Jajdelski v. Kaplan, Inc. CA4/1 (2014) · DecisionDepot
Jajdelski v. Kaplan, Inc. CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Jan 24, 2014 No. D063190Unpublished
Filed 1/24/14 Jajdelski v. Kaplan, Inc. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CHARLES JAJDELSKI, D063190
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2011-00095912- CU-WT-CTL) KAPLAN, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lorna
Alksne, Judge. Affirmed.
Aguirre, Morris & Severson, Michael J. Aguirre, Christopher S. Morris and Maria
C. Severson for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Nicola T. Hanna, Timothy J. Hatch, James L. Zelenay,
Jr., and Jeremy S. Ochsenbein for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Charles Jajdelski appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Kaplan,
Inc. (Kaplan) after the court sustained Kaplan's demurrer to Jajdelski's first amended
complaint (FAC), without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim under the
whistleblower protection provisions of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). (Former
Gov. Code, § 12653, repealed and replaced by Stats. 2012, ch. 647, §§ 4 & 5.) Jajdelski
contends that the court erred in finding that he did not sufficiently allege (1) actions in
furtherance of a false claims action, (2) a reasonable suspicion of a false claim, or (3) a
reasonable possibility that Jajdelski's actions would lead to a false claims action.
Jajdelski further contends that the court abused its discretion in denying him leave to
amend his complaint following this finding. Kaplan argues that the judgment is correct
on the grounds stated by the court and on alternative grounds. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kaplan owns and operates a number of for-profit higher education institutions.
Jajdelski was employed by Kaplan as an admissions representative at two such
institutions, Maric College in San Diego, California and Heritage College in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Kaplan terminated Jajdelski's employment in December 2003.
Following his termination, Jajdelski filed suit against Kaplan in federal court in
California on behalf of himself and as qui tam plaintiff on behalf of the United States.
Jajdelski alleged causes of action under the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729),
retaliatory termination under the CFCA (former Gov. Code, § 12653), and common law
wrongful termination. Following a number of years of litigation, including the transfer of
Jajdelski's lawsuit to federal court in Nevada, that court dismissed Jajdelski's federal
claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jajdelski's state law claims.
2
Jajdelski then filed this action in superior court. In his superior court complaint,
Jajdelski reasserted his cause of action for retaliatory termination under former
Government Code, section 12653. Jajdelski alleged that he began work for Kaplan as an
admissions representative at Maric College in San Diego. Eight months later, Kaplan
transferred Jajdelski to another Kaplan institution, Heritage College in Las Vegas.
Jajdelski "first became aware of a fraud at and around the time of the October 2003
graduation ceremony for Kaplan Heritage College . . . ." Following that ceremony,
Jajdelski noticed approximately five boxes of Heritage diplomas that had been prepared
but not handed out. A Heritage College department chairperson told Jajdelski that the
unused diplomas were for students who did not attend or finish Heritage College
programs. Later, a Heritage College director of education told Jajdelski that half of the
prospective students who complete the paperwork to enroll in Heritage College never
show up. Of the other half, a percentage of those students drop out within a seven-day
window. However, Heritage College instructors were required to keep these students'
names on their attendance rosters. Around this time, Jajdelski became aware of one
student who attended the college for approximately four months but then dropped out.
Although she had dropped out, Heritage College had given this student "graduated"
status.
In addition to these discrepancies, Jajdelski uncovered evidence that Heritage
intended to report false job placement data to its accrediting body. When they became
aware of Jajdelski's investigation, Heritage management told Jajdelski that his job would
be in jeopardy if he did not drop his concerns. Jajdelski continued his investigation,
3
though, and reported his concerns about falsification of enrollment, graduation, and
placement rates to the United States Department of Education. He also informed Kaplan
corporate management of suspicious activities at Heritage.
Soon thereafter, Jajdelski's employment at Heritage was terminated. Although
downsizing was cited as a factor, Jajdelski was the only person at Heritage who was
terminated, and he had been Heritage's highest-enrolling admissions representative.
Jajdelski was told that the decision to terminate him had been made by the same Kaplan
officials whom he told of the suspicious activities at Heritage.
Jajdelski gathered his personal items and was escorted out of his office, and to his
home, by Kaplan and Heritage management, including a Kaplan regional manager.
When Jajdelski arrived home, the regional manager told him, "What the hell did you
think you were going to accomplish? We already knew about graduation and placement
rates before we purchased the Heritage campus. You should have kept your mouth shut
and stayed out of it . . . ."
Kaplan demurred to Jajdelski's complaint. Kaplan argued among other things that
the CFCA, including its whistleblower protections, applied only to false claims made to
California or its political subdivisions. The court agreed and sustained Kaplan's demurrer
on the grounds that Jajdelski had alleged only federal false claims, based on federal
educational funds, and not false claims made to California or its political subdivisions.
The court, however, granted Jajdelski leave to amend his complaint.
Jajdelski then filed a FAC. Jajdelski's FAC contains additional allegations
stemming from Jajdelski's time at Kaplan-owned Maric College in San Diego, prior to his
4
transfer to Heritage College. In his FAC, Jajdelski alleges that he witnessed financial aid
personnel at Maric College providing false information to prospective students regarding
expected earnings upon graduation from Maric. Jajdelski also witnessed non-English
speaking students being assisted with their financial aid forms by Maric representatives,
who would sign the forms for students. Jajdelski understood that this assistance was not
lawful.
Jajdelski contacted his supervisor about these activities. The supervisor brushed
off his concerns and implicitly threatened Jajdelski's job. Jajdelski went to another Maric
official, who told Jajdelski that the incidents he witnessed were not isolated but that he
should "leave it alone."
Within a week of this conversation, a Kaplan regional director visited Jajdelski.
He told Jajdelski that he "needed to listen carefully and understand the severity of the
statements that he was making about Kaplan's practices." He also told Jajdelski that he
was being reassigned to Heritage College in Las Vegas and that Jajdelski should accept
the reassignment if he wanted to keep his job. Jajdelski alleges that this reassignment
was in retaliation for his reporting unlawful activity.
In his FAC, Jajdelski also alleges a connection between Maric's practices and
educational funds provided by California, rather than the federal government. According
to the FAC, enrolled students at Maric could use so-called California Workforce funding,
administered through the California Workforce Investment Board, in addition to funds
from the federal government directly. Jajdelski alleges that he reported Maric's practices,
and the connection to California Workforce funding, to the United States Department of
5
Education at the same time as he reported the suspicious activities that he had witnessed
at Heritage College.
Kaplan demurred to the FAC as well. Kaplan argued that the FAC still did not
allege any false claims made to California and did not allege any conduct in furtherance
of a CFCA action. Kaplan also argued that the FAC was a sham, since Jajdelski's new
allegations regarding fraud at Maric College contradicted his previous allegations (also
carried over to the FAC) that, among other things, Jajdelski "first became aware of a
fraud at and around the time of the October 2003 graduation ceremony for Kaplan
Heritage College . . . ." Finally, Kaplan contended that Jajdelski's FAC was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations because it was too factually dissimilar from Jajdelski's
prior complaints and thus could not relate back to Jajdelski's initial complaint for statute
of limitations purposes.
The court again sustained Kaplan's demurrer. The court found that California
Workforce funds could form the basis of a CFCA action, but that Jajdelski had not
adequately alleged (1) actions in furtherance of a false claims action, (2) a reasonable
suspicion of a false claim, or (3) a reasonable possibility that his actions would lead to a
false claims action. The court further found that "plaintiff has not shown there is a
reasonable possibility he can cure this defect by further amendment" and denied leave to
amend. The court entered judgment against Jajdelski accordingly, and he appeals.
6
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, the "reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.
[Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or
conclusions of law. [Citation] The judgment must be affirmed 'if any one of the several
grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]' [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial
court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any
possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer
without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect
identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment." (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital
Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) "While the decision to sustain or overrule a demurrer is
a legal ruling subject to de novo review on appeal, the granting of leave to amend
involves an exercise of the trial court's discretion." (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501.)
"[W]e may affirm a trial court judgment on any basis presented by the record
whether or not relied upon by the trial court." (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, fn. 1.)
7
II
Contradictory Allegations in Jajdelski's First Amended Complaint
Jajdelski contends that the court erred in sustaining Kaplan's demurrer on the
grounds that Jajdelski's FAC failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for retaliation
under former Government Code, section 12653. As an initial matter, we must consider
whether to accept the allegations of the FAC as true for purposes of this appeal, as
Jajdelski contends, or whether to disregard them as "sham" allegations, as Kaplan urges.1
It is well established that "when reviewing a judgment entered following the
sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, the appellate court must assume the
truth of the factual allegations of the complaint. [Citation.] However, an exception exists
where a party files an amended complaint and seeks to avoid the defects of a prior
complaint either by omitting the facts that rendered the complaint defective or by
pleading facts inconsistent with the allegations of prior pleadings. [Citations.] In these
circumstances, the policy against sham pleading permits the court to take judicial notice
of the prior pleadings and requires that the pleader explain the inconsistency. If he fails
to do so the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations and read into the amended
complaint the allegations of the superseded complaint." (Owens v. Kings Supermarket
(1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 383-384 (Owens); see also Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006)
1 In a footnote in his opening brief, Jajdelski "requests the court take judicial notice of [his] filings as set forth in the Register of Actions pursuant to Evidence Code section 452." We decline to consider Jajdelski's request because he has not complied with the California Rules of Court, rule 8.252, governing requests for judicial notice in this court. (Canal Ins. Co. v. Tackett (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 239, 243.) 8
139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425.) " 'A plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or
positions in an amended complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the original
complaint or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false.' " (McKell v.
Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1491.)
Here, Jajdelski's original superior court complaint alleged as follows: "Plaintiff
first became aware of a fraud at and around the time of the October 2003 graduation
ceremony for Kaplan Heritage College where he served as Admissions Representative
following a then-recent transfer from Kaplan's Maric College in San Diego, California."
(Italics added.) This language is consistent with the substantive allegations of his original
superior court complaint, which rely on alleged fraudulent activity at Heritage College as
the basis of his cause of action for retaliation under the CFAC.2
Jajdelski's FAC, however, alleges that Jajdelski was personally aware of fraud at
Maric College, reported it to his superiors there, and was consequently subject to adverse
employment action there, all prior to the October 2003 graduation ceremony at Heritage
College. These allegations did not appear in his original superior court complaint, nor do
they appear in any of Jajdelski's five federal complaints in the record.
Kaplan argues that these allegations in the FAC are factually inconsistent with the
allegations in his original superior court complaint and his prior federal complaints.
Jajdelski responds that the allegations in the FAC are not inconsistent, but he does not
2 Jajdelski's operative federal complaint contains nearly the same allegation: "Relator first became aware of a fraud at and around the time of the October 2003 graduation ceremony for Kaplan Heritage College . . . ." 9
explain how. In his opening brief, Jajdelski contends, "First, that 'Appellant became
aware of fraud at and around the time of the October 2003 graduation ceremony for
Kaplan Heritage College' is not contradicted by the fact that Appellant complained of
fraud before his transfer. . . .[3] For what Appellant told his supervisors he witnessed in
California, he was assigned to a position that would require his weekly commute
hundreds of miles. For what Appellant witnessed in Nevada and California, he was
terminated. That is no contradiction, but rather a progressive service [sic] of adverse
employment acts by a company desperate to keep its government-funded gravy train in
place." Jajdelski does not acknowledge the plain meaning of his allegation that he "first
became aware of a fraud at and around the time of the October 2003 graduation
ceremony for Kaplan Heritage College" and therefore denies any discrepancy. (Italics
added.) Jajdelski's reply on this issue is similarly devoid of reasoning. Jajdelski cites no
legal authority, either in his opening brief or on reply, in support of his argument that the
FAC's allegations are not a sham.
The progression of Jajdelski's pleadings is similar to the situation encountered by
the court in Owens. There, the plaintiff initially alleged that he was injured on a public
roadway. After the trial court sustained defendants' demurrers on the grounds that they
had no duty towards plaintiff in that location, plaintiff added "an allegation that plaintiff
was on defendants' premises when he was injured." (Owens, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d
p. 383.) The trial court disregarded this inconsistent pleading as a sham, and the Owens
3 Jajdelski misstates the allegation in question, omitting the material term "first" from his quotation, among other things. 10
court affirmed. (Id. at p. 384.) Here, in his original superior court complaint, Jajdelski
alleged that he "first became aware of a fraud" while employed at Heritage College in Las
Vegas. Kaplan's demurrer to the original complaint was sustained because such
allegations did not involve false claims made to California, or its political subdivisions,
and thus could not state a claim for retaliation under the CFAC. Jajdelski then alleged, in
his FAC, that the fraud he witnessed at Heritage College in Las Vegas was not his first
awareness of a fraud. Instead, Jajdelski allegedly was aware of prior fraud at Maric
College in California, reported that fraud to his superiors, and was subject to adverse
employment action based on reporting such fraud.
We conclude that the FAC's allegations of fraud at Maric College, Jajdelski's
awareness thereof, and Kaplan's retaliation therefor contradict Jajdelski's prior allegation
that he "first became aware of a fraud at and around the time of the October 2003
graduation ceremony for Kaplan Heritage College . . . ." We also conclude that Jajdelski
has provided no adequate explanation for the inconsistency in his pleadings. We will
therefore disregard the inconsistent allegations in assessing the sufficiency of Jajdelski's
FAC. (Owens, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 384; Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck
Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946 ["[A]ny inconsistencies with prior
pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the
inconsistent allegations."].)
11
III
Protected Activity Under the California False Claims Act
"To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff alleging retaliation under the CFCA
must show: '(1) that he or she engaged in activity protected under the statute; (2) that the
employer knew the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; and (3) that the employer
discriminated against the plaintiff because he or she engaged in protected activity.'
[Citations.]" (McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 455-
456.) "This code section, characterized as the whistleblower protection provision of the
CFCA, is construed broadly. [Citations.]" (Kaye v. Board of Trustees of the San Diego
County Public Law Library (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 48, 59 (Kaye); see also Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 713, 725.)
The issue here is whether Jajdelski's FAC adequately alleges protected activity
under the CFCA. "Generally, to constitute protected activity under the CFCA, the
employee's conduct must be in furtherance of a false claims action. [Citation.] The
employee does not have to file a false claims action or show a false claim was actually
made; however, the employee must have reasonably based suspicions of a false claim and
it must be reasonably possible for the employee's conduct to lead to a false claims action.
[Citations.]" (Kaye, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.)
The CFCA defines a " '[c]laim,' " in relevant part, as "any request or
demand . . . for money, property, or services . . . that . . . [¶] . . . [i]s presented to an
officer, employee, or agent of the state or of a political subdivision." (Gov. Code,
§ 12650, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Kaplan argues that protected activity under the whistleblower
12
protection provisions of the CFCA must be similarly limited.4 We agree. In order to
allege protected activity under the CFCA, an employee must state facts showing that his
or her activity was in furtherance of a CFCA action, i.e., an action predicated on funds
wrongfully claimed from the state or a political subdivision thereof. (See former Gov.
Code, § 12653, subd. (b); see also Hoefer v. Fluor Daniel, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2000) 92
F.Supp.2d 1055, 1056.)
Jajdelski contends that his FAC sufficiently alleges protected activity in
furtherance of a CFCA action based on his investigation of fraud at Maric College, which
could have lead to false claims by Kaplan for California Workforce funding.5 However,
these are the same allegations that we disregard as inconsistent with Jajdelski's prior
pleading that he "first became aware of a fraud at and around the time of the October
2003 graduation ceremony for Kaplan Heritage College . . . ." (See pt. II, ante.) Because
Jajdelski does not point to any other allegations to support his claim, we conclude that
Jajdelski's FAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under former
Government Code, section 12653.
4 Jajdelski does not provide any contrary argument or authority.
5 The parties dispute whether California Workforce funds can constitute "state funds" under the CFAC. (See former Gov. Code, § 12650, subd. (b)(9).) Even assuming arguendo that California Workforce funds do constitute "state funds," as Jajdelski urges, our analysis is unchanged. Likewise, in light of our conclusion, we need not consider Kaplan's alternative argument that the statute of limitations bars Jajdelski's claim. 13
IV
Leave to Amend
Jajdelski contends that the trial court should have granted him leave to file a
further amended complaint. "[I]t is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without
leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified
by the defendant can be cured by amendment." (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra,
2 Cal.4th at p. 967.) However, Jajdelski " 'must show in what manner he can amend his
complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.' "
(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Here, Jajdelski has requested leave to
"clarify his arguments" and "adorn [his] current allegations." Such generic averments are
insufficient. To the extent that Jajdelski offers to further explain the "statutory scheme"
and "checks and balances" of California Workshare funds, or the "practical effects" of his
transfer from San Diego to Las Vegas, such amendments would still not address the
deficiencies of the FAC. Finally, Jajdelski's claim that he did not have the opportunity to
conduct discovery is unfounded (see Budget Finance Plan v. Superior Court (1973) 34
Cal.App.3d 794, 798; Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d
1429, 1436), and does not relieve him of the burden of "show[ing] in what manner he can
amend his complaint" in any event. (See Goodman, at p. 349.) Because Jajdelski has not
shown a reasonable possibility that the defects in his FAC can be cured by amendment,
he has not established that it was an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
O'ROURKE, J.
15
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's whistleblower retaliation claim under the California False Claims Act, holding that the plaintiff failed to allege protected activity and that the amended complaint's new allegations were impermissible sham pleadings contradicting prior filings.
Issues
Whether the plaintiff's amended complaint contained impermissible sham allegations that contradicted prior pleadings.
Whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged protected activity under the California False Claims Act.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the original complaint or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false.”
“Generally, to constitute protected activity under the CFCA, the employee's conduct must be in furtherance of a false claims action.”
“Because Jajdelski has not shown a reasonable possibility that the defects in his FAC can be cured by amendment, he has not established that it was an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”