California Court of Appeal Jan 13, 2014 No. D063517Unpublished
Filed 1/13/14 P. v. Ismail CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063517
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD242861)
AHMOD ISMAIL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Frederick
Maguire and Leo Valentine, Jr., Judges. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Paul J. Katz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and Sabrina Y.
Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ahmod Ismail (aka Ahmed Ismail) appeals the order granting probation after a
jury found him guilty of unlawful possession and use of a controlled substance. Ismail
contends the convictions must be reversed because the evidence against him was obtained
by means of an unlawful detention. He also contends the trial court erred by ordering
Ismail moved to suppress the bags of khat and other evidence police found in and
around his car on the ground the evidence was the product of an unlawful detention.
(Pen. Code, § 1538.5.) After a hearing at which only Swadener and Brou testified, the
trial court (Judge Maguire) ruled there was no detention and denied the motion.
The case then proceeded to jury trial. The jury found Ismail guilty of
misdemeanor use and possession of a controlled substance, but not guilty of felony
transportation.
The trial court (Judge Valentine) suspended imposition of sentence for three years
and granted probation. The court also ordered Ismail to pay $570 in court-appointed
attorney fees, even though it held no hearing on his ability to pay those fees. (Pen. Code,
§ 987.8.)
A. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Ismail's Suppression Motion
Ismail complains the trial court erroneously denied his suppression motion
because the bags of khat and other incriminating evidence found in and around his car
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were obtained by police in violation of the "right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend.; see Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 655 [holding 4th Amend.
and associated exclusionary rule applicable to states through 14th Amend.].)
Specifically, Ismail argues he was unlawfully detained when, without reasonable
suspicion, Swadener and Brou put on a "show of authority" by parking their patrol car
"directly in front of Ismail's car," "preventing Ismail from driving straight to leave," and
then taking an "encircling approach" as they exited the patrol car and walked toward him.
We disagree.
"The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures
that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." (United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 878.) "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19,
fn. 16.) "[T]o determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court
must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the
police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not
free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." (Florida v.
Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439.) Whether police conduct constitutes a detention or
another type of seizure presents a pure question of law where, as here, that conduct is not
in dispute. (People v. Capps (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1119.)
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Under these principles, Ismail was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. We reject Ismail's contention that the police detained him by parking their
patrol car right in front of his car so that he could not drive straight ahead to leave,
because, by parking 10 to 12 feet from Ismail's car, the officers "left plenty of room for
[him] to drive away." (People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1494; cf. People v.
Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 938, 940 [no detention when "officer pulled up
directly behind [pedestrian] and stopped his car" but "did not block [pedestrian's] way"].)
Nor did the officers detain Ismail when they subsequently exited the patrol car and
walked toward his car. (See Perez, at p. 1494 [no detention when officer parked in front
of defendant's vehicle, "exited the patrol car, [and] walked to the driver's side of
[defendant's] vehicle"]; People v. Sandoval (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 958, 961 [no
detention when officer parked near pickup truck in parking lot, "got out of his car and
walked up to the driver's side of the pickup to see what the occupants were doing"].)
Ismail cites nothing in the record to support his assertion that the officers' approach
prevented him from "driv[ing] away without likely hitting the police car ahead of him or
the officers on either side." The record shows that during their approach, the officers
"directed no verbal requests or commands to [Ismail]" (Franklin, at p. 940) and "made no
show of force or attempt to physically restrain [him]" (People v. Lopez (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 289, 293). Indeed, neither officer said anything until Brou arrived at Ismail's
car and immediately saw the bag of khat resting on the center console. "Where officers
lawfully approach a vehicle and observe in plain view contraband or other evidence of
crime they are warranted in searching the vehicle and in making an arrest." (People v.
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Vallee (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 167, 172.) Hence, because the evidence against Ismail was
not obtained by means of an unlawful detention, the trial court correctly denied his
suppression motion.
The cases on which Ismail relies do not convince us otherwise. People v. Wilkins
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 804 is easily distinguishable. There, a police officer "stopped his
marked patrol vehicle behind [a] parked station wagon in such a way that the exit of the
parked vehicle was prevented. Under these circumstances," the court held, "a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave." (Id. at p. 809, italics added.)
Here, by contrast, the patrol car was parked so that Ismail had enough room to drive
away. People v. Jones (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 519 is also not on point. In Jones, a police
officer "pulled his patrol car to the wrong side of the road"; "parked diagonally against
the traffic"; got out of the car; asked the defendant to stop; and " 'grabbed his left
forearm.' " (Id. at p. 522.) No such "coercive" police conduct occurred in this case. (Id.
at p. 523.) In People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1104, a police officer shone
a spotlight on the defendant and walked " 'briskly' " toward him while asking whether he
was on probation or parole. The court held these "actions constituted a show of authority
so intimidating as to communicate to any reasonable person that he or she was ' "not free
to decline [the officer's] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." ' " (Id. at
p. 1112.) In this case, however, there was no such intimidating show of authority: no
spotlight, no brisk walking, and no questions.
In sum, we hold the trial court properly denied the suppression motion because
Ismail was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore need
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not address his arguments that the police had no reasonable suspicion to detain him. (See
In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th at 805, 821 [no reasonable suspicion needed when no
detention].)
B. The Trial Court Erred by Ordering Ismail to Pay Attorney Fees Without First Conducting a Hearing on His Ability to Pay
Ismail also complains the trial court improperly ordered him to pay a portion of
the fees for his appointed attorney without conducting a hearing to determine his ability
to pay, as required by Penal Code section 987.8.1 The People respond that Ismail
forfeited this complaint by not objecting to the fee order in the trial court, citing among
other cases a recent decision from the Court of Appeal directly supporting the forfeiture
argument. (See People v. Aguilar (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1094, review granted Nov. 26,
2013, S213571.) That case may no longer be cited, however, because, as noted, the
California Supreme Court granted review after briefing was completed in Ismail's appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(e)(1), 8.1115(a).) Other cases hold that when a
defendant has not been given a hearing under section 987.8, it is appropriate to reverse
the order for payment of attorney fees and remand the matter to the trial court for the
1 As pertinent here, Penal Code section 987.8 provides that in any case in which a criminal defendant is provided counsel at public expense, "upon conclusion of the criminal proceedings in the trial court, . . . the trial court may, after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the present ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof." (Id., subd. (b).) At the hearing, the defendant has the rights "to be heard in person," "to present witnesses and other documentary evidence," "to confront and cross- examine adverse witnesses," "to have the evidence against him or her disclosed to him or her," and to receive "a written statement of the findings of the court." (Id., subd. (e).) If, after the hearing, the court determines the defendant has the present ability to pay all or a part of the fees of appointed counsel, the court shall set the amount to be paid and order the defendant to pay it. (Ibid.) 7
statutorily required hearing. (See, e.g., People v. Prescott (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1473,
1476; People v. Tuggle (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1081.) Given the lack of definitive
guidance from our Supreme Court on the forfeiture issue and the People's alternative
suggestion that remand for a hearing on Ismail's ability to pay may be the proper remedy,
we reverse the attorney fee order and remand the matter to allow the trial court to hold
the hearing required by section 987.8.
For the guidance of the trial court on remand, we note our agreement with the
parties that although a court may order a criminal defendant to reimburse fees for
appointed counsel, it may not condition the grant of probation on payment of those fees.
(People v. Flores (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 568, 578; People v. Bradus (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 636, 641-642.) Thus, if, after holding the hearing required by Penal Code
section 987.8, the court finds Ismail has a present ability to pay all or a portion of the fees
of appointed counsel, the court may not include an order that he pay those fees as a
probation condition.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting probation is reversed to the extent it requires Ismail to pay
$570 in fees of appointed counsel, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct
the hearing on his present ability to pay in accordance with Penal Code section 987.8. In
all other respects, the order is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant was not unlawfully detained under the Fourth Amendment, but that the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to pay attorney fees without first conducting a hearing on his ability to pay.
Issues
Did the police conduct an unlawful detention of the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Did the trial court err by ordering the defendant to pay attorney fees without a hearing on his ability to pay?
May a court condition the grant of probation on the payment of attorney fees?
Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Ismail was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”
“we reverse the attorney fee order and remand for a hearing on Ismail's ability to pay those fees, but otherwise affirm.”
“although a court may order a criminal defendant to reimburse fees for appointed counsel, it may not condition the grant of probation on payment of those fees.”