California Court of Appeal Mar 26, 2014 No. E059563Unpublished
Filed 3/26/14 In re J.S. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E059563
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ120269)
v. OPINION
A.R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Tamara L. Wagner,
“After the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care,
custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point
‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in
fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of
the child. [Citation.]” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317, quoting In re
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Still, it is at this very point that “[s]ection 388
plays a critical role in the dependency scheme. Even after family reunification services
are terminated and the focus has shifted from returning the child to his parent’s custody,
section 388 serves as an ‘escape mechanism’ to ensure that new evidence may be
considered before the actual, final termination of parental rights.” (In re Hunter S. (2006)
142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1506; In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528.)
Here, the court’s conclusion that Mother failed to establish changed circumstances
was within the range of the court’s discretion. The primary problem that led to the
decisions to remove J.S. from the maternal grandmother and recommend the termination
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of services was the discovery that, contrary to Mother’s and the maternal grandmother’s
assurances, the father had been in contact with Mother, the maternal grandmother, and
J.S. The problem was more than a matter of dishonesty or the lack of forthrightness in
dealing with DPSS, but that Mother’s willingness to let the father have contact with J.S.
put the child at risk of harm and indicated Mother’s failure to recognize that risk.
There is nothing in the record to indicate how the substance abuse and parenting
courses that Mother refers to as evidence of her changed circumstances addressed these
problems. Indeed, most or all of these courses had already been completed by the time
Mother’s and the maternal grandmother’s deception had come to light in late March
2013. DPSS could thus reasonably conclude that although Mother was compliant with
her case plan and participating in services, she had failed to benefit from the services.
For the same reasons, the court acted within its discretion in finding there was no change
of circumstances within the meaning of section 388.
The court’s determination that the requested change would not be in J.S.’s best
interest is also well within its discretion. In light of Mother’s misrepresentations about
her relationship with the father, the court could reasonably believe that Mother would
continue her relationship with the father, thus placing J.S. at the risk of harm that gave
rise to this proceeding from the outset. Granting Mother’s request would also result in
taking J.S. away from his three older siblings and prospective adoptive parents with
whom he has developed strong bonds.
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We conclude, therefore, that the court did not err in denying Mother’s section 388
petition.
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
KING J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's section 388 petition because she failed to demonstrate changed circumstances or that modifying the order would be in the child's best interest.
Issues
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion in denying the mother's section 388 petition to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and reinstate reunification services?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The decision to grant or deny the petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its denial of the petition will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown.”
“the court acted within its discretion in finding there was no change of circumstances within the meaning of section 388.”
“The court’s determination that the requested change would not be in J.S.’s best interest is also well within its discretion.”