In re Daniel G. CA2/2

Filed 2/28/14 In re Daniel G. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re DANIEL G., a Person Coming Under B248630 the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TJ20187)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Tamara E. Hall, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________

The Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that appellant Daniel G. committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211. After a contested adjudication, during which evidence was presented that appellant stole a bike from a 14-year-old boy, the juvenile court sustained the petition, found count 1 true, and declared it a felony. The maximum term of confinement was set at five years. On March 18, 2013, appellant was sentenced to home on probation, with various specified conditions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, arguing that his probation conditions numbers 4 and 14, are unconstitutional. Condition number 4 is constitutional. That said, we agree with the parties that condition number 14 should be amended to add a knowledge requirement. DISCUSSION I. Standard of review Trial courts have broad discretion to devise appropriate conditions of probation, “so long as they are intended to promote the ‘reformation and rehabilitation’ of the probationer.” (In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 188; Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) “In cases involving juvenile offenders, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) provides that when a minor who is adjudged a ward of the court ‘is placed under the supervision of the probation officer . . . , the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward . . . . The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’” (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1142.) “[Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. [Citation.] ‘[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.’” (In re Shaun R., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1142.)