California Court of Appeal Dec 18, 2013 No. E057454Unpublished
Filed 12/18/13 P. v. Estrada CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E057454
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1100789)
MATTHEW JOEL ESTRADA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Charles J. Koosed, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, and
Kimberley A. Donohue, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Matthew Joel Estrada stabbed to death his friend, Rene Gonzalez.
Before the killing, defendant had been drinking heavily. A jury convicted defendant of
one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189)1 and found true the allegation
of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.”
(Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
In determining whether evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible, the trial
court must look to the similarities between the uncharged misconduct and the charged
conduct. The required degree of similarity changes depending on the purpose for which
the proponent of the evidence wishes to introduce the uncharged acts: “[E]vidence of a
defendant’s uncharged misconduct is relevant where the uncharged misconduct and the
charged offense are sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are
manifestations of a common design or plan. [¶] . . . [¶] The least degree of similarity . .
. is required in order to prove intent”—that the defendant probably harbored the same
intent in each instance. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 401-402.) The trial
court must also decide whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
7
outweighed by the probability that its admission would (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury. (Id. at p. 404, citing Evid. Code, § 352.) “Prejudicial”
is not synonymous with “damaging,” but refers instead to evidence that “‘“uniquely tends
to evoke an emotional bias against defendant”’” without regard to its relevance on
material issues. [Citations.]” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121; see also
People v. Dejourney (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1105.)
We conclude the evidence of defendant’s unprovoked assaults with deadly
weapons on two other persons was properly admitted to establish his intent to kill
Gonzalez. The trial court determined that the uncharged assaults were sufficiently
similar to Gonzalez’s murder to allow the evidence under Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b). The trial court considered the similarities between the stabbing of
Gonzalez and defendant’s cellmate. Specifically, the court examined the manner in
which defendant attacked both victims, the injuries caused, and the circumstances.
Defendant’s attack on his cell mate was sufficiently similar to the attack on Gonzalez
because it showed that he attacked his victims with a weapon from behind in order to
gain an advantage. After wounding his victims, he proceeded to attack them further.
Each attack was severe enough to show an intent to kill.
The trial court concluded that these attacks, although one occurred in jail and
another on the streets, were sufficiently similar to allow admission. The trial court also
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concluded that any prejudice from the evidence was outweighed by its probative value
under Evidence Code section 352. Noting that it is “hard to ignore the highly, I think,
probative value of these acts,” and recognizing that many inmates in jail do not
physically attack other inmates when they are “disrespected,” the trial court found that
the probative value of an unprovoked attack against defendant’s cell mate outweighed the
prejudice, especially given the significant similarities between the two attacks.
The trial court also examined the similarities between defendant’s attack on his
neighbor and found it was sufficiently similar to the attack on Gonzalez to warrant its
admission under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). When defendant’s
neighbor left him at the hospital, it took defendant 30 to 45 minutes to walk home and he
became so enraged that he hit his neighbor in the head with a brick. This unprovoked
attack was sufficiently similar to the unprovoked attack on Gonzalez to warrant its
admission to establish defendant’s intent to endanger the life of another with a weapon.
The trial court then examined the probative nature of the evidence, compared to its
prejudicial effect. Defendant’s irrational attack on his neighbor outweighed any
prejudicial impact.
When instructing the jury, the trial court indicated that any evidence of uncharged
acts could be considered only for the limited purpose of determining whether defendant
had the intent to kill. The trial court’s decision was well within the bounds of reason, and
therefore not an abuse of discretion.
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Even if this court were to conclude that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of defendant’s uncharged assaults, any such error was harmless—as it is not reasonably
probable that defendant would have received a more favorable result absent the
admission of that evidence. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 750.) Defendant
does not dispute he stabbed Gonzalez, intending to kill him. After first stabbing
Gonzalez in the back, defendant continued to attack, culminating in a fatal stab to the
chest. Defendant stabbed Gonzalez with so much force that the tip of the knife bent.
Defendant pierced the sternum and continued stabbing to a depth of four to five inches,
damaging two separate chambers in Gonzalez’s heart and piercing Gonzalez’s upper left
lung. As defendant acknowledges, “Stabbing the victim in the torso with such force that
it penetrates muscle, bone and two vital organs constitutes compelling and virtually
irrefutable evidence of intent to kill.”
Additional evidence confirmed defendant intended to stab someone that night.
Defendant told Guzman he was angry because Torres and his friends had killed his dog a
few years before and he wanted retribution. Considering the evidence against defendant,
it is not reasonably probable that, absent the evidence of the prior assaults, a different
result would have occurred. Thus, any error was harmless. (People v. Williams (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 587, 612.)
Finally, defendant forfeited an objection to the admission of evidence on federal
constitutional grounds by failing to raise that objection with the trial court. (People v.
10
Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 510, fn. 3, citing People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d
1223, 1264-1265, overruled on other grounds in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d
787.) Defendant never asserted any objection based on the Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth
Amendments when opposing the prosecution’s motion to admit the evidence. In any
event, as discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence. Because defendant’s due process argument can rest only on the premise that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, his claim fails. (Sanders, at
p. 9.) It is also not reasonably likely defendant would have obtained a more favorable
outcome. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) For the same reasons, any error
does not rise to the level of prejudice under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,
24.)
IV
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Defendant next asserts the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. We hold the trial court had no duty to give
the instruction but any error in failing to instruct the jury was harmless because the jury
was instructed on both first and second degree murder and convicted appellant of first
degree murder.
11
We conduct an independent review of instructional error concerning a lesser
included offense. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 705.) When discussing jury
instructions, the trial court stated:
“We have been discussing jury instructions.
“There were a couple, there were two specifically which the defense has
requested, and the Court is inclined to deny that request, specifically it is CALCRIM 570,
voluntary manslaughter, heat of passion as a lesser-included offense, as well as 571,
voluntary manslaughter, imperfect self-defense as a lesser-included offense.
“. . . The Court in reviewing the evidence that was presented in the trial does not
believe that there is substantial evidence warranting those instructions be given to the
jury.
“The facts which were argued in support of those instructions, . . . was that there
was an argument, a verbal argument which took place, I think logically you could
conclude between the victim and [defendant], because Mr. Torres said he was taking care
of his kid at the time and overheard an argument.
“And I think Mr. Philips also mentioned that there was some—there could have
been some injuries to [defendant], although I will tell you that in listening to the
evidence, I am not aware of any injuries that would have occurred by way of a fist fight.
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“In any event, that was all I was provided with, so as to the provocation, heat of
passion, I am not aware of any evidence that was presented which would otherwise have
provoked [defendant] to the point where he would have acted in the way that he did.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“Again, it is just a verbal argument. If any one of those instructions is even close
to being applicable, it would probably be the heat of passion as opposed to self-defense,
but even that one there is a big hole and lack of evidence to warrant those instructions.”
The court ultimately instructed the jury only on first degree and second degree
murder. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.
A trial court must instruct the jury on the general principles of law that are
“closely and openly connected with the facts before the court.” (People v. Wickersham
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12
Cal.4th 186, 200-201.) This obligation extends to lesser included offenses if the evidence
“‘raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense are present
and there is evidence that would justify a conviction of such a lesser offense.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 287.) Voluntary manslaughter is a
lesser-included offense of murder. (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 181.)
However, as the trial court decided, the evidence in this case did not justify the giving of
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion or provocation or
imperfect self-defense. A court’s duty to instruct on lesser included offenses arises only
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where there is substantial evidence for a jury to evaluate. (People v. Barton, supra, 12
Cal.4th at p. 195, fn. 4; People v. Oropeza (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 73, 78.) Speculation
is not sufficient evidence. (People v. Escobar (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 999, 1016; People
v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)
Voluntary manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice
. . . [¶] . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (§ 192, subd. (a).) An intentional,
unlawful homicide caused by sudden quarrel, heat of passion, or provocation is voluntary
manslaughter. (People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201.) There must be evidence
that: (1) the provocation was caused by the victim or the defendant reasonably believed
it was caused by the victim, and (2) the provocation was such as to cause an ordinary
person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.
(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 550; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59.)
Similarly in order for a killing to be imperfect self-defense, a defendant must have an
actual, but unreasonable, belief of having to act in self-defense. (People v. Barton, supra,
12 Cal.4th at pp. 200-201.)
In People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 585-586, the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on voluntary
manslaughter based on heat of passion or provocation because an average, reasonable
person would not shoot someone who taunted him or called him names. (Ibid.) In
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another instance, the same defendant confronted another victim, who had been
romantically involved with the defendant’s girlfriend, and fatally shot him. A witness
told law enforcement officers that, just before the shooting, the victim asked the
defendant, “Why are you mad at me?” and “What’s your problem with me?”' The
defendant shot the victim from a distance of several feet and drove off. (Id. at pp. 561-
562.) The California Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled to an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense because the
defendant never indicated that he felt a threat of immediate harm or fear of the victim.
(Id. at p. 582.) At most, the evidence showed the defendant had a fear of future harm
which is insufficient to require an instruction on imperfect self-defense, which requires
an actual, but unreasonable, fear of imminent harm. (Ibid.)
The evidence here was, likewise, insufficient to require an instruction on the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter, either under a theory of heat of passion or
imperfect self-defense. There was no evidence defendant feared imminent harm from
Gonzalez. Defendant was the unprovoked aggressor, stabbing Gonzalez in the back with
the knife. Additionally, any injuries defendant sustained were, by his own admission,
caused by jumping and eluding law enforcement—not inflicted by Gonzalez. Defendant
had told Guzman earlier in the day that he was planning to stab someone. Finally,
defendant fled the scene of the murder, leading police on a chase through the
neighborhood. The only mention of self-defense arose in the context of defendant’s
15
jailhouse conversation with his stepfather, in which he agreed with the stepfather’s
comment that he acted in self-defense. The only possible provocation was an argument
between him and Gonzalez. But an average, reasonable person would not stab someone
based on a verbal dispute. (People v. Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586.)
Defendant maintains the jury reasonably could have inferred that Gonzalez threatened or
taunted defendant, justifying an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Berry
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515.) The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion.
The trial court had no duty to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, either under the theory
of heat of passion or the theory of imperfect self-defense.
In any event, there could be no prejudice from any error in this case. Error is
harmless unless the court finds it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the
defendant would have been reached absent the error. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19
Cal.4th 142, 178; People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556.) Because the jury
found defendant guilty of first degree murder, they necessarily found that he acted with
premeditation and deliberation. It is not reasonably probable, therefore, that had the trial
court instructed on voluntary manslaughter, the jury’s verdict would have been any
different: “The jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of the first degree murder of [the
victim] implicitly rejected defendant’s version of the events, leaving no doubt the jury
would have returned the same verdict had it been instructed regarding imperfect self-
defense.” (People v. Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 582, citing People v. Lewis
16
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) Any error in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter
was harmless.
V
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
The abstract of judgment should be corrected to show defendant was sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life on count 1 (first degree murder) along with a
one-year sentence on the personal weapons-use enhancement to run consecutively to the
sentence on count 1, for a total indeterminate sentence of 26 years to life. (People v.
Avila (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 819, 828, citing People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381,
394, fn. 2.) The trial court should forward the corrected abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
17
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged assaults to prove intent, and that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter due to a lack of substantial evidence.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged assaults.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
Disposition. Affirmed with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court’s decision was well within the bounds of reason, and therefore not an abuse of discretion.”
“The evidence here was, likewise, insufficient to require an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, either under a theory of heat of passion or imperfect self-defense.”
“Any error in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was harmless.”