People v. Williams CA6

Filed 12/9/13 P. v. Williams CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H039187 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1117755)

v.

STEVEN WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Steven Williams pleaded no contest to a felony violation of former Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The incident apparently occurred outside a San Jose club or bar. The trial court granted probation on specified terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant Williams challenges only the following probation condition: "You shall not have any contact with [the named victim]." Defendant Williams argues that the probation condition is unconstitutional on its face because it lacks an express knowledge requirement. Defendant suggests that he might not recognize the victim and unknowingly have contact with the victim by, for

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example, accidently bumping into the victim on the street.1 He also hypothesizes that the victim might seek contact with him. The People do not agree that a knowledge requirement must be added. They also urge this court to adopt the approach taken by the Third District Court of Appeal in People v. Patel (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 956. They suggest that, like the Third District, this District should automatically imply a knowledge requirement in every probation condition and, thereby, eliminate the need for explicit modification. In Patel, the appellate court announced that henceforth it would "construe every probation condition proscribing a probationer's presence, possession, association, or similar action to require the action be undertaken knowingly" and it would "no longer be necessary to seek a modification of a probation order that fails to expressly include such a scienter requirement." (Id. at pp. 960-961, fn. omitted.) We find it unnecessary to expressly add a knowledge requirement to the challenged probation condition or to imply such a requirement. "A probation condition 'must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,' if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. (People v. Reinertson (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 324-325 . . . .)" (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) "[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of 'fair warning.' (People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 751 . . . .) The rule of fair warning consists of 'the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders' (ibid.), protections that are 'embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions. (U.S.