California Court of Appeal Mar 11, 2014 No. D064556Unpublished
Filed 3/11/14 P. v. Reed CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D064556
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CR40656)
LE SON REED,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter L.
Gallagher, Judge. Affirmed.
Leonard Jay Klaif, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Le Son Reed pled guilty to one count of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)1 and
admitted a firearm enhancement allegation (§ 12022.5.) More than 30 years later, in
2013, Reed filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, seeking to vacate his 1977 plea.
In his petition, Reed contended that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court
and his counsel had not informed him that he had the right to appeal from the judgment
two counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (§ 10851) (counts 5 and 6). With
respect to count 2, the People alleged that Reed was armed with, and used, a firearm
during the commission of the robbery (§ 12022.5).
On September 20, 1977, Reed executed a "Change of Plea" form on which he
indicated both that he understood the nature of the charges against him and that his
attorney had discussed the nature of the charges against him and the possible defenses to
the charges. A minute order of that same date indicates that the trial court held a hearing
at which Reed was "sworn [and] examined," the trial court "advised [Reed of his] rights,"
and Reed "waived [the] same." The minute order further states that Reed pled guilty to
count 2 and that, upon the People's motion, the trial court dismissed the remainder of the
counts.
In January 1978, the trial court committed Reed to the California Youth Authority.
In its order, the trial court indicated that the maximum term of imprisonment to which
Reed could have been sentenced was six years.
In June 2013, Reed filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, seeking to vacate
the 1977 plea. In July 2013, the trial court issued an order denying the petition.
Reed appeals from the order denying his petition.
3
III.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and
proceedings in the trial court. Counsel presented no argument for reversal but invited this
court to review the record for error in accordance with Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.
Pursuant to Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, counsel identified the following as possible, but
not arguable, issues:
"Was the decision, dated July 8, 2013, denying appellant relief without an evidentiary hearing, an abuse of discretion and/or did said decision deny appellant his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
"Is the proffered reason for the delay[2] in challenging the guilty plea sufficient to overcoming the doctrine of laches?"
After this court received counsel's brief, we gave Reed an opportunity to file a
supplemental brief. Reed filed a supplemental brief in which he argued that the trial
court erred in denying his petition because at the hearing in 1977 during which Reed
entered a guilty plea, the trial court did not ascertain that Reed understood the elements of
the offense to which he was pleading guilty. This claim fails for several reasons,
including that the record does not contain a transcript of the plea colloquy. Thus, even
assuming that Reed is correct that the trial court was required to determine that he
understood the elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty, without a
2 In his petition, Reed sought to justify the delay in filing the petition on the ground that he had been unaware that the 1977 conviction could serve as the basis for enhancing a subsequent conviction. 4
transcript of the guilty plea, we have no way of determining whether the trial court made
such a determination. "A petition for writ of coram nobis places the burden of proof to
overcome the strong presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment on the
petitioner. This burden requires the production of strong and convincing evidence. A
mere naked allegation that a constitutional right has been invaded will not suffice."
(People v. Stapleton (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 512, 513.) Accordingly, Reed is not entitled
to reversal of the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of coram nobis on this ground.
In addition, Reed has failed to provide an adequate explanation for why it was reasonable
for him to wait more than 30 years after his conviction to file this petition.
A review of the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders,
supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the issues suggested by counsel and by Reed, has
disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issue. Reed has been adequately represented
by counsel on this appeal.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for writ of error coram nobis is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
5
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's petition for writ of error coram nobis, finding no reasonably arguable appellate issues and noting the defendant's failure to meet his burden of proof or justify his 30-year delay.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion or deny due process by denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing?
Is the defendant's explanation for the 30-year delay in challenging his guilty plea sufficient to overcome the doctrine of laches?
Did the trial court err in 1977 by failing to ascertain that the defendant understood the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A petition for writ of coram nobis places the burden of proof to overcome the strong presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment on the petitioner. This burden requires the production of strong and convincing evidence.”