Pantoja v. Brent CA1/4

Filed 2/25/14 Pantoja v. Brent CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JULIO PANTOJA, Plaintiff and Respondent, A137291 v. DANIEL BRENT et al., (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV506012) Defendant and Appellant.

Following a court trial, Daniel Brent, individually and doing business as Brent Landscaping (Brent), appeals a judgment finding him liable for failing to pay overtime to his employee Julio Pantoja. Brent contends the trial court erred in its interpretation of California Labor Code section 510, subdivision (b) (hereafter Labor Code section 510(b)), dealing with compensation for commute time, and that the federal Portal- to-Portal Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. §§ 251, 254(a)) modifies the California Labor Code to exempt employee travel time. We affirm. I. EVIDENCE AT TRIAL For approximately four years, Julio Pantoja worked as a landscaper for Brent. According to Pantoja, he routinely worked in excess of forty hours a week, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. or later, but was rarely paid overtime for work that exceeded eight hours. At trial, Brent conceded his failure to pay overtime on at least four occasions, but maintained that Pantoja’s actual hours worked were typically forty hours or less each week.

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Brent testified that Pantoja drove a company-owned truck and arrived at Brent’s home at 7:00 a.m. for a daily briefing. At the briefing, Brent gave him a list specifying the homes to visit and tasks to be completed. Pantoja then drove to a company storage area to pick up and load the requisite tools. Pantoja next proceeded to the first job on Brent’s list. After finishing work at the last house, Pantoja drove back to the storage area and unloaded the truck. Brent claimed that all of this commute time, approximately seventy-five to one hundred-twenty minutes daily, was non-compensable. II. DISCUSSION Brent claims Labor Code section 510(b) and the federal Portal-to-Portal Act are dispositive of his claims on appeal. His brief, however, provides us with no clear explanation for this conclusion. His argument appears to be that an employer who does not compel or control an employee’s travel is not required to compensate that time, deeming it “commute time.” Brent further argues that because he provided Pantoja with a company-owned vehicle, that all time Pantoja spent in that vehicle was beyond employer control and, thus, exempt from compensation as “commute time.” A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Questions of law regarding statutory interpretation, where the facts are not disputed, are reviewed de novo and the appellate court is free to draw its own conclusions independent of the trial court. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) For questions of fact, the appellate court must, “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review.” (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.) “When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (Urbano v. Market S. R. Co. (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 22, 23.) Where, as here, there is no statement of decision, we apply the doctrine of implied findings to all questions of fact. Under this doctrine, we presume the trial court made all necessary factual findings to support its decision. (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate