California Court of Appeal Mar 10, 2014 No. E058663Unpublished
Filed 3/10/14 In re C.D. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re C.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, E058663 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J248576) v. OPINION C.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill
and Barbara A. Buchholz, Judges. Affirmed.
Paul J. Katz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Parag
Agrawal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
The juvenile court found true an allegation that C.D. (minor) possessed, received,
or concealed a stolen vehicle in violation of Penal Code1 section 496d, subdivision (a),
found C.D. to be a minor within the meaning of Welfare of Institutions Code section 602,
and placed her on probation in the custody of her mother. In this timely appeal, minor
contends the record does not contain substantial evidence that she exercised dominion
and control over the stolen vehicle so she may not be found to have unlawfully possessed
or received it. Because the People presented substantial evidence that minor knew the
vehicle was stolen and aided and abetted in concealing it, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
The owner of a 1999 Silver Honda, with distinctive red stickers on the rear side
windows, parked the vehicle in a store parking lot in Santa Ana and locked the doors.
When she returned to the parking lot some seven hours later, the vehicle was gone. The
owner reported the vehicle stolen the next morning.
An officer with the Montclair Police Department was patrolling the parking lot of
the Galleria Motel around 12:34 a.m., when he saw minor standing next to the door of
room 20. The officer knew minor from numerous contacts he had with her on the 4800
block of Evart Street, where minor lived. The officer testified that is the same street
where the motel was located, and where the police had previously discovered an
automotive “chop shop” and numerous stolen vehicles. In the past, the officer had
responded to the motel on drug related calls and calls about stolen vehicles, and he had
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
spoken to “quite a few people” in room 20. The officer pulled up to the motel and said to
minor, “What’s up?” Minor told the officer he should go investigate “a weird lady” who
was in the street. The officer noticed that minor’s demeanor was unusual, and she
appeared to be “[r]eal nervous, trying to get [the officer] out of there; trying to steer [him]
away.” Minor also told the officer that she was waiting for a friend who lived at the
motel.
The officer said goodbye to minor and drove off into the parking lot when he saw
a vehicle parked in the far north corner of the lot, where stolen vehicles had been found
before. A male suspect was walking away from the parked vehicle, but he turned around
and started walking back to the vehicle when he saw the officer approaching. The officer
noticed that the parked vehicle was a Silver Honda Civic with a “distinct” red sticker on
it, and he recognized it as a vehicle he had seen parked in front of minor’s residence the
day before. He then got out of his patrol vehicle and walked over to investigate. He told
the male suspect to sit on the ground.
The officer asked the male suspect about the owner of the Honda. The male
suspect said it belonged to his friend and that he had picked it up the day before and had
been driving it around. The male suspect denied having parked the vehicle in front of
minor’s residence. The officer asked permission to search the vehicle, and saw that its
stereo and speakers were missing. The officer found two purses and an “Elmo” backpack
in the passenger compartment, and also found wood blocks and what appeared to be
speaker cables in the trunk. Under the front left tire, the officer saw a jack and tire iron,
3
and the officer noticed that the male suspect’s hands were oily like he had been touching
tires. Based on these observations, the officer concluded the vehicle was probably stolen.
As the officer was speaking to the male suspect, minor walked over to the officer.
She confirmed that the purses and backpack found in the vehicle were hers. When the
officer asked minor what he would find in the backpack, minor told him there was a
flannel shirt inside. The officer searched the backpack and found a flannel shirt and
registration papers for another vehicle. The officer then placed both the male suspect and
minor under arrest.
In his patrol vehicle on the way to juvenile hall, the officer advised minor of her
Miranda2 rights, which she waived. Minor told the officer that the male suspect picked
her up at her house, and they drove to San Dimas. She said that on the drive from San
Dimas to the motel, the male suspect thought he saw a police vehicle. He asked minor if
she had seen the “cop.” Minor then asked the male suspect if the vehicle was stolen.
Minor said the male suspect told her the vehicle was stolen, but then minor recanted and
said that he told her he merely came upon the vehicle. Minor told the officer she made
up the story about the “weird” lady because she was scared. Minor also told the officer
that her friend parked the vehicle in the far corner of the parking lot so he could remove
the wheels and tires and “make some money.”
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
4
The officer never observed minor drive the vehicle or see her inside of it. He did
not find a key or burglar’s tools on her person, nor did he observe that minor had oily or
greasy hands. Minor did not admit to stealing the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
As she did in the juvenile court, minor contends she may not be found to have
violated section 496d, subdivision (a), because she did not exercise control or dominion
over the vehicle. Minor argues that, at most, the People proved that she knew the vehicle
was stolen, but at the first available opportunity she got out of the vehicle and exercised
no control over it whatsoever. Regardless of whether the People did or did not establish
that minor had control or dominion over the vehicle, the record contains substantial
evidence that minor knew it was stolen and aided and abetted in concealing it from the
officer.
“Our review of [a minor’s] substantial evidence claim is governed by the same
standard applicable to adult criminal cases. [Citation.] ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘“[O]ur role
on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence rule, we must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
5
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1020, 1026.)
Section 496d, subdivision (a), provides that “[e]very person who buys or receives
any motor vehicle . . . that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner
constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or who
conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any motor
vehicle, trailer, special construction equipment, or vessel from the owner, knowing the
property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for 16 months or two or three years or a fine of not more
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, or by imprisonment in a county jail not to
exceed one year or a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.”
(Italics added.)
As demonstrated by our italics, a person violates section 496d not only by
knowingly receiving and concealing a stolen vehicle, but also by knowingly aiding and
abetting another to conceal a stolen vehicle. Minor does not dispute that she knew or had
good reason to believe that the vehicle was stolen. The male suspect told her the vehicle
was stolen on their drive from San Dimas to the motel and, later, told her that he intended
to remove the wheels and tires from the vehicle to “make some money.” When the
officer pulled up to the motel and spoke to minor, he could tell that she was nervous and
seemed to be trying to get rid of him or steer him away from the area. She then
concocted the story of a “weird” lady being in the street and told the officer to go
6
investigate it. After being placed under arrest, minor admitted that she made the story up
because she was “scared,” but she continued to try and steer the officer from the truth by
recanting what she had said about the male suspect telling her the vehicle was stolen.
Instead, minor told the officer the male suspect said he merely came upon the vehicle.
From this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that minor knew the vehicle was stolen before the officer arrived on the
scene, and that she assisted the male suspect in concealing the vehicle’s presence in the
parking lot by making up the ruse about a strange lady in the street and telling the officer
that he should go investigate her. Because the record contains substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that minor violated section 496d, subdivision (a), we
must affirm the judgment.
During oral argument before this court, minor argued that the crime of concealing
a stolen vehicle contains the same element of possession as does the crime of receiving a
stolen vehicle, and that, because the record does not contain substantial evidence that
minor had dominion and control over the vehicle, she cannot be found to have committed
either crime. The crime of concealing stolen property “consists of the act of intentionally
secreting stolen property in violation of the affirmative duty to return it—or at least to
disclose its whereabouts—to its rightful owner.” (Williams v. Superior Court (1978) 81
Cal.App.3d 330, 343-344 (Williams); see also People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
7
579, 595 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] (Grant).)3 Although the crimes of receiving and
concealing stolen property are separate crimes, for a direct perpetrator they have the same
essential elements, including possession. (Grant, at pp. 594-596; Williams, at pp. 343-
344.) In Grant and Williams, the evidence tended to show the defendants actually
possessed stolen property but the statute of limitations had run on the crime of receiving
stolen property. (Grant, at pp. 585-586, 594-595; Williams, at pp. 337-340, 343.)
Nonetheless, the courts held that the statute of limitations had not run on the continuing
crime of concealing stolen property. (Grant, at pp. 595-596; Williams, at pp. 343-344.)
Although there may or may not be substantial evidence in this case that minor had
dominion and control over the stolen vehicle, for purposes of proving that she directly
received and concealed a stolen vehicle, minor cites no authority for the proposition that
possession is an element of the crime of aiding and abetting another to conceal a stolen
vehicle over which the direct perpetrator has possession. “All persons involved in the
commission of a crime, whether acting directly or aiding and abetting, are principals in
the crime committed. [Citations.]” (People v. Ogg (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 173, 180.)
3 Like the cases cited by the parties, Williams and our decision in Grant addressed section 496, subdivision (a), the general statute criminalizing possession, receipt, or concealment of stolen property. (See Williams, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 344; Grant, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 594-596.) Because section 496d, subdivision (a), contains identical language to the general statute, we look to cases interpreting section 496 in the absence of authority interpreting the more specific statute addressing possession of stolen vehicles.
8
“An aider and abettor must ‘share the specific intent of the perpetrator.’ [Citation.] He
or she shares the specific intent of the perpetrator if he or she ‘knows the full extent of the
perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose
of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.’ [Citation.] It is not necessary
that the aider and abettor be prepared to commit the offense by his or her own act should
the perpetrator fail to do so nor that the aider and abettor seek to share the fruits of the
crime. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 180-181.)
There is no question that the male suspect had dominion and control over the
stolen vehicle and that he took steps to conceal it by parking it in the far corner of the
motel parking lot. Also, there is no dispute that minor knew the vehicle was stolen and
knew that the male suspect intended to remove the wheels and tires to sell them. By
deterring the officer through the story of the “weird” lady, a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that minor knew that the male suspect intended to conceal the stolen vehicle,
and also conclude that minor knowingly aided and abetted the male suspect to conceal the
presence of the stolen vehicle.
Finally, we disagree with minor’s suggestion in her reply brief that at most the
evidence establishes an attempt to conceal the vehicle as opposed to a completed
concealment in violation of section 496d. Minor relies on People v. Hill (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1078 (Hill), which addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction under section 135 for destroying or concealing evidence. (Id. at p. 1088.) Hill
was seen throwing a wad of paper into the street while being pursued by a police officer
9
on suspicion of passing counterfeit traveler’s checks. (Id. at p. 1082.) The police later
found the wad, which contained torn traveler’s checks. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal noted that “[t]he purpose of section 135 is to prevent the
obstruction of justice. [Citation.]” (Hill, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1089.) The court
rejected Hill’s argument that the word “conceal” in section 135, like “destroy,” “must
have the same effect as destruction—permanent unavailability . . . . The ordinary
meaning of ‘conceal,’ its context, and the purpose of the statute do not support this
assumption.” (Id. at p. 1090.) Instead, the court held “successful concealment of
evidence from a particular investigation is sufficient.” (Ibid.) “Obviously, to
permanently conceal evidence is a substantial obstruction of justice. To a lesser degree is
any act of concealment that interferes with, impedes, frustrates, or unnecessarily prolongs
a lawful search.” (Ibid.) “[W]here a thief does not interfere with, impede, frustrate, or
prolong a lawful investigation, for example, where a thief is interrupted while concealing
evidence or where the police watch him conceal it, he has not successfully hidden the
evidence or appreciably affected an investigation and thereby obstructed justice. He has
merely tried to do so.” (Ibid.) Because Hill threw out the torn travelers’ checks in plain
sight of the police, the Court of Appeal held he was not successful in hiding them or in
impeding the investigation into his passing counterfeit traveler’s checks and reversed his
conviction under section 135. (Id. at p. 1091.) “At most, abandoning [the torn checks] in
front of the police was an attempt to conceal them.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
10
We are not persuaded that the analysis from Hill is applicable here. The Court of
Appeal in Hill was careful to note that its interpretation of the word “conceal” (and of the
word “destroy”) in section 135 was informed by the context in which the Legislature used
it and by the purpose of the statute—to prevent the obstruction of justice. (Hill, supra, 58
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1089-1091.) Unlike section 135, concealment of a stolen vehicle in
violation of section 496d is not an obstruction of justice type of crime. The concealment
contemplated by section 496d includes concealment from the police, but is not limited to
it—secreting a stolen vehicle from its rightful owner is the true gravamen of the crime.
(Grant, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 595; Williams, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at pp. 343-344,
346.) There is substantial evidence in the record that minor acted in such a manner to aid
and abet the male suspect to conceal the existence of the stolen vehicle such that its true
owner could not have recovered it except for its discovery by the police.
In any event, even if we were to adopt Hill’s definition of “conceal” from section
135, we still would not reverse the judgment. Hill held that something less than making
an object permanently unavailable constitutes concealment. (Hill, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1090.) As long as the concealment “interferes with, impedes, frustrates, or
unnecessarily prolongs a lawful search” in an appreciable way, the crime is completed
and is not merely a failed attempt. (Ibid.) While minor is correct that the officer
discovered the stolen vehicle within moments of speaking to her, the juvenile court could
reasonably have concluded that minor’s ruse about the “weird” lady and her effort to
steer the officer away from the motel parking lot had some appreciable effect on the
progress of the officer’s investigation. Even if minor did not permanently deter the
11
officer from finding the stolen vehicle, aiding and abetting the male suspect to
temporarily conceal the stolen vehicle constituted sufficient concealment for purposes of
section 496d.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a minor may be convicted of violating Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a), by aiding and abetting the concealment of a stolen vehicle, even if the minor did not personally exercise dominion and control over the vehicle.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports a finding that a minor violated Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a), by aiding and abetting the concealment of a stolen vehicle.
Whether possession is a required element for an aider and abettor to be convicted of concealing a stolen vehicle under Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a).
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a person violates section 496d not only by knowingly receiving and concealing a stolen vehicle, but also by knowingly aiding and abetting another to conceal a stolen vehicle.”
“minor cites no authority for the proposition that possession is an element of the crime of aiding and abetting another to conceal a stolen vehicle over which the direct perpetrator has possession.”