California Court of Appeal Feb 25, 2014 No. E057028Unpublished
Filed 2/25/14 P .v. Sammons CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E057028
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA1101851)
ALEXANDER DESHAWN SAMMONS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter Quon, Jr., and Linh
Lam, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted defendant Alexander Deshawn Sammons of five charges: three
counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211)—two arising out of the same
incident on December 6, 2011, and a third from December 11, 2011—as well as one
count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of burglary
(§ 459) related to the events of December 11, 2011. On appeal, defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence with respect to one of the two robbery convictions for the
December 6 incident, arguing there is no evidence that defendant intentionally directed
any force or fear-inducing conduct at one of two store employees. The trial court
sentenced defendant to a total of 18 years in state prison; the punishment for the
challenged robbery conviction is a concurrent six-year term. Defendant also requests that
we order the abstract of judgment to be corrected to reflect accurately the trial court’s
oral pronouncement of sentence.
There is substantial evidence to support defendant’s conviction on the challenged
robbery count, so the judgment will be affirmed. We will order that the abstract of
judgment be corrected to accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement of
sentence.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 6, 2011, the victim of the challenged robbery count (victim 1) was
working with the victim of the unchallenged robbery counts (victim 2) at a cell phone
sales store in Rialto, California. At approximately 3:30 p.m., defendant came into the
store. He had been in the store earlier in the day but left because victim 1 was then
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
working alone and busy with another customer. Now, no other customers were in the
store. Victim 1 assisted him; victim 2 was in the back of the store. Defendant requested
that victim 1 show him “the most expensive phones that you have.” Victim 1 then
demonstrated a phone model for defendant using an inoperative “dummy” phone. Victim
2 walked to the front of the store and observed victim 1’s conversation with defendant.
Defendant requested to purchase two of the phones, and the real phones were
brought out and placed on a shelf behind the store’s counter as victim 1 processed the
transaction. Victim 1 walked seven or eight feet away to the side of the store to process
defendant’s debit card for payment; meanwhile, victim 2 stood behind the counter by the
cash register, near where the phones had been placed. Defendant’s card was declined, as
was a second and third card provided by defendant. Defendant then told victim 1 he
would make a phone call to find out why the transaction did not go through.
After a short telephone conversation, defendant hung up his phone and approached
victim 2, who was still behind the counter by the cash register. He came around the
counter quickly and in an aggressive manner, causing victim 2 to back up. Victims 1 and
2 both testified that it looked like defendant was preparing to punch victim 2, balling up
his hands into fists and posturing with his body. Defendant cursed at victim 2,
demanding that she give him the phones. She acceded to the demand, allowing defendant
to take the phones and leave. While defendant approached victim 2, victim 1 remained a
few steps away, by the machine for processing debit transactions. Victim 1 saw what
defendant was doing, but did not act to try to stop him; she testified that she “froze up,”
and that she feared defendant might hurt her.
3
After the close of evidence, the trial court denied a motion for acquittal with
respect to the robbery count involving victim 1. After the jury’s verdict, the court denied
defendant’s motion for a new trial on that count.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the fear
element of the robbery offense as to victim 1. He does not dispute there is substantial
evidence supporting both of his convictions for robbery of victim 2. Robbery is “the
felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or
immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211, italics added.) Multiple robbery convictions for a single incident “are proper if
force or fear is applied to multiple victims in joint possession of the property taken.”
(People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal.4th 743, 750.) Proof of either force or fear is sufficient to
sustain the conviction; it is not necessary to prove both. (People v. James (1963) 218
Cal.App.2d 166, 170.)
“[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980)
26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “‘[U]nless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 963.) “We presume ‘“in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
4
evidence.’ [Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is
involved.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251.) Stated another
way, “[a]lthough the jury was instructed that if two reasonable inferences arise from
circumstantial evidence, it must accept the inference that points to innocence, on appeal
we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (People v.
Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 56, fn. 22.)
The element of fear is satisfied by evidence of conduct, words, or circumstances
reasonably calculated to produce sufficient fear to cause the victim to be deterred from
preventing the theft or attempting to immediately reclaim the property (See, e.g., People
v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.) The requisite fear includes fear of “unlawful
injury to the person or property of the person robbed . . .” or “an immediate and unlawful
injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the
time of the robbery.” (§ 212; People v. Brew (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 99, 103-104.) The
law does not require that force or fear-inducing actions be specifically and intentionally
directed at the victim, only that the taking be “accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211; see People v. Prieto (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 210, 211-216 [victim too “fearful and
shocked” to intervene in nearby struggle between perpetrator and second victim over
purses belonging to both victims].) Nor does the fear need to be the result of an express
threat. (Flynn, supra, at pp. 771-772.) “[I]t makes no difference whether the fear is
generated by the perpetrator’s specific words or actions designed to frighten, or by the
circumstances surrounding the taking itself.” (Id. at p. 772.)
5
Thus, as applied to this case, substantial evidence supports the conviction of
defendant for the robbery of victim 1 if testimony in the record that is neither physically
impossible nor inherently improbable, together with its reasonable implications, shows
that defendant’s words and actions, or the circumstances surrounding his taking of the
phones, produced the required fear.
Here, victim 1’s and victim 2’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence
supporting the conviction. As noted above, victim 1 testified that when she observed
defendant’s aggressive actions toward victim 2, she was standing only seven or eight feet
away, and that she was afraid she might herself be hurt. Victim 1 also feared immediate
and unlawful injury to victim 2: she saw defendant rush behind the counter, toward
victim 2, with body language that seemed to indicate he was about to hit victim 2. The
two women were alone in the store when defendant began acting aggressively; there was
no one else to come to their aid or call police. Victim 1’s fear was sufficient to deter her
from preventing the theft or immediately reclaiming the property: she “froze up,” and
was unable to take any action. Victim 1’s testimony is neither physically impossible nor
inherently improbable. Additionally, victim 2’s testimony corroborates in all material
respects victim 1’s description of the circumstances and defendant’s words and conduct
that actually and reasonably gave rise to victim 1’s fear.
In short, in light of the entire record, there is substantial evidence—specifically,
the testimony of victim 1 and victim 2—supporting the fear element of defendant’s
conviction for robbery with respect to victim 1. The judgment will therefore be affirmed.
6
Defendant insists there is no substantial evidence that defendant intentionally directed
any force or fear-inducing conduct toward victim 1. We disagree. Defendant’s conduct
threatened injury to victim 2 most directly. But the jury could reasonably have concluded
that defendant’s threatening conduct toward victim 2 was also intended as a display to
deter victim 1 from interfering with his attempt to take the phones. Defendant had been
interacting directly with victim 1 only minutes before, and it is reasonable to infer he
remained well aware of her presence in the store, only a few steps away, even if he did
not look at or gesture towards her at the moment of the taking. (See Whalen, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 56, fn.22 [“on appeal we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment”].)
In any case, however, as noted, the law does not require that force or fear-inducing
conduct be intentionally directed at the victim, only that the taking be “accomplished by
means of force or fear.” (§ 211; see Prieto, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 211-216). Here,
there is strong evidence that the taking was accomplished by means of the fear actually
and reasonably caused by defendant’s words and conduct, which caused both victims to
submit to defendant’s demand for the phones. As such, defendant was properly
convicted of robbery not only with respect to victim 2, but also victim 1.
Defendant argues by reductio ad absurdum that Prieto and any other case
suggesting that force or fear-inducing conduct need not be intentionally directed at the
victim must be wrongly decided. He raises the specter of a defendant being held liable
for robbery of an employee that is never seen by the defendant, but who observes a theft
via surveillance camera or from a back room, and is placed in fear. This argument fails
7
because, among other things, it does not account for the statutory definition that robbery
is theft from the “person or immediate presence” of the victim. (§ 211.)
Regarding the second issue raised by defendant on appeal: The first page of the
abstract of judgment correctly reflects the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence,
indicating that the punishments for the assault and burglary convictions (counts 2 and 3)
were stayed pursuant to section 654. The minutes of the sentencing are also correct.
Handwritten notations on the second page of the abstract of judgment, however,
erroneously omit mention of the stays. The People concede that the abstract of judgment
should be corrected. We agree.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed, and the superior court is directed to transmit to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation an amended abstract of judgment corrected
on the second page in item 11 to state that the sentences on counts 2 and 3 are stayed
pursuant to section 654.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P.J. MCKINSTER J.
8
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a robbery conviction where the defendant's aggressive conduct toward one victim created fear in a second victim, thereby deterring her from preventing the theft. The court also ordered a correction to the abstract of judgment to accurately reflect the trial court's oral sentencing pronouncement.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the fear element of a robbery conviction regarding a victim who was not the primary target of the defendant's aggressive conduct.
Whether the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence regarding stayed counts.
Disposition. Affirmed with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The law does not require that force or fear-inducing actions be specifically and intentionally directed at the victim, only that the taking be “accomplished by means of force or fear.””
“There is substantial evidence to support defendant’s conviction on the challenged robbery count, so the judgment will be affirmed.”