Little Lake City School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence CA2/3 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Little Lake City School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence CA2/3
California Court of Appeal Nov 26, 2013 No. B244991Unpublished
Filed 11/26/13 Little Lake City School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LITTLE LAKE CITY SCHOOL B244991 DISTRICT, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. BS135319)
v.
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE,
Defendant and Respondent;
EILEEN HAWKINS,
Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed. Law Offices of Eric Bathen, Eric J. Bathen and Jordan C. Meyer for Plaintiff and Appellant. No appearance for Respondent. Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Glenn Rothner and Constance Hsiao for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. _______________________________________
Little Lake City School District (District) appeals the denial of its petition for
a writ of mandate to set aside a decision by the Commission on Professional
Competence (Commission) rejecting the District’s attempted dismissal of
Eileen Hawkins, a special education teacher. The District contends the evidence does
not support the trial court’s determination that there was no cause for dismissal. We
conclude, however, that substantial evidence supports the court’s determination and
(4) unsatisfactory performance, and (5) evident unfitness for service. Hawkins
requested a hearing before the Commission.
2. Administrative Hearing
The Commission conducting an evidentiary hearing in October 2011. Hawkins
represented herself at the hearing. The Commission rendered a decision in December
2011 finding that there was no cause for dismissal.
The decision stated regarding the performance evaluation for the 2007-2008
school year: “As to Respondent’s professionalism, it was not established that
Respondent was failing to collaborate with the general education teachers, or anyone
else. The District offered no testimony from any teacher who had a problem or issue
with Respondent’s ability to collaborate, or lack thereof. Dr. Grant’s other critique, that
Respondent’s students appeared bored, was established. However, the students were
bored because Respondent was utilizing the Systematic Instruction in Phoneme
Awareness, Phonics, Sightwords (SIPPS) program which Dr. Grant herself described as
‘highly scripted and very slow paced.’ Thus, Respondent was merely teaching her
students with the materials that the District had instructed Respondent to utilize.
Dr. Grant’s critique that Respondent was ‘often late in arriving in the morning’ and was
late to staff meetings was not established by the evidence. It strains credibility to
imagine that a teacher, namely Respondent, would be tardy when she had a nearly
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perfect attendance record for 13 years, volunteered for ‘Monday Morning Gate Duty,’
and stayed until 9 or 10 p.m. on many workdays. . . . The other allegations as specified
in the pleadings, as related to this school year, were not established by the evidence.”
The decision stated regarding the performance evaluation for the 2008-2009
school year: “Again Respondent was critiqued for not communicating with other
teachers concerning the progress of her RSP students. This critique was not established
for the same reasoning as set forth in Factual Finding 6 [quoted ante]. The other
allegations as specified in the pleadings, as related to this school year, were not
established by the evidence.”
The decision stated regarding the performance evaluation for the 2009-2010
school year that the District had established that Hawkins was not using the
CELL/ExLL strategies as required by the District, and stated that she should have
requested additional resources, training or assistance if necessary. It also stated that
Hawkins should use graphic organizers, and stated that the other allegations specified in
the pleadings were not established. The decision stated, however, that the District had
failed to follow its own policy requiring a teacher who receives an “unsatisfactory”
rating in “teaching strategies” to receive assistance from a consulting teacher. It stated
that the District’s failure to follow its own policy made the discipline imposed on
Hawkins improper.
The decision stated regarding the 2010-2011 school year that Dr. Ybarra’s
instructions to Hawkins to complete all IEP goals and objectives within one month of
the initial date of the IEP meeting and input all components of the IEP into the SEIS
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computer program within three days of the IEP meeting were reasonable, but those
requirements were inappropriate because the District had failed to provide her with
a consulting teacher as required by its own policy.
The decision stated regarding the 90-Day Performance Improvement Plan,
“Instead of including Ibarra’s prior instructions to Respondent, the PIP required
Respondent to ‘sign and attest’ all IEP reports immediately after the meeting and also
required her to bring a pre-prepared IEP report to the IEP meeting using the SEIS
computer program. These directives were more stringent than those recommended by
Ibarra only two months earlier. Additionally, although the District was aware that
Respondent was having difficulty with her workload, the District added additional
Response to Intervention (RTI) students to her workload. The Commission finds that
requiring Respondent to ‘affirm and attest’ all IEP reports on the same day of the IEP
meeting is unreasonable, as is adding additional RTI students to Respondent’s already
heavy caseload. Further, having an IEP report almost completely filled out before the
IEP meeting is unreasonable. The whole point of an IEP meeting is for the team
members to discuss the student’s specific needs, goals and objectives. As such, much of
the IEP report can not be completed before the IEP meeting concludes, especially since
meeting notes need to be added, goals require updating, some pages require signatures,
and the team needs to be in agreement. . . . [] . . . In sum, the District’s PIP was
unreasonable and virtually ensured Respondent’s failure.”
The Commission’s decision stated further: “Respondent could, in general, have
been more assertive and communicative with the District regarding her need for
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assistance. She could have been more open-minded to new teaching strategies and the
use of a computer. She could have had a more positive attitude toward the
implementation of the SEIS program. However, Respondent was submissive to the
District’s directives. That is, when she had a heavy caseload, she did not complain or
ask for help. Instead, she worked late. Her workload was so heavy that when she was
suspended her students were reassigned to two RSP teachers, rather than only one.
When the District began issuing critical evaluations, she attempted to appease the
District by attempting to perform the tasks they wanted done, no matter how difficult or
unreasonable. While Respondent may not be a perfect teacher, it was undisputed that
she deeply cared for her students and she tried to do her very best. The overall evidence
established that the District did not follow its own policy and proactively try to assist
Respondent. Instead, they asked her to perform in an almost physically impossible
manner. It was established that the District did not have any basis to impose any
discipline against Respondent. Any allegations stated in pleadings that are not
discussed above were not established by the evidence.”
3. Trial Court Proceedings
The District filed a petition for writ of mandate in January 2012 (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1094.5) challenging the Commission’s decision. Hawkins answered the
petition, and the parties filed briefs on the merits. The trial court filed a 16-page
tentative decision. After a hearing on the merits, the court adopted the tentative
decision as its order, but declined to issue a statement of decision absent a timely
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request. Exercising its independent judgment on the evidence in the record, the court
found that there was no cause for dismissal.
The order stated that Hawkins did nothing that was immoral and that the District
apparently had abandoned that charge. It stated that Hawkins did not willfully refuse to
perform any task that she was directed to perform, but instead attempted to do what was
asked of her and worked long hours to do so. It also stated, “[t]he term ‘unprofessional
conduct’ means conduct establishing an unfitness to teach, usually involving incidents
of extracurricular sexual or criminal activity, or use of sexually explicit teaching
materials. [Citation.] Hawkins’ failures were not of this variety. Her failures generally
were those of not completing tasks, not performing tasks on a timely basis, not
communicating and collaborating as required, not preparing and completing IEPs as
directed. None of these failures was shown to be unprofessional.”1
The order stated further, “To meet its burden of showing incompetency, the
District was obligated to show that Hawkins was given multiple opportunities to
perform the job (including aid from a Consulting Teacher), that she was simply unable
to do the tasks assigned, and that those tasks were an important part of her job. The
District has shown that Hawkins was given multiple opportunities and that she failed to
complete certain tasks. It has not shown that she was given the aid of a Consulting
Teacher. More important, the District has not shown how important these tasks were to
1 The trial court did not separately discuss the charge of “evident unfitness for service” and instead considered that charge together with the charge of “unprofessional conduct.”
12
the job. Without expert testimony on the significance of Hawkins’ failures, the District
has not shown incompetency.”
The trial court therefore denied the District’s petition and entered a judgment
ordering the District to reinstate Hawkins as of October 1, 2012; pay her $136,003.30 in
back pay, minus taxes and agreed-upon deductions; and credit her for accrued sick
leave. The District timely appealed the judgment.
CONTENTIONS
The District contends the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that
there was no cause for dismissal and instead shows that Hawkins is evidently unfit to
teach, willfully refused to perform her regular assignment, and committed
unprofessional conduct.2
DISCUSSION
1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review
A school district may dismiss a permanent employee only for one or more causes
specified by statute. (Ed. Code, § 44932, subd. (a).) Among the causes for dismissal
are “[i]mmoral or unprofessional conduct,” “[u]nsatisfactory performance,” “[e]vident
unfitness for service” (ibid.) and “willful refusal to perform regular assignments without
reasonable cause” (id., § 44939). An employee receiving notice of the school district’s
intention to suspend or dismiss the employee is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before
the Commission upon a timely request. (Id., §§ 44934, subd. (a), 44944.) Two of the
2 The District does not argue on appeal that the charges of immoral conduct and unsatisfactory performance should have been sustained.
13
three members of the Commission are required to be credentialed teachers with
experience in the respondent teacher’s discipline. (Id., § 44944, subd. (b).) The
Commission’s decision whether to suspend or dismiss the employee or not to do so
constitutes the final administrative decision. (Id., § 44944, subd. (c)(1), (4).)
A party obtains judicial review of the Commission’s decision by filing a petition
for writ of mandate in the trial court. (Ed. Code, § 44945.) The trial court must
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence in the record and determine whether
the weight of the evidence supports the Commission’s decision. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5, subd. (c).) The Commission has experience and expertise in evaluating
teachers’ performance, and its findings are entitled to a strong presumption of
correctness even under an independent judgment review. (Fukuda v. City of Angels
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817; San Dieguito Union High School Dist. v. Commission on
Professional Competence (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 278, 288.)
On appeal, we must sustain the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported
by substantial evidence in the record. (Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commission on
Professional Competence (1977) 20 Cal.3d 309, 314.) We may consider the findings in
the final administrative decision for guidance in determining whether the trial court’s
judgment is supported by substantial evidence. (Sandarg v. Dental Bd. of California
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor
of the party prevailing at trial and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences
supporting the judgment. (Pasadena, supra, at p. 314.) If more than one inference can
14
reasonably be deduced from the facts, we cannot substitute our own deduction for that
of the trial court. (Ibid.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Hawkins Is Not Evidently Unfit to Teach
a. The District Failed to Establish Many of the Purported Shortcomings and Failures
A teacher is evidently unfit for service within the meaning of Education Code
section 44932, subdivision (a)(5) if he or she is “ ‘clearly not fit, nor adapted to or
unsuitable for teaching, ordinarily by reason of temperamental defects or
inadequacies.’ . . . ‘evident unfitness for service’ connotes a fixed character trait,
presumably not remediable merely on receipt of notice that one’s conduct fails to meet
the expectations of the employing school district.” (Woodland Joint Unified School
Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1444.)
Although “immoral or unprofessional conduct” is also set forth as a cause for dismissal
(Ed. Code, § 44932, subd. (a)(1)), such conduct can justify a dismissal only if it
indicates an unfitness to teach. Thus, the determinative test is fitness to teach. (Board
of Education v. Jack M. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 691, 696-697.)
The District argues that Hawkins’s “pervasive failure to accept responsibility for
her shortcomings as a teacher, her stubborn unwillingness to acknowledge her failures
even in the face of uncontroverted and unambiguous evidence, and her unwillingness
and reluctance to accept assistance to improve” indicate that she is clearly not fit,
adapted to, or suitable for teaching. Even if we assume arguendo that the conduct the
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District describes would establish evident unfitness for service, there is contrary
evidence in the record.
Hawkins disputed the criticisms in her performance evaluations both in her
written rebuttals and in her testimony before the Commission. She testified that she
instructed a large number of students with learning impairments, and that she was busy
instructing students throughout the day and typically worked until 9:00 p.m. three days
per week in order to complete the required reports. She testified that it was difficult to
find time to meet with the general education teachers because the teachers were busy
preparing for class in the mornings and she was busy instructing students during the
school day, and she was never offered a substitute teacher on collaboration dates. She
stated that she would call the teacher if she had a concern and that some teachers came
to her. The District presented no teacher testimony supporting the claim of failure to
collaborate and communicate.
Hawkins testified that she was never absent from Studebaker, having worked
there since the 2003-2004 school year, and disputed the statement in the 2007-2008
performance evaluation that she was “rarely absent.” She also disputed the statement
that she was “often late to arrive in the morning and is frequently late to morning and
afternoon staff meetings.” She testified that she was late only on rare occasions when
there was a major accident on the freeway, never missed her gate duty in the morning,
was late for morning meetings only if she was on a phone call at the time, and was
usually the first person to arrive to the afternoon meetings.
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Hawkins disputed the statement that she failed to use CELL/ExLL instructional
strategies, stating that she had incorporated those strategies but also had to address goals
and objectives based on the weaknesses identified in her students. She disputed the
criticism of her use of space in the classroom, stating that she shared the classroom with
a speech therapist, the back door was kept locked requiring the students to come and go
through a single door, and there were limitations on her use of space in the room.
Hawkins also disputed the statement that the materials she used were not aligned
with the students’ instructional levels, stating that she tested the students, formulated
goals and objectives based on the results of the testing, and used instructional materials
appropriate for those goals and objectives. She stated that her responsibilities as
a special education teacher differed from those of a general education teacher, and yet
she was being evaluated as if she were a general education teacher. She explained the
reading strategies that she used and stated that the criticisms of her reading instruction
were unfounded. Hawkins also presented testimony by teachers and a parent describing
her as an effective teacher who was well-liked by her students and collaborated with
other teachers.
Hawkins testified that her workload was heavy and that she did not have the time
to complete some tasks and was frustrated at times. Although her 2009-2010
performance evaluation stated that she was required to receive assistance from
a consulting teacher, there is no evidence that such assistance was offered to her.
The Commission’s decision also supports the conclusion that many of the
criticisms in the performance evaluations were unfounded. The Commission found that
17
the District failed to establish a failure to collaborate and communicate with the general
education teachers and failed to establish that she often arrived late in the morning and
was late to staff meetings. The Commission found that the District had established that
Hawkins was not using the CELL/ExLL strategies as required. The Commission also
found, however, that the District failed to follow its own policy requiring a teacher who
receives an unsatisfactory rating in “teaching strategies” to receive assistance from
a consulting teacher, and found that the 90-Day Performance Improvement Plan was
unreasonable and “virtually ensured Respondent’s failure.” The Commission concluded
that Hawkins “deeply cared for her students and she tried to do her very best,” that she
attempted to perform the tasks requested by the District “no matter how difficult or
unreasonable,” and that there was no cause for any discipline. The trial court,
exercising its independent judgment, found that there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the Commission’s decision.
b. The Morrison Factors Do Not Compel the Conclusion that Hawkins Is Unfit to Teach
The California Supreme Court in Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969)
1 Cal.3d 214 set forth a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether
a teacher’s conduct indicates that the teacher is unfit to teach (Morrison factors). Those
factors are: “[1] the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected students or
fellow teachers, [2] the degree of such adversity anticipated, [3] the proximity or
remoteness in time of the conduct, [4] the type of teaching certificate held by the party
involved, [5] the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the
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conduct, [6] the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the
conduct, [7] the likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct, and [8] the
extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling effect upon
the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or other teachers.” (Id. at p. 229,
fns. omitted.)
The District’s analysis of the Morrison factors assumes that the evidence
establishes all of the shortcomings and failures described in the performance
evaluations. Our conclusion that there is substantial evidence to the contrary
undermines the District’s analysis. We conclude that the trial court, exercising its
independent judgment, reasonably concluded based on substantial evidence in the
record, consistent with the Commission’s decision, that Hawkins was not evidently unfit
to teach. Our consideration of the Morrison factors does not compel a contrary
conclusion.
3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Hawkins Did Not Willfully Refuse to Perform her Regular Assignment
The District argues that the same facts purportedly showing Hawkins’s evident
unfitness for service also show that she willfully refused to perform her regular
assignment. It argues that the evidence shows that she consistently failed to accept and
acknowledge criticism and failed to comply with the District’s directives. We conclude
that the evidence discussed ante constitutes substantial evidence that Hawkins did not
willfully refuse to perform, but instead attempted to do what was required of her. The
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trial court exercising its independent judgment reasonably so concluded, consistent with
the Commission’s decision. The District has shown no prejudicial error in this regard.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Hawkins is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CROSKEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
KLEIN, P. J.
KITCHING, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the District's petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that there was no cause to dismiss the teacher.
Issues
Did the trial court err in finding that the District failed to establish cause for the dismissal of a special education teacher?
Does substantial evidence support the trial court's determination that the teacher was not evidently unfit for service or guilty of unprofessional conduct?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude, however, that substantial evidence supports the court’s determination and therefore will affirm the judgment.”
“The overall evidence established that the District did not follow its own policy and proactively try to assist Respondent. Instead, they asked her to perform in an almost physically impossible manner.”
“Without expert testimony on the significance of Hawkins’ failures, the District has not shown incompetency.”