California Court of Appeal Feb 11, 2014 No. B247513Unpublished
Filed 2/11/14 In re Joshua J. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re JOSHUA J. et al., Persons Coming B247513 Under the Juvenile Court Law. ___________________________________ (Los Angeles County LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. CK38073) DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STEPHANIE S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite Downing, Judge Affirmed and remanded with directions. Lori A Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
Stephanie S. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s orders at the six-month
review hearing. The juvenile court held that return of mother’s children, J. J., Ju. J., and
Joshua J., to mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them based
on evidence that mother was allowing Justin J. (father) unmonitored access to the
children in violation of court orders. Mother contends that substantial evidence did not
support this order. Mother also appeals the court’s order changing mother’s visits from
unmonitored to monitored, and the court’s failure to ensure that notice was served on
the Blackfoot Tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We agree only
that the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply
with ICWA notice requirements, and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the
juvenile court to ensure that such notice is properly provided. In all other respects, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and father have three children together: seven-year-old J., nine-year-old
Ju., and 11-year-old Joshua. On January 11, 2012, the Department received a referral
alleging that the children were victims of physical abuse by both parents.1 The
1 Mother also had a prior court case involving three of her other children based on her use of inappropriate discipline, her abuse of marijuana, and domestic violence between mother and the father of those children. Mother failed to reunify with those children and her parental rights were terminated. In addition, with respect to J., Ju. and Joshua, there have been 11 prior referrals to the Department alleging neglect and abuse. Ten of those referrals were determined to be inconclusive or unfounded, however, a referral made on September 25, 2008 alleging that Joshua and J. were the victims of general neglect was “substantiated.” As a result, mother and father participated in “family preservation” services and therapy for six months between 2008 and 2009.
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reporting party said that Ju. claimed her parents used belts and clothes hangers to punish
her and her siblings.
Later that day, a Department social worker interviewed the children.
Seven-year-old J. stated that mother hit her with a belt when she said bad words, and
that father threw a shoe that hit her in the face when she would not eat a banana. J.
further said that she witnessed father hit mother “ ‘really hard,’ ” and that her parents
smoked “brown things that she called cancer bars.” Likewise, nine-year-old Ju. said
that mother hit her, father threw a shoe at her that hit her, and father hit mother. She
further stated that her parents smoked marijuana and that she felt safer around the social
worker than her family.
Eleven-year-old Joshua denied that there was physical abuse in the home. When
the social worker asked Joshua if he or his siblings were ever hit, he said “ ‘not really.’ ”
He further said that he was only spanked when he was in really bad trouble, father only
chased the children with a belt but did not hit them, mother only used a hanger to warn
them, and he had not seen father hit mother. He also denied that his parents smoked
marijuana. However, when the social worker spoke with Joshua’s therapist, the
therapist reported that the parents had a long history of domestic violence. She also said
that there was marijuana use in the home, and that mother did not give Joshua his
psychotropic medication on a regular basis.
Ju. suffered hallucinations when she was talking with the social worker, and was
admitted to a psychiatric facility the following day. A week later, the Department
received a second referral based on statements by Ju. that she and her siblings had been
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locked in the bathroom previously, and had been left alone at home at night. Ju. also
said she had once attempted to hang herself.
The social worker interviewed J. and Joshua about the referral allegations. J.
said that the children had been locked in the bathroom for approximately 30 minutes
when the adults were drinking beer and having a party. She also said that mother hit her
when she was bad, such as when she jumped on the bed, and that she had been hit with
a belt by her parents. She told the social worker a second time about the incident when
her father threw a shoe at her that hit her in the face. She also said that her parents fight
all the time and hit each other.
Joshua denied that the children had ever been locked in the bathroom or that he
had ever been left home alone at night. The social worker noted that Joshua “appeared
to be concerned about making any statements that would disrupt his family.” However,
when asked about his medication regimen, Joshua said that he did not take his
medication every day because mother forgot or they did not have enough.
A petition was filed on January 31, 2012, alleging that mother and father had
physically abused the children, among other allegations. The court detained the
children. Father appeared at the hearing and reported that he might have American
Indian heritage from the Blackfoot Tribe. The court ordered the Department to provide
notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, and the Blackfoot Tribe.
The Department did not do so.
In the Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, J. and Ju. recanted many of their previous
statements. J. said that mother and father never argued but only “sa[id] good stuff.” She
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denied that she had ever been struck with an object, reported that she was never
spanked, and said “[n]obody does drugs.” However, she acknowledged that her aunt
had “punched Joshua,” but then asked the interviewer to cross out that statement
because “my mommy will be mad . . . I said that because our family only does good
things.” Juniya also said that her parents never argued, and that they did not do drugs.
In addition, she denied that she had been hit or spanked by mother.
On February 7, 2012, father was convicted of a misdemeanor count of inflicting
corporal injury on a “Spouse/Cohabitant.” At the jurisdictional hearing on April 11,
2012, the court sustained allegations that mother inappropriately disciplined the
children, that father failed to protect them, that mother abused marijuana, and that both
parents neglected to ensure that Joshua regularly took his medication.2 The court
dismissed the domestic violence count on the grounds that the occurrence of violence
was “too remote in time.” At the dispositional hearing on April 30, 2012, the court
ordered mother and father to complete a substance abuse program, and to participate in
individual counseling to address issues of substance abuse, domestic violence, and
appropriate parenting. The court further ordered father to take a parenting class and
noted that mother had already completed such a class. The court further gave the
2 The court also sustained allegations that father had a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of marijuana. Father appealed from this count and argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he had a substance abuse problem. (In re Joshua J. (B241205; filed on January 4, 2013) [nonpub. opn.].) We agreed and reversed as to this particular jurisdictional finding. (Ibid.)
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Department discretion to release the children to mother and granted both parents
visitation “to be monitored by [a] DCFS approved monitor.”
In a Interim Review Report filed on August 6, 2012, the Department reported
that mother was making progress in therapy, and that all of mother’s random drug tests
were negative. However, mother’s counselor reported that mother had “express[ed] or
[] implied that she is in [im]minent danger with father . . . . ” The social worker told
mother that “[i]f the unmonitored visits were approved she would have to agree to not
allow the father to have contact with the children at anytime and she would need to be
proactive in protecting her children. So if father showed up to her home or at the visit,
she would need to call the police or obtain a restraining order if she felt threatened in
any way.” Mother agreed to those conditions and said she had not been in a relationship
with father for over a year.
On September 14, 2012, mother again reported to the social worker that she and
father were living separate lives and did not interact. The children also said that they
had not had a visit with father “ ‘for a long time,’ ” and that they liked visiting with
mother. The Department reported that mother was consistently on time and played with
the children, and that it had liberalized mother’s visits to unmonitored, to include
overnight and weekend visits.
However, at the next progress hearing, the court noted that the Department was
concerned that mother “has been less than candid about the relationship with [father].”
Mother’s counsel stated that “mother denies that [father] has been around the children[,]
[b]ut even if he was, this court has not made any order that mother is not to monitor his
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visits. . . . ” The court responded that “[mother] is not in a position to monitor
anybody’s visits . . . we need to be really clear about that.” Mother indicated that she
understood this.
On September 25, 2012, Ju. and J. told a social worker that father had been
present during unmonitored visits. Mother denied this. The following month, the
Department informed the court that mother was expecting another child by father, and
that mother had misrepresented to the social worker that father was not responsible for
her pregnancy.
In November 2012, Joshua told his therapist that father visited regularly when
the children were visiting mother, and that mother told him to lie “all the time” so that
they could come home to live with her. J. also told a social worker that “ ‘my mom tells
me to say no to anything you ask me because I won’t get to go home.’ ” Mother denied
these allegations.
In December 2012, J. and Joshua’s foster mother reported that the children said
father had been present at mother’s house the previous weekend. J. had told her foster
mother that “they did not have a good weekend because her father got mad,” and
“[i]mmediately, Joshua[,] who overheard her comment . . . explained that [d]ad was
mad at mom because she was talking, but they worked it out and everything is fine.”
In advance of the six-month review hearing, the Department recommended to the
court that the children remain in their current foster homes and filed a Welfare and
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Institutions Code3 section 3884 petition requesting that mother’s visits be changed from
unmonitored to monitored. At the contested hearing on December 19, 2012, the court
found that return of the children to mother’s physical custody would be detrimental to
them and granted the section 388 petition. Mother timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS
Mother contends that (1) there was no substantial evidence supporting the court’s
conclusion that returning the children to mother at the six-month review hearing would
create a substantial risk of detriment to them; (2) the court abused its discretion by
changing her visits from unmonitored to monitored; and (3) the Department failed to
provide notice as required by ICWA.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court’s finding that returning
a child to parental custody poses a risk of detriment is reviewed as to whether there is
substantial evidence supporting it. (In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1483.)
“In so doing, we consider the evidence favorably to the prevailing party and resolve all
conflicts in support of the trial court’s order. [Citation.] ‘Substantial evidence’ means
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial
3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 4 Section 388 provides, “[a]ny parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made . . . . ”
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proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case. [Citation.]” (In re
Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)
With respect to a section 388 petition, we review the juvenile court’s decisions
for an abuse of discretion. (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71.) “ ‘The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’
[Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
2. There Was Substantial Evidence Supporting the Court’s Conclusion That Returning the Children to Mother’s Custody Would Create A Substantial Risk of Detriment to Them
Section 366.21, subdivision (e) governs the six-month review hearing and
provides that “the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his
or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create
a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that
detriment.”
Mother contends that the court did not make the factual findings necessary to
support its order that return of the children to her care would be detrimental. Mother is
correct that, pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), “the court shall specify the
factual basis for its conclusion that the return would be detrimental,” and that, here, the
court failed to do so with respect to this decision. However, any error in failing to make
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express factual findings was harmless, as explained below. (In re Jason L. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218.)
Although mother participated in the classes and counseling ordered by the court,
and had positive visits with her children, there was substantial evidence that mother was
not taking the steps necessary to protect the children from father’s violent tendencies.
At the outset of the case, J. and Ju. both stated that father hit mother, and that father
threw shoes at them. In addition, Joshua’s therapist reported that there was domestic
violence in the home. Soon after the petition was filed, father was convicted of a
misdemeanor count of domestic violence. During the course of this case, mother
represented to her counselor that father posed an imminent danger to her. Despite this
disclosure and the court’s order that father was only permitted to visit with the children
under the supervision of a Department-approved monitor, there was evidence that
mother allowed father to visit with the children without a monitor present. Against the
backdrop of father’s history of violence, evidence that mother was allowing father
unmonitored access to the children constituted substantial evidence that return of the
children to mother’s care at that time would create a substantial risk of detriment to
them.
Mother argues that the court should not have considered the presence of domestic
violence in the home because there were no sustained allegations of domestic violence
in the petition. However, although mother suggests that the court’s review under
section 366.21, subdivision (e), was limited to issues covered by its jurisdictional
findings, “nothing in section[] 366.21 . . . requires that the detriment which justifies
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continued removal of the minor from parental custody must be akin to the detriment
which necessitated juvenile court jurisdiction.” (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
890, 899.) “[T]he question whether to return a child to parental custody is dictated by
the well-being of the child at the time of the review hearing; if returning the child will
create a substantial risk of detriment to his or her physical or emotional well-being
[citations], placement must continue regardless of whether that detriment mirrors the
harm which had required the child’s removal from parental custody [citation].” (Id. at
p. 900.)
Mother also argues that the Department did not meet its burden at the six-month
review hearing because it never established that a Department-approved monitor was
not present when father was visiting the children with mother. However, it was
reasonable for the court to infer that father’s visits were not monitored based on
evidence that (1) mother never claimed that an approved monitor was present but denied
that father had ever showed up during her visits with the children, and (2) mother told
the children to lie about their father’s visits.
3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Granted the Department’s Section 388 Petition
Mother contends that the court abused its discretion by granting the
Department’s section 388 petition and ordering that mother’s visits be changed from
unmonitored to monitored. At a hearing on a section 388 petition, “[t]he petitioning
party has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there is
a change of circumstances or new evidence; and (2) the proposed change in the court’s
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previous order is in the child’s best interests. [Citations.]” (In re Carl R. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1071.) Here, both prongs were satisfied.
Mother argues that there was no “change of circumstances” because the court’s
“basic premise” that mother was threatened by father was erroneous as there was “no
evidence . . . that Mother ha[d] ever been ‘in danger’ or ‘threatened’ [by] Father.” In
fact, there was such evidence: (1) at the outset of the case, J. and Ju. had said that father
hit mother, and Joshua’s therapist reported that there was domestic violence in the
home; (2) father was convicted for domestic violence during the course of this case; and
(3) mother represented to her counselor that father presented an imminent danger to her.
Contrary to mother’s contention, this evidence indicated that father presented a threat to
her. Moreover, this evidence, combined with evidence that mother was allowing father
unmonitored access to the children, supported the court’s conclusion that mother had
failed to protect the children from father during visits, and thus, unmonitored visits were
no longer appropriate.
Mother also argues that changing mother’s visits to monitored was not in the
children’s best interests because the children needed extended time with her and
suffered as a result of being away from her. Even if this were true, the evidence also
showed that mother placed these children at risk by exposing them to father without an
approved monitor present. Within the context of mother’s disclosure that she felt father
placed her in imminent danger, father’s recent conviction for domestic violence, and the
children’s statements that they had previously seen father hit mother, the evidence that
mother was allowing father unmonitored access to the children was sufficient to support
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the court’s conclusion that it was no longer in the children’s best interests to have
unmonitored visits with mother.
4. The Notice Requirements of ICWA Were Not Satisfied
Mother contends that the Department failed to provide required notice under
ICWA, and the Department concedes the point. The juvenile court is required to inquire
about a child’s Indian status in all dependency proceedings. (In re W.B., Jr. (2012)
55 Cal.4th 30, 52-53.) “Once the court has learned that a child under its jurisdiction
may have Indian ancestry, the next step ICWA typically requires is notice to the tribe, or
if no tribe is identified, to the [Bureau of Indian Affairs.]” (Id. at p. 53.)
Here, father informed the court that he may have Indian ancestry through the
Blackfoot Tribe, and the court ordered the Department to notice the tribe. The
Department failed to do so, and the parties now agree that a limited remand is necessary
with directions to the juvenile court to ensure that ICWA’s requirements are satisfied.
That is the proper remedy here. (See In re Brooke C. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 377, 385
[holding that orders other than the termination of parental rights may be affirmed
despite lack of ICWA notice, and the matter remanded only for the purpose of allowing
the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the notice requirements]; but see Nicole K.
v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 779 [disagreeing with In re Brooke C. and
holding that “when there has been a lack of ICWA notice, the juvenile court’s orders
must be vacated because they are based on different standards than should have been
applied if ICWA notice was provided and showed the child is an Indian child.” (Id. at
p. 781.)])
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If, after proper notice is given under ICWA, “neither the tribe nor the Bureau of
Indian Affairs has provided a determinative response within 60 days after receiving that
notice, then the court may determine that the [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings,
provided that the court must reverse its determination of the inapplicability of the act
and must apply it prospectively if the tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs subsequently
confirms that the child is an Indian child.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.482,
subd. (d)(1).) In the alternative, if it is determined that the children are Indian children
and that ICWA applies to these proceedings, either the children or the parents can
petition the dependency court to invalidate any prior order which violated ICWA.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.486, subd. (a); In re Brooke C., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 385-386.)
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DISPOSITION
The six-month review hearing orders are affirmed and the matter is remanded for
the limited purpose of directing the juvenile court to order the Department to comply
with the notice provisions of ICWA. If, after proper notice, a tribe claims that Joshua, J.
and Ju. are Indian children, the juvenile court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA,
and the children or their parents may petition the trial court to invalidate any orders that
violated ICWA. If, on the other hand, no tribe makes such claim, prior defective notice
becomes harmless error.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CROSKEY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KITCHING , J.
ALDRICH, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of detriment and the modification of visitation, but remanded the case for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notice requirements.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supported the finding that returning the children to the mother's custody would create a substantial risk of detriment.
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in modifying the mother's visitation from unmonitored to monitored.
Whether the Department of Children and Family Services failed to comply with ICWA notice requirements.
Disposition. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“evidence that mother was allowing father unmonitored access to the children constituted substantial evidence that return of the children to mother’s care at that time would create a substantial risk of detriment to them.”