Riverside Sheriff's Assn. v. County of Riverside CA4/2 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Riverside Sheriff's Assn. v. County of Riverside CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Nov 26, 2013 No. E054180Unpublished
Filed 11/26/13 Riverside Sheriff’s Assn. v. County of Riverside CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
RIVERSIDE SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E054180
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC526383)
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ronald L. Taylor, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.
VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Hayes & Cunningham, Ricardo Ochoa, Amanda K. Hansen, Dennis J. Hayes, and
Christopher H. Conti for Plaintiff and Appellant.
The Zappia Law Firm, Edward P. Zappia, Anna Zappia, and Day B. Hadaegh for
Defendants and Appellants.
Riverside Sheriff’s Association (RSA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus
against the County of Riverside (County). The petition alleged that the County violated
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RSA’s memorandum of understanding (MOU) and the Riverside salary ordinance by
hiring temporary employees to fill group counselor positions within the probation
“Proof” is the establishment by evidence of a requisite degree of belief concerning
a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court. (Evid. Code, § 190; Barnett v. Penske
Truck Leasing, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.) Thus, if a defendant concedes or
stipulates to a matter prior to trial that he or she had previously denied in RFA, such that
the plaintiff is spared the expense of proving that fact, cost of proof is not appropriately
ordered. (Wagy v. Brown (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) Awarding costs of proof is
improper if the party who denied the RFA held a reasonably entertained good faith belief
it would prevail on the issue at trial. (Miller v. American Greetings Corp., supra, 161
Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.)
The determination of whether “there were no good reasons for the denial,”
whether the requested admission was “of substantial importance,” and the amount of
expenses to be awarded, if any, are all within the sound discretion of the trial court.
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(Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co., supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 508.) On appeal, the
trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless the appellate demonstrates that the lower
court abused its discretion. (Ibid.; see also Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 618, 637, fn. 12.) One of the essential attributes of abuse of discretion is that
it must clearly appear to effect injustice. (Dorman v. DWLC Corp. (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815.) Discretion is abused whenever, in its exercise, the court
exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. (Ibid.)
The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and unless a
clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice, a
reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its
discretionary power. (Ibid.)
1. The Cost of Proof Sanctions Awarded to RSA
The County argues that sanctions against it were improper because it had
stipulated it had violated the salary ordinance in the past in the arbitration hearing, and its
denial of the RFA in the current proceeding was accompanied by copies of payroll
documents used by RSA to show that the County had cured its prior violations, making
any alleged violations irrelevant. However, the County’s act of providing documentation
to RSA did not obviate the need for proof. The matter was submitted for decision on the
basis of trial briefs. RSA’s trial brief included points and authorities in support of its
position that the County violated the salary ordinance, and submitted the documentation
obtained during discovery to prove the violation.
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Although the County could have conceded the issue, it submitted points and
authorities in opposition to the petition. The County argued it did not violate the salary
ordinance, but that even if RSA could establish any technical violation in failing to obtain
prior approval for employing temporary group counselors in excess of 1,000 hours, the
County had cured any such violation by subsequently obtaining board approval to do so.
The County did not stipulate that it had violated the salary ordinance, thereby sparing
RSA the need to submit proof to the court.
The County’s denial was unreasonable in light of the fact it had previously
stipulated to the fact that it had violated the salary ordinance in the earlier arbitration
proceedings. Nor did the County have a good faith belief it would prevail on the issue at
trial in light of the prior admission. The court was well within its discretion to order the
County to pay to RSA the cost of proof of that fact.
2. Cost of Proof Sanctions Denied to the County
The County next argues that because the case law has established that the MOU
does not cover temporary employees, RSA had no reasonable basis to deny the County’s
request for admissions that it had not violated the MOU. It relies on the holding of
Jenkins v. County of Riverside, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th 583. In that case, the County of
Riverside terminated the employment of plaintiff, who was a temporary employee, after
she requested reasonable accommodation for a disability, due to the fact that she had
exceeded the number of hours under the salary ordinance. This case does not support the
County’s position because it is distinguishable.
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The plaintiff in Jenkins filed a complaint against the County for violation of her
civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983), breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and
violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. The trial court concluded that
temporary employees whose terms of employment have expired have no right to
reasonable accommodation where that accommodation would extend the employment
beyond the statutory limit. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the County, and
was affirmed on appeal. This court held that the plaintiff was not a regular, permanent
employee, despite the fact she had worked in excess of 1,000 hours, and could be
terminated at any time for any reason. (Jenkins v. County of Riverside, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) “As a matter of California law, the mere lapse of time that an
employee occupies a position designated as ‘temporary’ is not sufficient, of itself, to
render the employee a de facto regular or permanent employee.” (Id. at p. 615.)
However, the plaintiff in Jenkins was not employed in a position covered by
collective bargaining unit, such as RSA, so that case did not determine whether or not a
violation of the salary ordinance constituted a violation of the MOU. A case is not
authority for propositions not considered. (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45
Cal.4th 243, 254.) RSA’s petition sought a determination that the violation of the salary
ordinance constituted a violation of the MOU, so that issue was presented squarely in the
present case.
At the hearing on the motion to recover cost of proof, RSA argued that its denial
of the RFA was based on a reasonable belief it would prevail on that issue. While the
trial court disagreed with RSA’s position, it considered the argument legally tenable and
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determined that RSA did not deny the RFA in bad faith. The court considered everything
that had been submitted in support of the County’s request for cost of proof sanctions but
denied the request.
The court’s conclusion was a reasonable exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each side will bear its own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST J.
RICHLI J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, finding the litigation was primarily motivated by the plaintiff's own pecuniary interests rather than the public interest, and affirmed the trial court's discretionary rulings on discovery sanctions.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding cost of proof sanctions against the County and denying the County's cross-motion for such sanctions.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court found RSA was motivated primarily by its own pecuniary interests.”
“The trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless the appellate demonstrates that the lower court abused its discretion.”