California Court of Appeal Feb 21, 2014 No. D062443Unpublished
Filed 2/21/14 P. v. Morris CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062443
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD237458)
ROBERT JAMES MORRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frederick
Maguire, Judge. Reversed.
Law office of Alissa L. Bjerkhoel and Alissa L. Bjerkhoel for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Heather M.
Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Robert James Morris pleaded guilty to transporting a controlled substance and
possessing a controlled substance for sale. The trial court granted him probation after it
denied his motion to suppress. He contends that methamphetamine found in a closed
eyeglasses case during an inventory search of his car and any other evidence obtained
after his subsequent arrest should have been suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful
Saunders, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1129 at p. 1137.) Morris produced a valid registration and
an identification card instead of a driver's license. Where, as here, the driver does not
produce a valid driver's license, the officer may expand the scope of the detention.
(People v. Valencia (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 906, 918.) We reject any suggestion that once
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Morris produced a valid registration, Officer Tom could ignore that Morris failed to
provide a valid driver's license. Officer Tom was entitled to complete the traffic stop by
investigating whether Morris had a valid driver's license and this investigation did not
impermissibly prolong the stop.
Morris next argues that his car should not have been subject to impound under the
instant circumstances. He asserts the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing
that impounding the car was constitutionally reasonable because it failed to show that
removal of the car from the street furthered a community caretaking function. Even
assuming the decision to impound did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Morris
contends the inventory search was invalid because there was no evidence the San Diego
Police Department has standardized procedures for conducting inventory searches,
including the opening of containers. We need not address whether the impound of
Morris's car furthered a community caretaking function because the People failed to
satisfy their burden of establishing the search of Morris's car was conducted pursuant to a
standardized inventory procedure.
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless they fall within a few
well-delineated exceptions. (Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 372; People v.
Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127 (Williams).) Inventory searches of police-
impounded cars are a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement because they
serve "to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure
against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from
danger." (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 372.) Nonetheless, it is well
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established that inventory searches must not be a "ruse for a general rummaging in order
to discover incriminating evidence." (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 (Wells);
Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 126.) Wells and Williams addressed impermissible
inventory searches of closed containers in impounded cars.
In Wells, our high court stated that a police officer should be allowed latitude "to
determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the
nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself." (Wells, supra, 495 U.S.
at p. 4.) It explained that policies of opening all containers, opening no containers, or
giving officers discretion regarding what containers to open were equally permissible.
(Ibid.) It held, however, that evidence found during an inventory search must be
suppressed where police had "no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed
containers encountered during an inventory search." (Id. at pp. 4-5.)
Similarly, in Williams, California Supreme Court stated the "prosecution must
always prove the existence of a policy supporting an inventory search . . . ." (Williams,
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 138.) "Because of the risk that an inventory search will be 'a ruse
for a general rummaging,' a risk that this case particularly exemplifies, a valid inventory
search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice. [Citation.] This rule may require
the prosecution to prove more than the existence of some general policy authorizing
inventory searches; when relevant, the prosecution must also prove a policy or practice
governing the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search."
(Ibid.) In Williams, the officers found illegal drugs in closed leather bags inside the
defendant's truck during the inventory search. Because the prosecution did not prove the
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leather bags had been opened "pursuant to a policy or practice," the Court held the
warrantless search was unlawful. (Ibid.)
Here, during the inventory search Officer Tom opened an eyeglasses case to find
the methamphetamine. After finding the drugs, Officer Tom arrested Morris and Acord.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Tom testified that department policy permits him to
impound a vehicle if a driver has a suspended license and requires an inventory if a
vehicle is to be impounded. This conclusory testimony is insufficient. The People must
prove the actual existence of a policy, including "the specifics" that govern those areas
actually searched. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 138.) The People did not present
evidence of any policy regarding the opening of closed containers during an inventory
search and thus failed to meet its burden of justifying the warrantless search, rendering
the warrantless search unlawful. The Attorney General erroneously relies on People v.
Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367 (Green), for the proposition that the inventory search
was lawful because the police followed standard procedures. The Green court did not
address the search of closed containers because the evidence that the officers seized was
located in plain sight. (Id. at p. 370.) Thus, there was no need for the prosecution in that
case to establish the police had a particular policy allowing searches of a container.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand the trial court is directed to vacate its order
denying Morris's motion to suppress evidence and to enter a new order granting the
motion. The trial court is further directed to permit Morris to withdraw his plea within 30
days after issuance of the remittitur. If Morris does not move to withdraw his plea within
that time, the judgment of conviction shall be reinstated.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HALLER, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the warrantless search of a closed eyeglasses case during an inventory search was unlawful because the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a standardized police policy governing the opening of closed containers.
Issues
Whether the officer's investigation into the defendant's driver's license status impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop.
Whether the warrantless search of a closed eyeglasses case during an inventory search was constitutional in the absence of evidence regarding a standardized policy for opening closed containers.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The People must prove the actual existence of a policy, including "the specifics" that govern those areas actually searched.”
“The People did not present evidence of any policy regarding the opening of closed containers during an inventory search and thus failed to meet its burden of justifying the warrantless search, rendering the warrantless search unlawful.”