People v. Christopher CA4/2 (2013) · DecisionDepot
People v. Christopher CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 26, 2013 No. E053885Unpublished
Filed 2/11/13 P. v. Christopher CA4/2 Received from the court on 12/26/13 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E053885
v. (Super.Ct.No. INC082845)
JEFFERSON BRUCE CHRISTOPHER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert E. Law, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Mun. Ct. for the Central Orange Jud. Dist. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Ronald R. Boyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Alana Cohen Butler
and James D. Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant Jefferson Bruce Christopher suffers from schizoaffective disorder. In
2004, after serving his time on a conviction for aggravated assault, he was committed for
treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). In 2011, he was recommitted for an
914 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Moreover, “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)
We therefore conclude that defendant cannot show that the trial court failed to
apply the correct statutory standard.
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IV
VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Defendant contends that the trial court’s refusal to place him on outpatient status
violated due process because there was insufficient evidence that, if placed on outpatient
status, he would be dangerous.
The People respond that defendant is essentially challenging the jury’s finding
that, by reason of his mental disorder, he represented a substantial danger of physical
harm to others. Hence, we begin by determining precisely what defendant is actually
arguing.
Some confusion is understandable, because dangerousness crops up again and
again in a recommitment proceeding.
First, as an overarching principle of substantive due process, an involuntary civil
commitment requires proof that the committee “[is] unable to control [his or her]
behavior and . . . thereby pose[s] a danger to the public health and safety.” (Kansas v.
Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 357 [117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501]; see generally
id., at pp. 357-358; see also Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 78 [112 S.Ct. 1780,
118 L.Ed.2d 437].)
Second, as a statutory matter, in an MDO recommitment proceeding, the trier of
fact must find, among other things, that “by reason of his or her severe mental disorder,
the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others . . . .” (Pen. Code,
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§ 2972, subd. (c).) We note that, while this requirement is statutory, it is necessary in
order to make the statute conform with the federal Constitution.
Third — and again as a statutory matter — the trial court must determine whether
“there is reasonable cause to believe that the committed person can be safely and
effectively treated on an outpatient basis.” (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (d).) If, so, the
person must be released on outpatient status. (Ibid.) The question of whether the person
can be treated “safely” necessarily involves a determination of dangerousness.
This third finding, however, differs from the first and second findings. The first
two inquiries basically ask whether the person would be dangerous if not recommitted
and not treated. By contrast, the third inquiry asks whether the person would be
dangerous even if recommitted and treated as an outpatient.
Defendant, citing authorities such as Foucha, asserts that this requirement, too, is
constitutionally mandated. However, this does not logically follow. Even though the
statute refers to being “released on outpatient status” (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (d),
italics added), an outpatient is, nevertheless, recommitted (see id., subds. (c), (d)).
CONREP entails significant restrictions on a committee’s freedom. As Dr. Farooqi
testified, an outpatient starts out “kind of in a locked facility, but then gradually, as they
improve, get more accommodated into . . . society . . . .”
Thus, defendant’s position is not simply that a civil commitment requires proof
that the committee is dangerous; rather, he is necessarily arguing that a more restrictive
13
civil commitment requires proof that the committee would be dangerous in a less
restrictive civil commitment.
In support of this view, he cites People v. Rasmuson (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
1487. Rasmuson stated that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6608, subdivision (a),
which allows a sexually violent predator to petition for conditional release, “satisfies, in
part, th[e] constitutional mandate” of Foucha. (Rasmuson, at p. 1505.) It is not at all
clear that by using the words “satisfies, in part,” the court meant that Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6608, subdivision (a) is in itself constitutionally mandated. In
any event, no such constitutional issue was presented in Rasmuson. Thus, this language
is dictum.
In our view, dangerousness is a factor in deciding whether a person can be civilly
committed at all. It is not necessarily a factor in deciding whether the conditions of
confinement comply with due process. “[D]ue process requires that the conditions and
duration of confinement . . . bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
persons are committed. [Citations.]” (Seling v. Young (2001) 531 U.S. 250, 265 [121
S.Ct. 727, 148 L.Ed.2d 734], and cases cited.) While dangerousness may play some part
in this analysis, it is hardly the constitutional touchstone that defendant suggests.
We therefore reject defendant’s constitutional challenge. We repeat, however, that
as a statutory matter the trial court must determine whether the defendant can be safely
treated on an outpatient basis. Moreover, as already discussed in part III, ante, the trial
court’s finding on this issue must be supported by evidence in the record. Defendant
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does not argue — separate and apart from his constitutional challenge — that there was
insufficient evidence that he could not be safely and effectively treated as an outpatient.1
Nevertheless, if only out of an excess of caution, we examine this issue briefly.
Dr. Farooqi emphasized that the two biggest factors in whether defendant was
dangerous were whether he was taking his medication and whether he was using street
drugs. There was no evidence that CONREP would effectively ensure that defendant
took his medication and stayed off street drugs. As noted in part III.B, ante, the burden
of proof was on defendant. For this reason alone, the record supports the trial court’s
ruling.
Defendant points to Dr. Farooqi’s recommendation, as of the time of trial, that he
be placed in CONREP. One possible inference would be that CONREP could effectively
control defendant’s drug use and abuse. However, this was not the only possible
inference. For years, defendant had resisted going into CONREP, because he felt the
rules were too strict. Thus, it was inferable that he would try to get around any
restrictions it imposed. Also, CONREP would allow defendant more and more freedom
over time. He had a history of not taking his medication and, because he did not believe
he had a mental illness, he lacked the motivation to keep taking his medication. And
presumably at some point he would be able to obtain street drugs, if he so desired.
Finally, even though Dr. Farooqi had recommended defendant for CONREP, CONREP
1 In his reply brief, he explicitly states: “This argument was not based upon statute . . . .”
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itself had apparently rejected him. Thus, it was fairly inferable that defendant could not
be safely and effectively treated in CONREP.
V
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI J. We concur:
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
McKINSTER J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not err in refusing to place the defendant on outpatient status, as the court properly exercised its discretion to deny the request after considering the evidence regarding the defendant's potential for dangerousness and lack of insight into his mental illness.
Issues
Did the trial court err by ruling it lacked the authority to place the defendant on outpatient status?
Did the trial court fail to apply the correct legal standard regarding the safety and effectiveness of outpatient treatment?
Did the trial court's refusal to grant outpatient status violate the defendant's substantive due process rights?