California Court of Appeal Feb 13, 2014 No. B250422Unpublished
Filed 2/13/14 In re M. E. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re M. E., A Person Coming Under the B250422 Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. CK75874) FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff;
v.
MARCUS E.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elizabeth Kim, Juvenile Court Referee, (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) and Margaret Henry, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Janette F. Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant, C.H. No appearance for Plaintiff. Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent, Marcus E. _______________________________________
C. H. (appellant), the foster mother of two-year-old M. E., appeals the juvenile
court’s denial of her request for de facto parent status. Appellant argues the juvenile
court erred in denying her request because she had met her burden of showing she was
entitled to de facto parent status. We agree and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
M. E. was born premature on November 30, 2011, and tested positive for
cocaine. On December 7, 2011, the Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a petition alleging that Claudia I.’s (mother) substance abuse
endangered M.’s physical health, and that mother had a ten-year history of illicit drug
abuse.1 The Department also reported to the court that Marcus E. (father) had an
extensive criminal history dating back to 1976. The court detained M. and she was
placed in foster care.
On January 3, 2012, the Department filed a first amended petition which added
the allegation that father had a criminal history. A second amended petition was filed
on February 22, 2012, which alleged that father also used marijuana, rendering him
incapable of providing regular care for M. and placing her at risk of abuse and neglect.
At the contested jurisdictional hearing on February 29, 2012, the court sustained
the allegations against both parents and removed M. from her parents’ custody.2 The
1 Mother also had prior dependency cases involving her two older children, with whom she failed to reunify due to her illicit drug use. 2 Father appealed the court’s jurisdictional findings against him as well as the removal order. (In re M.E. (B239887; filed on November 15, 2012) [nonpub. opn.].) We affirmed. (Ibid.)
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court ordered random drug testing for father, individual counseling, and parenting
courses, and granted him family reunification services. The court denied reunification
services to mother, but ordered monitored visits for both parents.
On March 28, 2012, the Department informed the court that M. had been moved
to a new foster home, and that it was assessing father’s home for placement. On
July 19, 2012, when M. was eight months old, she was moved again and placed with
appellant. Appellant reported to the Department that M. was adjusting to her new home
and thriving with regards to meeting developmental milestones.
On August 29, 2012, the Department informed the court that father consistently
visited M. five times a week, had “good parenting skills” and had “formed a strong
bond and attachment with the child.” However, father had tested positive for illicit
substances on three separate occasions, and had not shown up for two of his drug tests.
Mother’s visits were inconsistent.
With respect to appellant, the Department reported that M. appeared “happy and
[was] adjusting well to [her] new placement,” and that appellant was working on
“increasing [the] child’s hand strength through hand exercises and appropriate toys so
that [the] child can latch onto her bottle.” In addition, M. was “engag[ing] [appellant]
with babbling and trying to talk.”
At the six-month review hearing on September 4, 2012, the court continued
reunification services for father. However, later that month, the Department filed
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a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3423 petition alleging that father had tested
positive for marijuana and cocaine on multiple occasions, and had failed to regularly
participate in the court-ordered substance rehabilitation program and random drug
testing. The court sustained these allegations on October 10, 2012, and also continued
reunification services and monitored visits for father.
On October 22, 2012, a Department social worker observed appellant to be “very
caring towards” M. when the child was sick, and concluded that M. was “thriving in her
current placement.” On January 30, 2013, in preparation for the 12-month review
hearing, the Department informed the court that father was complying his case plan, and
that his visits with M. were going well. The Department further reported that appellant
was “meeting M.’s needs by providing food, shelter, clothing and medical care as
necessary; ensuring her overall well being. [The social worker] has observed various
interactions between [appellant] and M. M. appears to be comfortable in her presence
and looks to [appellant] when she needs comforting. It appears that the child is thriving
in her care and the placement continues to be appropriate.” Appellant told the social
worker that she was willing to adopt M. if father did not reunify with her. At the 12-
month review hearing, the court continued reunification services for father.
On May 6, 2013, appellant filed a request for de facto parent status in propria
persona. She filed out the “De Facto Parent Statement” form to completion and used all
3 Section 342 provides that “[i]n any case in which a minor has been found to be a person described by Section 300 and the petitioner alleges new facts or circumstances . . . sufficient to state that the minor is a person described in Section 300, the petitioner shall file a subsequent petition.”
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the space available to her on the form. She wrote that she had provided daily care for
M. since July 2012, and that she “love[d], care[d] for, fe[]d, clothe[d], interact[ed][,]
play[ed] and engage[d], nurture[d] and assist[ed] [M.] with developmental
milestones[.]” The form asked applicants to provide “[k]inds of information [you] have
about the child that others may not have (medical, educational, behavioral, etc.),” in
response to which appellant stated “[m]edical [-] pre-natal exposure to drugs + alcohol,
[e]motional [d]evelopment[.]” Appellant also said that she had not attended court
hearings but would like to receive notice and attend these hearings. The court
summarily denied appellant’s request without a hearing. Appellant timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS
Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her request for de facto
parent status because she met her burden of showing she was entitled to such status.
DISCUSSION
A “de facto parent” is “a person who has been found by the court to have
assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child’s physical
and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for
a substantial period.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502, subd. (10).) “On a sufficient
showing the court may recognize the child’s present or previous custodians as de facto
parents and grant standing to participate as parties in disposition hearings and any
hearing thereafter at which the status of the dependent child is at issue.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.534, subd. (e).)
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De facto parent status only entitles a person “to be present at dependency
proceedings, to be represented by counsel, and to present evidence.” (In re Kiesha E.
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 77.) It does not entitle a person to reunification services, custody,
or visitation. (Ibid.) “The de facto parenthood doctrine simply recognizes that persons
who have provided a child with daily parental concern, affection, and care over
substantial time may develop legitimate interests and perspectives, and may also present
a custodial alternative, which should not be ignored in a juvenile dependency
proceeding.” (Ibid.) We review the juvenile court’s denial of a request for de facto
parent status for substantial evidence.4 (In re Ashley P. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 23,
26-30.)
“[T]he concept of de facto parenthood must be applied liberally.” (In re
Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 514; In re Jacob E., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at
p. 919 [“de facto parent status ordinarily should be liberally granted.”]) The rationale
behind this liberal application is that “the views of such persons who have experienced
close day-to-day contact with the child deserve consideration.” (In re A.J. (1969)
4 Some courts have reviewed the denial of de facto parent status for an abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., In re Jacob E. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 909, 919.) However, an application for de facto parent status requires the court to consider whether the individual facts of the case show that the applicant has assumed the role of a parent and cared for the child. (See In re Kieshia E., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 78 [“the key to the privileged status of de facto parenthood is adherence to ‘the role of parent,’ both physical and psychological.”]) Thus, the issue is more of a factual determination than a discretionary one, and the better approach is to use the substantial evidence standard of review. (See Seiser and Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2012) § 2.60A[2][a]; see, e.g., In re Vincent C. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1356-1357; In re Krystle D. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1808.)
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274 Cal.App.2d 199, 202.) As several courts have observed, “the juvenile courts can
only benefit from having all relevant information bearing on the best interests of the
child . . . . ” (In re Hirenia C., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 514; In re Rachel C. (1991)
235 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1452 disapproved on other grounds in In re Kieshia E., supra,
6 Cal.4th 68; In re Jacob E., supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.)
Moreover, “if it turns out that the information provided by the de facto parent is
not helpful, the court need not give much weight to the input in making the difficult
decisions it must make.” (In re Hirenia C., supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 514.) Foster
parents, in particular, “are usually the ones best equipped to aid the court” during the
reunification period through participation as de facto parents. (Christina K. v. Superior
Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1469)
“Whether a person falls within the definition of a ‘de facto parent’ depends
strongly on the particular individual seeking such status and the unique circumstances of
the case. However, the courts have identified several factors relevant to the decision.
Those considerations include whether (1) the child is ‘psychologically bonded’ to the
adult; (2) the adult has assumed the role of a parent on a day-to day basis for
a substantial period of time; (3) the adult possesses information about the child unique
from the other participants in the process; (4) the adult has regularly attended juvenile
court hearings; and (5) a future proceeding may result in an order permanently
foreclosing any future contact with the adult. [Citations.]” (In re Patricia L. (1992)
9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66-67.) “[A] juvenile court should not deny a request for de facto
status based upon some vague concern that such participation will lengthen the hearings
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or somehow interfere with the goal of providing the child with a stable and loving
home.” (In re Vincent C., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358.)
Here, four out of the five factors identified in In re Patricia L. were present. The
evidence indicated that appellant (1) was “ ‘psychologically bonded’ ” with M. by virtue
of having been the infant’s exclusive caregiver for ten months, (2) had assumed the role
of parent on a day-to-day basis during that period of time, and (3) “possesse[d]
information about the child unique from the other participants in the process” as a result
of having taken care of M.’s medical and educational needs at a stage when a child’s
needs and behaviors change often. In addition, “future proceedings [could] result in an
order permanently foreclosing any future contact” between M. and appellant should the
court decide to reunify M. with father. (In re Patricia L., supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 66-67.) Furthermore, although appellant had not attended court hearings, she
expressed an interest in being present for future hearings.
The Department had also noted that appellant was providing excellent care for
M. The Department reported several times that appellant was providing an appropriate
home for M. and that M. was doing well in appellant’s care. The Department even
informed the court that appellant was meeting all of M.’s needs, that appellant was
“very caring” towards M., and that M. looked to appellant for “comforting.” No report
includes any criticism of appellant.
Although “a person who otherwise qualifies for de facto parent status may
become ineligible by acting in a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with the role
of a parent,” here, there was no evidence that appellant had ever harmed M. (In re
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Bryan D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 142; In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
235, 257 [an applicant for de facto parent status is “automatically disqualified” if he or
she “substantially harms” the minor].) In fact, all the evidence before the court was
positive and showed that appellant had taken care of M. on a day-to-day basis for almost
a year.
Only father has opposed this appeal, arguing that appellant did not meet her
burden of proof.5 Specifically, father argues that appellant did not show that she
possessed unique information regarding M.’s medical needs regarding “pre-natal
exposure to drugs [and] alcohol” because appellant did not observe M. when she was
born. However, M. was only eight months old when she was placed with appellant and
appellant was in the best position to observe any continued effects from M.’s pre-natal
exposure to illicit substances.
Furthermore, appellant also possessed unique information regarding M.’s
development and behavior as appellant had cared for M. from age eight months to
eighteen months. Appellant spent substantially more time with M. than either father or
mother, and the evidence indicated that she had fulfilled all of M.’s needs by having
“care[d] for, fe[]d, clothe[d], interact[ed][,] play[ed] and engage[d], nurture[d] and
assist[ed] [M.] with developmental milestones[.]” (Cf. In re Jacob E., supra,
121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 919-921 [holding that, despite five years as caretaker, the
grandmother failed to merit de facto parent status because she did not ensure the child’s
5 The Department did not take a position below regarding this issue or on appeal.
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visits with siblings or meet his schooling and medical needs, and had exposed him to
domestic violence and physical abuse]; cf. In re R.J. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 219, 224
[affirming the juvenile court’s summary denial of the grandmother’s request for de facto
parent status where there was no evidence that the grandmother had assumed a parental
role on a day-to-day basis, although the grandmother did have a “positive, nurturing,
and loving relationship” with her grandchildren.])
Accordingly, appellant met her burden of showing that she was entitled to
de facto parent status, and there was no evidence that she had harmed M. or failed to
provide for her care such that she should be denied such status. The juvenile court thus
erred in denying appellant’s request for de facto parent status, and we reverse that
ruling.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying de facto parent status is reversed. The juvenile court is
directed to enter a new order granting appellant’s de facto parent application.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CROSKEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
KLEIN, P. J.
ALDRICH, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The juvenile court erred in denying the foster mother's request for de facto parent status because she met her burden of demonstrating that she had assumed the role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period.
Issues
Did the juvenile court err in denying the foster mother's request for de facto parent status?
Disposition. reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“appellant met her burden of showing that she was entitled to de facto parent status, and there was no evidence that she had harmed M. or failed to provide for her care such that she should be denied such status.”