California Court of Appeal Mar 13, 2014 No. D064350MPublished
Filed 3/13/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064350
Petitioner, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. CR110487) v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORDER MODIFYING OPINION SAN DIEGO COUNTY, [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] Respondent;
MANUEL FLORES,
Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on February 21, 2014, be modified as follows:
1. On page 9 of the opinion, the second full paragraph should be deleted and replaced with the following:
Here, Flores cannot show that he is similarly situated to offenders sentenced to LWOP because his sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP. As previously noted, after the enactment of section 3051 (SB 260), Flores has " 'some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on maturity and rehabilitation.' " (People v. Martin (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 98, 105 [finding that a sentence of 45 years plus two consecutive life terms was not the functional equivalent of LWOP because newly enacted section 3051 provided him a meaningful opportunity for parole].) Thus, Flores is
not similarly situated to offenders with LWOP sentences and his equal protection argument fails.
youth offender parole hearing to consider release shall provide a meaningful opportunity
to obtain release" and any psychological assessments utilized by the board in making its
parole determination must "take into consideration the diminished culpability of juveniles
as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth
and increased maturity of the individual." (§ 3051, subds. (e), (f)(1).)
Despite the enactment of SB 260, Flores argues that the Legislature responded to
Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th 262 through SB 9 and intended to treat de facto LWOP
sentences the same as technical LWOP sentences. The language and legislative history
of section 1170(d)(2) do not support Flores's contention.
The plain language of section 1170(d)(2) provides that it applies to juvenile
offenders "sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole." (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(2)(A)(i), italics added.) There is nothing in the language that indicates the
Legislature intended for the statute to also apply to sentences that may be the functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. Had the Legislature intended that
effect, we presume it would have expressly stated so. It is not "the province of this court
to rewrite the statute to imply an intent left unexpressed by the Legislature. . . . The
courts may not speculate that the legislature meant something other than what it said.
Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein."
(People v. Burgio (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 769, 778.)
Even if we conclude that the language of the statute is susceptible to more than
one reasonable construction, its legislative history does not support Flores's argument that
the legislature responded to our high court's decision in Caballero with SB 9. SB 9 was
introduced in December 2010, which was nearly two years before the Caballero decision.
The bill went through multiple revisions with the last amendment on July 2, 2012, which
was more than a month before Caballero. The Senate passed SB 9 four days after the
decision in Caballero; however, there is no indication that they or the governor
responded to the Caballero decision.
Further, the history of SB 9 shows the Legislature knew that in certain instances,
courts found long-term sentences for juvenile offenders constituted de facto LWOP
sentences. For example, in the analysis by the Assembly Committee on Public Safety,
the author referenced a case in which the court found a juvenile's sentence was cruel and
unusual punishment because it was a "de facto LWOP" sentence in that it did not provide
a meaningful opportunity for release during the offender's lifetime. (Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 9 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 27,
2011, p. 10.) Despite its recognition of "de facto LWOP" sentences, the Legislature did
not include such language in SB 9.
The legislative history of recently enacted SB 260 further supports the conclusion
that the Legislature did not intend for section 1170(d)(2) (the subject of SB 9) to apply to
long term sentences that are not technically LWOP. As stated in the analysis by the
Assembly Committee on Appropriations, "[c]urrent law [(section 1170(d)(2))] allows an
inmate who was under 18 at the time of an offense that resulted in a term of life-without-
the-possibility-of parole (LWOP) (first-degree murder) to petition the court for
resentencing after 15 years. [SB 260] addresses the situation, the subject of People v[.]
Caballero, in which a youth is sentenced to life-with-the-possibility of parole, which may
serve as a de facto life sentence." (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 260 (2012-2013 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 12, 2013, p. 2.) Accordingly, SB 260
filled the gap left after SB 9 and addressed Caballero.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude section 1170(d)(2) does not apply to
offenders sentenced to long-term indeterminate sentences that are not technically LWOP.
Rather, section 3051 applies to those offenders, including Flores. Thus, the trial court
erred in granting Flores's petition under section 1170(d)(2).
II. Equal Protection
Flores argues that interpreting section 1170(d)(2) to apply only to offenders with
technical LWOP sentences violates his right to equal protection because with a de facto
LWOP sentence, he is similarly situated. We reject this argument.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A
similar requirement appears in the California Constitution, article I, section 7.
" ' " 'The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause
is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly
situated groups in an unequal manner.' [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether
persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but 'whether they are similarly situated for
purposes of the law challenged.' " ' " (People v. Jeha (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1063,
1073, quoting People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1218-1219.)
Here, Flores cannot show that he is similarly situated to offenders sentenced to
LWOP because his sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP. As previously
noted, after the enactment of section 3051 (SB 260), Flores has " 'some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on maturity and rehabilitation.' " (People v. Martin
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 98, 105 [finding that a sentence of 45 years plus two consecutive
life terms was not the functional equivalent of LWOP because newly enacted section
3051 provided him a meaningful opportunity for parole]; In re Alatriste (2013) 220
Cal.App.4th 1232, 1240 [finding that sentences of 77 years to life and 55 years to life did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the sentences were not the
functional equivalent of LWOP where the Legislature subsequently enacted section 3051,
providing defendants a meaningful opportunity to obtain release on parole].) Thus,
Flores is not similarly situated to offenders with LWOP sentences and his equal
protection argument fails.
DISPOSITION
Let a writ issue directing the superior court to vacate its order recalling Flores's
sentence under section 1170(d)(2) and setting a resentencing hearing. The trial court is
directed to enter a new order dismissing Flores's petition for recall and resentencing. The
stay issued by this court on August 8, 2013 is vacated.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Penal Code section 1170(d)(2) does not apply to juvenile offenders serving long-term sentences that are not technically life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and this interpretation does not violate equal protection because such offenders have a meaningful opportunity for parole under Penal Code section 3051.
Issues
Does Penal Code section 1170(d)(2) apply to juvenile offenders serving long-term sentences that are not technically life without parole?
Does the exclusion of non-LWOP juvenile offenders from section 1170(d)(2) relief violate equal protection?
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“we conclude section 1170(d)(2) does not apply to offenders sentenced to long-term indeterminate sentences that are not technically LWOP.”
“Flores cannot show that he is similarly situated to offenders sentenced to LWOP because his sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.”
“Thus, Flores is not similarly situated to offenders with LWOP sentences and his equal protection argument fails.”