California Court of Appeal Feb 7, 2014 No. E056689Unpublished
Filed 2/7/14 P. v. Jaramillo CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E056689
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1105820)
CHRISTOPHER JARAMILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Affirmed.
Sarita Ordonez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Julianne Karr
Reizen, and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Christopher Jaramillo was detained by police while driving with his
nine-year-old nephew as a passenger. After searching defendant and his car, the police
possession of a syringe wrapped in cash, and defendant’s nervous, sweaty behavior,
established probable cause for the officers to believe incriminating drug evidence would
be found in the car.
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IV
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND A FAIR TRIAL
Defendant protests that his right to confrontation and a fair trial were violated by
Detective Roebuck’s testimony that the people in the parking lot were drug users and the
stipulation that two of them—Ricardo Williams and Teresa Osuna—had extensive drug-
related criminal records. The parties agreed to stipulate to the prior criminal convictions
of Williams and Osuna. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court found such evidence was
relevant as to whether defendant possessed the heroin for personal use or sale.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause bars admission of “testimonial”
hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S.
36, 42, 53-54, 68.) The confrontation clause does not apply to nontestimonial statements.
(Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 823-824].) “If the statement is not
testimonial, it does not implicate the confrontation clause, and the issue is simply whether
the statement is admissible under state law as an exception to the hearsay rule. [¶]
Testimonial statements are ‘statements, made with some formality, which, viewed
objectively, are for the primary purpose of establishing and proving facts for possible use
in a criminal trial.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 291.)
Neither the detective’s testimony as a percipient witness nor the admission of Williams
and Osuna’s criminal records implicated defendant’ rights under the confrontation clause.
First, we observed defendant waived the issue by failing to object in the trial court
and, instead, stipulating to the admission of the records. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14
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Cal.4th 155, 186) The only defense objection made was to Detective Roebuck “testifying
to speculation regarding ‘known drug users’ at the incident location.” Defendant did not
make a specific or timely objection based on the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause
either to the admission of the testimony of the detective regarding his knowledge of
Williams and Osuna or to the admission of Williams and Osuna’s convictions. An
objection to evidence is required to be timely made “because it ‘allows the court to
remedy the situation before any prejudice accrues.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Boyette
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.) Further, “‘[s]pecificity is required both to enable the court
to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering
the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence.’” (Ibid.) Accordingly, defendant failed
to preserve his confrontation challenge on appeal.
In any event, the record shows the detective’s testimony was based on his own
familiarity with Williams and Osuna because of prior criminal contacts. On cross-
examination, Detective Roebuck reiterated he knew them as drug users and sellers. An
objective review of the record demonstrates defendant had the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine Detective Roebuck without restriction. No authority required the
prosecution to call Williams and Osuna to substantiate the detective’s testimony.
Detective Roebuck, as a percipient witness to defendant’s criminal activities, properly
testified as to his observations. Detective Roebuck’s personal knowledge was not
inadmissible hearsay and did not violate defendant’s right to confrontation.
Furthermore, as a general rule criminal records do not violate the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment. California courts have consistently held that records of
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prior convictions are nontestimonial and therefore are outside the scope of the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. (People v. Moreno (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 692, 710-711; People v. Morris (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 363; People v.
Taulton (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1221.) The Taulton court, at page 1225, reasoned:
“Although they may ultimately be used in criminal proceedings, as the documents were
here, they are not prepared for the purpose of providing evidence in criminal trials or for
determining whether criminal charges should issue. Therefore, these records are beyond
the scope of Crawford, and the court properly admitted them and considered them for the
statutory purposes.”
Regardless of whether they were defendant’s criminal records or another person’s
criminal record, the courts have consistently held criminal records are nontestimonial in
nature because they are not compiled for the purpose of trial. Defendant does not show
that the criminal records of Williams and Osuna were “‘crafted in anticipation of being
used in future court proceedings,’” or that the primary or sole purpose of the documents
was to provide evidence in a subsequent prosecution. (People v. Moreno, supra, 192
Cal.App.4th at p. 710.)
Not only was no defense objection raised regarding these records but the parties
stipulated to admit the records. Even if the parties had not stipulated, in light of
Detective Roebuck’s testimony about Williams and Osuna in the parking lot, certified
criminal records reflecting their convictions would have been admissible at trial. In
People v. Morris, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at page 367, 370-371, the court cited Taulton
and noted that a certified rap sheet is admissible under the public records exception to the
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hearsay rule pursuant to Evidence Code section 1280. Thus, defendant fails to show that
the admission of Williams and Osuna’s drug-related criminal records violated his
constitutional right to confront witnesses.
Finally, any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Loy
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 69-70.) Apart from the evidence that defendant was associating
with two “known drug users,” substantial evidence allowed a jury reasonably to conclude
that defendant possessed heroin for sale. The testimony of Detective Roebuck that he
witnessed drug sales and the drug-related evidence found in the search of defendant’s car
makes it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have reached the same verdict
without the purported error. Accordingly, any error concerning Williams and Osuna and
their records was harmless.
V
DISMISSAL OF PRIOR STRIKE CONVICTION ALLEGATION
As the final issue on appeal, we conclude the trial court did not err by refusing to
dismiss defendant’s prior strike.
At sentencing, the trial court reviewed all the pertinent materials and announced
an intended sentence of three years, doubled to six years. Defense counsel argued that
the prior strike conviction for first degree burglary occurred 15 years earlier and that
defendant’s only other criminal conviction was for a violation of section 242 in 2010.
Defendant was a certified machinist from 1997 to 2010. Defendant began using and
selling heroin only after he separated from his wife in 2011. Defense counsel argued
defendant was not a recidivist but a productive member of society.
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The prosecutor referred to the egregious facts of the 1997 conviction and that
defendant had violated parole after he was released from prison for the strike offense, and
returned to prison in 1998.
The court described how the residential burglary had involved a woman and child.
Defendant had also spray-painted racial slurs on the victim’s home and insulted the
victim and her family while resisting arrest. The seriousness of the present crime was
“elevated by the fact that [defendant] chose to take his 9-year-old nephew” with him
when he sold the drugs and exposed him to danger. The court also considered the fact
that defendant committed the present offense while on summary probation and that he
continued to deny any culpability or responsibility. In consideration of all of the factors
and balancing the current offense with the prior offense, the court decided it would be an
abuse of discretion to grant a dismissal of the prior strike conviction allegation.
We agree the trial court did not clearly abuse its broad discretion to dismiss a prior
conviction allegation. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) It is the
burden of the party challenging the sentence to show clearly that the sentencing decision
was irrational or arbitrary. (Id. at p. 376.) “It is not enough to show that reasonable
people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of [the] prior convictions.”
(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 309-310.) When the trial court considered
relevant factors and acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, the decision will
not be disturbed on appeal. (Id. at p. 310; Carmony, at p. 377.) So long as “‘the record
demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial
decision in conformity with the spirit of the law,’” the trial court’s ruling shall be
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affirmed even if the reviewing court might have ruled differently in the first instance.
(Id. at p. 378.)
The Three Strikes law establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every
case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike. (People v. Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) Exceptions can only be made where a defendant should be treated
as though he actually fell outside the Three Strikes scheme. (Ibid.) “[I]n ruling whether
to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding
under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’ pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in
whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161.)
Defendant contends the trial court improperly considered that defendant used his
nephew as a “shield” during the drug sales. Defendant also argues that he was only 20
years old at the time of the prior conviction; he had only one more conviction in 2010; he
had education and employment; he suffered from heroin addiction and depression; and
the amount of drugs was small.
Notwithstanding these factors, defendant fails to meet his burden to show the trial
court's decision was irrational or arbitrary. The court quite reasonably considered
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defendant’s conduct in exposing his nephew to danger. The court’s comment that
defendant used his nephew as a “shield” was not made until after defendant’s Romero
motion was denied when the court was imposing sentence and responding to defense
counsel's argument about whether factors like planning and sophistication justified a
mitigated term.
Here, the record reflects that the trial court carefully reviewed defendant’s record
and the nature of the current offense and acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, after a thoughtful and thorough assessment of all relevant factors. (See
People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 158.) The factors argued by defendant did not
justify finding he fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Defendant has not
demonstrated the trial court’s imposed sentence was irrational or arbitrary. The trial
court properly imposed the sentence that the Three Strikes law mandates.
VI
DISPOSITION
The trial court did not commit prejudicial error or abuse its discretion.
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J. 18
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress evidence and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the defendant's prior conviction.
Issues
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop and subsequent searches?
Did the admission of testimony and records regarding third parties violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation?
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the defendant's prior strike conviction?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant was engaged in criminal activity and might have a weapon.”