court concluded Leslie’s delinquency adjudication as a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst.,
§ 602), commitment for 120 days to juvenile hall, and eventual release on supervised
probation did not suffice under the SIJ statute to identify her as a child in dependent,
committed, or custodial care. The juvenile court similarly found her delinquency status
disqualifying on an unrelated SIJ factual question — the viability of parental
reunification — and rejected Leslie’s claim she could not return to her abusive mother
and absent father. On a third SIJ factor, whether the minor’s best interests include
repatriation, the juvenile court again found Leslie’s delinquency status disqualifying.
Although Leslie had no one to return to in Mexico other than her abusive mother or her
father who abandoned her, the court based its best interests conclusion on its observation
that immigrant parents sometimes “send their children back to Mexico to get them out of
the negative environment that has placed them in the juvenile court.” In 1990, Congress enacted the SIJ statute to open a path for abused,
neglected, and abandoned undocumented minors to become lawful permanent residents.
(In re Y.M. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 892, 910.) “Rather than being deported along with
abusive or neglectful parents, or deported to parents who had abandoned them once in the
United States, such children may seek special status to remain in the United States.”
(Yeboah v. Department of Justice (3d Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 216, 221.) “SIJ status allows a
juvenile immigrant to remain in the United States and seek lawful permanent resident
2
status if federal authorities conclude that [certain] statutory conditions are met.” (In re
Interest of Erick M. (Neb. Supreme Ct. 2012) 820 N.W.2d 639, 641.) A minor who
obtains SIJ status may apply after five years to become a naturalized citizen. (Zheng v.
Pogash (S.D. Texas 2006) 416 F.Supp.2d 550, 554 [citing federal SIJ status petition
guidelines].)
As we explain, the juvenile court’s policy conclusions about the general
unsuitability of juvenile wards for potential immigration status adjustments were
misplaced under the SIJ statute. The statute commits to a juvenile court only the limited,
factfinding role of identifying abused, neglected, or abandoned alien children under its
jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned to their home country.
The evidence does not support the juvenile court’s conclusions on these questions. To
the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly supports Leslie’s request for the necessary
findings to enable her to file her SIJ application with the appropriate federal authorities.
The juvenile court could not reasonably deny her request, and we therefore grant her writ
relief to vacate the juvenile court’s order and substitute a new and different order
sustaining the relevant SIJ factual findings.
I FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Garden Grove police officers arrested Leslie in April 2013 after she and
two teenage girlfriends attempted to steal two alcoholic beverages and some cigars from
a liquor store. The store clerk confronted the girls, who knocked him to the ground, and
assaulted him. In the ensuing melee outside the store, Leslie reportedly grabbed a shoe
from a neighboring store display and struck the clerk in the face. At her juvenile court
adjudication in May 2013, Leslie entered a plea admitting guilt to assault with force
3
likely to produce bodily injury and second degree commercial burglary, and the juvenile
court declared her a ward of the court and committed her to juvenile hall for 120 days,
with probation terms and supervision upon her release.
In July 2013, Leslie’s public defender objected on grounds of
confidentiality in juvenile proceedings to the release of any information concerning
Leslie to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials. When the
juvenile court overruled the objection, Leslie filed a request for the court to make the
findings necessary under section 1101(a)(27)(J) for her to apply to federal authorities for
SIJ status. The court scheduled a hearing in August 2013. Leslie and her grandmother,
Sonia V., with whom Leslie lived in Orange County for the last 10 years, submitted
declarations and testified.
Grandmother explained Leslie first lived with her as an infant when her
mother brought her to the United States when she was nine months old. Mother was
unemployed, irresponsible, and a heavy drinker who did not care for Leslie properly. She
left Leslie home alone without feeding her, and Leslie’s father was largely absent, using
drugs and carousing all night. Leslie returned to Mexico when she was about four or five
years old. Grandmother received disturbing telephone calls from Leslie that mother continued drinking, leaving her alone at night, sometimes tied to a chair, and that mother
hit Leslie often. Leslie begged for her grandmother to rescue her. When Leslie was
seven years old, mother returned Leslie to grandmother’s care because grandmother
threatened to stop sending money to mother. Upon Leslie’s return, grandmother
immediately noticed Leslie’s gaunt, malnourished features. She was no longer happy or
energetic, and she suffered nightmares, ate little, cried easily, and was afraid to leave
grandmother’s side.
4
Leslie testified she did not hear from her mother again after mother
deposited her at grandmother’s home. Mother never sent any money for her care, nor
attempted to communicate with her in any form. In Mexico, mother had abused and
neglected her, punching her, slapping her, and hitting her with cables. Mother sometimes
terrorized her by striking her with scalding metal spoons, which she boiled to inflict
greater pain. Mother was an alcoholic and a drug addict, and Leslie frequently saw her
smoke out of a can. Mother gave Leslie alcohol to make her stop crying, frequently left
Leslie alone in the apartment at night, and left her with strangers for weeks at a time.
Leslie only recalled meeting her father once, when she was about five years
old, and she never lived with him in Mexico or the United States. He never attempted to
contact her or send money for her care, and Leslie believed he was incarcerated
somewhere in Mexico. Leslie’s older brother had lived with grandmother temporarily,
but was deported following his arrest for domestic violence and violation of his bail
conditions. He made no effort to contact Leslie or send money for her care, and neither
Leslie nor grandmother knew his whereabouts.
At the August hearing on Leslie’s petition for SIJ findings, the juvenile
court reiterated, “She broke the law. She is in custody because she broke the law.” The court concluded that if it found Leslie met the factual criteria under
section 1101(a)(27)(J) for federal officials to consider adjusting her immigration status,
“every time we have a minor detained in juvenile hall they then become eligible for this
statute. And that cannot be the law. If that were the law then every minor who is here
illegally would have an incentive to commit a crime so they go into custody and then they
can state ‘I am now a dependent’ or ‘I am now dependent upon the juvenile court.’”
5
Leslie’s attorney objected that other criteria had to be met, pointing out SIJ
applicants must present evidence they were abused, neglected, or abandoned and cannot
safely reunify with their parents. Another factor requires evidence repatriation would not
be in the child’s best interest. The attorney also expressed confidence federal authorities
could weed out applications submitted with improper “motivation . . . to create
[immigration] eligibility,” and she observed, “no ethical immigration attorney could file a
case with [the] immigration service if the whole purpose . . . was to make someone
eligible for immigration benefits.” The juvenile court, however, was not persuaded,
labeling potential SIJ eligibility for a juvenile ward “an absurd result, . . . inconsistent
with Congress’ intent . . . .”
The juvenile court similarly rejected Leslie’s other requested SIJ findings.
“The second criter[ion], whether or not reunification is viable or not, I am not prepared to
make a finding that reunification is not viable. I don’t believe I have sufficient credible
evidence to make a determination in regards to that particular fact. I have got the
testimony of Leslie, who has admitted three theft allegations, one of them a felony. I
don’t place a lot of weight on her credibility, quite frankly. I am not prepared to find that
reunification is not viable.” The court did not address grandmother’s testimony and made no finding she was not credible.
The juvenile court continued: “The third criter[ion is] whether or not it
would be in her best interest to return to the country of her nationality. She has been in
the United States for some period of time. She has not gone to school. . . . She has
suffered a juvenile conviction for what would constitute a serious or violent felony. [¶]
If she continues with the same type of behavior that she has engaged in the last year, year
and a half, she is going to find herself in state prison. . . . [¶] I am hard-pressed to find
6
that staying in the United States would further serve her interests. If she were attending
school, if she was leading a law abiding productive life, if she was taking advantage of
the opportunities that she has, it would be a lot easier to make a finding that returning her
to Mexico would be contrary to her welfare. [A]nd not in her best interest.”
The court concluded: “Frankly, at this point I think going back to Mexico
would be in her best interest because the path that she is on right now is one that is going
to lead to self-destruction. It has been this court’s experience that on a number of
occasions parents who have minors who have encountered difficulty with the law, who
have roots in Mexico, send their children back to Mexico to get them out of the negative
environment that has placed them in the juvenile court. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] So taking into
consideration all three of these criteria, I am declining to make the findings requested by
the moving party.”
Leslie now files this writ petition to overturn the juvenile court order
denying her requested SIJ findings. The district attorney filed an informal letter in which
he declined to file a traverse because the People do not oppose Leslie’s requested relief.
II
DISCUSSION Leslie contends the juvenile court erred in failing to find she met the factual
requirements for SIJ classification under federal law. We review a trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998)
68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632), and the applicable law de novo. (Eddie E. v. Superior Court
(2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 622 (Eddie E.) “In construing a federal statute, ‘“we look first to
the plain language of the statue, construing the provisions of the entire law, including its
object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress.”’” (Shirey v. Los Angeles County
7
Civil Service Com. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) “If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter . . . .” (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (Chevron).)
“While the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
immigration [citations], state juvenile courts play an important and indispensable role in
the SIJ application process.” (In re Mario S. (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 2012) 954 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849
(Mario S.).) Under section 1101(a)(27)(J) and its implementing regulations codified at
8 Code of Federal Regulations part 204.11, “state juvenile courts are charged with
making a preliminary determination of the child’s dependency and his or her best
interests, which is a prerequisite to an application to adjust status as a special immigrant
juvenile. ‘The SIJ statute affirms the institutional competence of state courts as the
appropriate forum for child welfare determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or
abandonment, and a child’s best interests’ [citations].” (Mario S., at p. 849.)
Federal regulations currently provide that an alien child subject to
deportation is eligible to apply for reclassification by the United States Customs and
Immigration Services (USCIS), the federal agency charged with enforcing immigration
laws, as a “special immigrant” instead of an alien if a state juvenile court first makes certain findings. Those findings include that the child: “(1) Is under twenty-one years of
age; [¶] (2) Is unmarried; [¶] (3) Has been declared dependent upon a juvenile court
located in the United States in accordance with state law governing such declarations of
dependency, while the alien was in the United States and under the jurisdiction of the
court; [¶] (4) Has been deemed eligible by the juvenile court for long-term foster care; [¶]
(5) Continues to be dependent upon the juvenile court and eligible for long-term foster
care, such declaration, dependency or eligibility not having been vacated, terminated, or
8
otherwise ended; and [¶] (6) Has been the subject of judicial proceedings or
administrative proceedings authorized or recognized by the juvenile court in which it has
been determined that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the
country of nationality or last habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parent or
parents . . . .” (8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (2014).)
Apart from nonsubstantive changes in 2009 (see 74 Fed.Reg. 26937
(June 5, 2009)), these regulations were last updated in 1993 and therefore have not “kept
pace” with intervening Congressional amendments. (In re Minor Children of J.E. (N.J.
Super.Ct. 2013) 74 A.3d 1013, 1017, fn. 5 (Minor Children of J.E.).) “Accordingly,
those portions of the regulation that conflict with the current statute are no longer valid.”
(Ibid., citing Chevron, supra, 467 U.S. 837, 842-844 [agency regulations are generally
controlling unless contrary to statute].)
Under Congress’s latest amendment in 2008, for example, “‘the eligibility
requirements . . . hinge primarily on a reunification determination. The amendment
expanded eligibility to include juvenile immigrants whom a court has committed to or
placed in the custody of an individual or a state-appointed entity. . . . Finally, Congress
removed the requirement that a state juvenile court find that a juvenile is eligible for long-term foster care because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. Instead, a court must
find that reunification is not possible because of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.’
[Citation.]” (Mario S., supra, 954 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 848-849.)
Specifically, the SIJ statute now provides in pertinent part: “The term
‘special immigrant’ means—[¶] . . . [¶] (J) an immigrant who is present in the United
States—[¶] (i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an
9
agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or
juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the
immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis
found under State law; [¶] (ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or
judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the
alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence;
and [¶] (iii) in whose case the Secretary of Homeland Security consents to the grant of
special immigrant juvenile status, . . . [with certain inapplicable exceptions].” (8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J), italics added.)
Congress’s expansion of SIJ status eligibility beyond notions of
dependency restricted to long-term foster care or similar arrangements is reflected in
proposed regulation changes that specify: “The use of the term ‘dependency’ throughout
this proposed rule encompasses dependency, commitment, or custody as provided in
amended section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).” (76 Fed. Reg.
54980 (Sept. 6, 2011), italics added.) While the proposed regulations have not yet taken
effect, the statutory changes are themselves the best indicators of Congress’s intent. As
one court has explained, “As a result of the removal of the foster care requirement, state courts may now make SIJ [status] findings whenever jurisdiction can be exercised under
state law to make care and custody determinations, and are no longer confined to child
protection proceedings alone.” (Minor Children of J.E., supra, 74 A.3d at p. 1018.)
More precisely, as another panel of this court observed in Eddie E., under
the 2008 amendment to section 1101(a)(27)(J), “The first part of [subsection] (i) is
phrased in the disjunctive. [Citation.] Thus, a court must find either that an immigrant
has been (a) ‘declared dependent on a juvenile court’ or (b) ‘legally committed to, or
10
placed under the custody of’ a state agency or department or ‘an individual or entity
appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States.’ [Citation.] Once
either of those findings are made, the court must then ‘“ma[k]e two additional findings:
(1) that reunification with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law; and (2) that it
would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence.”’ [Citation.]” (Eddie E.,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627-628, original italics and bracket.)
In Eddie E., the juvenile court failed to reach the second and third SIJ
criteria concerning, respectively, the viability of reunification due to abuse and whether
the child’s best interests included returning to his or her home country. The juvenile
court did not consider these “‘two additional’” criteria under the mistaken impression the
first criterion in subsection (i) of section 1101(a)(27)(J) is met only by a dependency
determination under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, and not a delinquent
ward finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. We explained to the
contrary under the express terms of the SIJ statute that as “an alternative basis” to
dependency, an “alien in petitioner’s position may also demonstrate he had been ‘legally committed to, or placed in the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an
individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States.’
[Citation.]” (Eddie E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627-628, quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27(J)(i).) We therefore issued a writ of mandate for the juvenile court to
conduct a new hearing to “consider[] and mak[e] findings on this alternative basis” and
“on the remaining requested findings of fact necessary for SIJ status . . . .” (Eddie E.,
supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 628-629.)
11
Here, the juvenile court considered each of the SIJ criteria, but declined on
misplaced policy considerations to make the necessary factual findings, despite ample,
uncontroverted evidence supporting the findings. Specifically, the court concluded
Congress could not have intended juvenile wards may qualify for SIJ status because
Leslie “broke the law,” and “rewarding” her illegal conduct might motivate other
undocumented alien children to commit offenses to gain eligibility for SIJ status and
eventual nationalization.
The juvenile court erred. A state court’s role in the SIJ process is not to
determine worthy candidates for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or
abandoned alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be
safely returned in their best interests to their home country. As Mario S. aptly observed,
the SIJ statute and accompanying regulations “commit . . . specific and limited issues to
state juvenile courts. The juvenile court need not determine any other issues, such as
what the motivation of the juvenile in making application for the required findings might
be [citations]; whether allowing a particular child to remain in the United States might
someday pose some unknown threat to public safety [citation]; and whether the USCIS,
the federal administrative agency charged with enforcing the immigration laws, may or may not grant a particular application for adjustment of status as a SIJ.” (Mario S.,
supra, 954 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 852-853.)
Mario S. further explained that if “the USCIS denies a juvenile alien’s
application for legal permanent residence as a special immigrant juvenile,” the juvenile’s
remedy lies not in state court, but instead “to seek review of the agency’s decision in
federal court [citations].” (Id. at fn. 7.) State courts play no role in the final
determination of SIJ status or, ultimately, permanent residency or citizenship, which are
12
federal questions. Indeed, far from incentivizing illegal conduct as the juvenile court
speculated, an alien minor’s chance for a permanent home in the United States may
inspire his or her reform, but these are matters for immigration authorities to evaluate.
In sum, immigration policy considerations and their final adjudication in a
particular case are “beyond the scope of what a state juvenile court is required to decide
upon a motion for special findings which are a prerequisite to the filing of an application
to adjust the juvenile alien’s immigration status. Nothing in 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) or
the regulation[s] indicates that the Congress intended that state juvenile courts pre-screen
potential SIJ applications for possible abuse on behalf of the USCIS.” (Mario S., supra,
954 N.Y.S.2d at p. 853.) Rather, “[t]he juvenile court is simply called upon to
determine” discrete factual issues, including “whether, under state law, the juvenile is
under the age of 21, unmarried, dependent upon the court through an order of placement
or other court order, whether reunification with one or both of the juvenile’s parents is
not possible due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment of the child, and whether it would be
contrary to the juvenile's best interest to be returned to his or her previous country of
nationality.” (Id. at p. 852.)
In Mario S., the court determined a minor alien adjudicated a delinquent, placed in juvenile hall, and committed upon release to ongoing child welfare agency
supervision qualified under section 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) as a child in dependent, committed,
or custodial care. (Mario S., supra, 954 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 850-851.) The same is true here.
Leslie filed her petition for the juvenile court to make the requisite SIJ findings while in
juvenile custody, and she remained in custody through the hearing. She also remained
subject to continued juvenile court jurisdiction and supervision on probation terms upon
her eventual release.
13
Leslie argues that in addition to her ongoing commitment status, she
established the other factors comprising state court SIJ findings, and the juvenile court
erred in concluding otherwise. We agree. The juvenile court concluded it was “not
prepared to make a finding that reunification is not viable.” The court couched its
conclusion in terms of Leslie’s credibility, but the court made no such finding concerning
grandmother’s uncontradicted account of mother’s lifelong abuse and father’s
abandonment. The juvenile court’s misplaced policy conclusions may have improperly
colored its reunification finding. In any event, the facts overwhelmingly establish
Leslie’s reunification with one or both her parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect,
and abandonment.
Similarly, nothing in the record supported the juvenile court’s conclusion
that repatriation to Mexico was in Leslie’s best interests. The court based its finding on
anecdotal impressions, untethered to any evidence in this case, that parents of troubled
immigrant children may sometimes “send their children back to Mexico to get them of
out of the negative environment that has placed them in the juvenile court.” But the
juvenile court ignored that Leslie as an unaccompanied minor had no one to return to
safely in Mexico. Her father had abandoned her, her mother neglected her while an infant and abused her upon her return to Mexico, and her older brother had been deported
after violating bail terms following an arrest for domestic violence; he maintained no
contact with his sister, disappearing entirely from her life. By all accounts, Leslie’s
grandmother was her only refuge. On this record, the juvenile court could not reasonably
conclude it was in Leslie’s best interests to be sent back to Mexico alone and with no one
to care for her.
14
III
DISPOSITION
Let a writ of mandate issue commanding respondent Superior Court of
Orange County to vacate its order of August 14, 2013, denying petitioner’s application
for SIJ status findings. The juvenile court is directed to enter a new and different order
sustaining as of August 14, 2013, the requisite state court findings to enable petitioner to
file her SIJ application with the appropriate federal authorities. Each party shall bear its
own costs of this writ proceeding.
___________________________ ARONSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
___________________________ RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
___________________________ FYBEL, J.
15
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court erred by denying a minor's request for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) findings based on irrelevant policy considerations regarding her delinquency status; the court is required to make the factual findings necessary for the minor to apply for federal SIJ status.
Issues
Whether a juvenile court may deny SIJ factual findings based on a minor's delinquency status or policy concerns regarding immigration incentives.
Whether the evidence supported the juvenile court's refusal to find that reunification with parents was not viable and that repatriation was not in the minor's best interest.
Disposition. Petition granted.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The statute commits to a juvenile court only the limited, factfinding role of identifying abused, neglected, or abandoned alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent or be safely returned to their home country.”
“Nothing in 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) or the regulation[s] indicates that the Congress intended that state juvenile courts pre-screen potential SIJ applications for possible abuse on behalf of the USCIS.”