'a
"formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a
formal arrest.' " ' " (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1400 (Leonard).) The
essential inquiry is whether, based on the trial court's factual findings regarding the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, " 'a reasonable person in [the] defendant's
position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.' " (Ibid.) " 'In
determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the
6
circumstances surrounding the interrogation . . . .' " (Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at
p. 35.)
"California courts have identified a number of factors relevant to [the custody]
determination. While no one factor is conclusive, relevant factors include:
' "(1) [W]hether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the
length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the
demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning." ' [Citations.] [¶]
Additional factors include: '[W]hether the suspect agreed to the interview and was
informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed the person
he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the
suspect's freedom of movement during the interview, and whether police officers
dominated and controlled the interrogation or were "aggressive, confrontational, and/or
accusatory," whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at
the conclusion of the interview.' " (Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35-36.) "[T]he
term 'custody' generally does not include 'a temporary detention for investigation' where
an officer detains a person to ask a moderate number of questions to determine his
identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions."
(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 180.)
Here, the totality of the circumstances show that Shay — along with the other
occupants of the truck — were merely being temporarily detained while Deputy Chassen
investigated the situation to determine whether anyone was engaged in unlawful activity.
Shay's movement was not physically restrained by handcuffs or confinement. Instead,
7
Shay, along with the occupants of the truck, had been told to stay in place, with their
hands visible, for officer safety reasons, while the officers investigated the situation.
There is no indication that Deputy Chassen or any of the other officers were aggressive,
confrontational, or accusatory, or that they pressured Shay. Significantly too, the length
of the detention was not great, lasting only long enough for the officers to investigate the
situation, and it occurred in a public place, not in a confined space.
Most importantly, we find no indication that a reasonable person in Shay's position
would believe, prior to being questioned, that he was being placed under arrest rather
than being subjected to preliminary investigative questions so that the officers could
assess the situation. Only after Deputy Chassen questioned Shay were Headrick's
documents found in the cab of the truck, corresponding to Headrick's initials on the tools
in the truck bed. Those were the facts that led Deputy Chassen to suspect Shay of a
particular crime and place him under arrest. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that at
the time he questioned Shay, Deputy Chassen did not know that any particular crime had
been committed. We defer to that factual finding, which is supported by substantial
evidence. (Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 38.)
These circumstances, in totality, convince us that Shay was not in custody when
questioned about the ownership of the tools.
Shay contends that he believed he was being placed under arrest and was not free
to leave because he had admitted to being on parole and Deputy Chassen discovered
syringes on his person. However, we find no indication in the record that Shay was under
threat of arrest for possession of the syringes. Although possession of drug paraphernalia
8
is a crime (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1, subd. (a)), the statute creates a safe harbor for
the possession of syringes "solely for personal use of 30 or fewer hypodermic needles or
syringes if acquired from a physician, pharmacist, hypodermic needle and syringe
exchange program, or any other source that is authorized by law to provide sterile
syringes or hypodermic needles without a prescription." (Id., subd. (c).) The record
contains no evidence that Deputy Chassen believed that Shay's possession of the syringes
violated the law; the syringes contained no controlled substances; and there is no
indication of any signal by Deputy Chassen that he intended to take action against Shay
for possession of the syringes. Significantly, Deputy Chassen stated at the suppression
hearing that he did not take note of where the syringes were found on Shay's person
because "it wasn't a crime."
Shay contends that this case is like Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 26, which
concluded that the defendant, a parolee, was in custody within the meaning of Miranda,
after police officers discovered syringes when searching him after a traffic collision.
However, Bejasa is not persuasive here because the facts are significantly different. In
Bejasa, a search of the defendant revealed two syringes, one of which contained
methamphetamine, and the defendant admitted he used the syringe to " 'shoot up
methamphetamine.' " (Id. at p. 33.) The defendant was handcuffed, placed in the back of
a police car and told he was being detained for a possible parole violation. (Ibid.) Bejasa
explained that "a reasonable person in defendant's position would know that possession
of methamphetamine and related paraphernalia is a parole violation and a crime, and that
9
arrest would likely follow." (Id. at p. 37.) Here, in contrast, no drugs were present, and
there was no indication that Deputy Chassen had noted any parole violation.
Even more important, Bejasa commented that even if the presence of the syringe
filled with methamphetamine was not enough to create a custodial situation, the
defendant was clearly put into custody when he was handcuffed and placed in the police
car. (Bejasa, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 37-38.) In contrast, here, Deputy Chassen
did not restrict Shay's movement after finding the syringes.
Accordingly, although there is a superficial similarity between this case and
Bejasa because the defendants in both cases were on parole and possessed syringes, the
additional factors in Bejasa that created a custodial situation are not present here.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there was no
" ' " ' "restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal
arrest.' " ' " (Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1400.) At the point Shay was questioned,
Deputy Chassen had only temporarily detained him to investigate the situation and did
not suspect any specific crime had been committed. Accordingly, Shay was not in
custody, and the trial court properly determined that Miranda did not apply.2
2 Because we determine that Shay was not in custody, we need not and do not determine whether Deputy Chassen's questions constituted interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. 10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCDONALD, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
11
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his temporary investigative detention, as the officer had not yet identified a specific crime and the defendant's freedom of movement was not restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress statements made during a police detention without Miranda warnings.
Whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time of the questioning.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“'Absent "custodial interrogation," Miranda simply does not come into play.'”
“The essential inquiry is whether, based on the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, " 'a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave.' "”
“These circumstances, in totality, convince us that Shay was not in custody when questioned about the ownership of the tools.”