California Court of Appeal Oct 30, 2013 No. D062264Unpublished
Filed 10/30/13 P. v. Raines CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062264
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD230332)
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL RAINES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Peter C.
Deddeh, Judge. Remanded with instructions to amend abstract of judgment; affirmed in
all other respects.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lise S. Jacobson and Andrew
Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Christopher Michael Raines guilty of (1) committing a lewd act upon
a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)),1 with the further finding that he personally inflicted
bodily harm (§ 288, subd. (i)(1)); and (2) felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)), with the
further finding that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a child under the age of
five (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)). The jury also made true findings on allegations under the
"One Strike" law2 that, as to the lewd act count, Raines personally inflicted bodily harm
on a victim under 14 years of age and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 667.61,
subds. (a), (c), (d)).
The trial court sentenced Raines to prison for an indeterminate term of 25 years to
life.
Raines contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting into evidence statements
made in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda);
(2) admitting into evidence testimony describing prior acts of sexual abuse; (3) imposing
and then staying additional prison terms for the lewd act count (count 1); and
(4) imposing a $60 fee that it referred to as an "ICNA" fee at sentencing.
We conclude that the trial court erred by imposing and staying additional prison
terms for count 1, but that Raines's remaining arguments lack merit. We accordingly
remand for the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to remove reference to the
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 "Section 667.61 . . . is sometimes called the 'One Strike' law." (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 99.)
2
additional imposed and stayed prison terms for count 1, and we otherwise affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Raines was caring for a 22-month-old girl (the Child) on October 17, while her
mother (the Mother) was at work. While with Raines, the Child suffered a serious injury
to her genital area caused by blunt force trauma consistent with the forcible insertion of a
penis or other object into the Child's vagina. The injury consisted of a jagged rip of
approximately 1.5 centimeters in the Child's perineum, between her vagina and anus.
There were also serious injuries to the Child's internal vaginal structures, and the Child's
hymen was broken and torn away. The injury caused a large amount of bleeding that
soaked the Child's diapers. A pediatrician who specializes in child abuse later examined
the Child and determined that the injury did not appear to be the result of an accident, and
the insertion of fingers into the Child's vagina would not have caused such an extensive
injury.
Deciding that the injury required medical attention, Raines drove to meet the
Mother at her workplace to pick up the Child's medical insurance card before driving to
the hospital. On the way to the hospital, Raines told the Mother that the injury occurred
while he and the Child were in the shower and the Child slipped out of his arms. After
examining the Child, an emergency room doctor suspected sexual abuse and notified the
police.
3
Police officers spoke to Raines at the hospital. Raines initially told them that
while he was taking a shower with the Child, she slipped out of his arms and he grabbed
her while she was falling, which may have caused her injuries. When a police officer
told Raines that, according to the doctor, the Child's injuries were not consistent with a
slip in the shower, Raines put his head down and said, "My life is over." After being
silent with his head down for several minutes, Raines stated that the Child did not slip in
the shower. Raines explained that, instead, the Child was injured when he was changing
her diaper on the bed. According to Raines, the Child was falling off the bed when he
grabbed her to stop her fall, possibly causing his finger to penetrate her "butt."
The Child was transferred to Children's Hospital, where she underwent surgery to
repair her injuries.
While Raines was at Children's Hospital with the Child, he was interviewed by
police detectives in a private room. The interview, which was recorded, commenced
shortly before midnight on October 17 and did not end until 1:47 a.m. on October 18.
Near the beginning of the interview, Raines was informed of his Miranda rights and
agreed to speak to the detectives. Raines repeated the claim that the Child was injured
when he was changing her diapers and he grabbed her as she fell off the bed. He stated
that he originally claimed the injury happened in the shower because he was "in panic
mode" when he first got to the hospital. He denied touching the Child with his penis.
Early in the morning on October 18, Raines was taken to the police department
where a nurse performed a sexual assault examination on Raines, including taking swabs
from Raines's penis and scrotum. A subsequent DNA analysis of a bloody swab from
4
Raines's penis showed the Child as a possible contributor of some of the DNA on the
swab.
Around 8:00 a.m. on October 18, a police interviewer and a police detective
questioned Raines at the police station in a recorded interview (the third police
interview). During the third police interview, Raines initially maintained his prior claim
that he must have accidentally injured the Child when she fell from the bed during a
diaper change. However, near the end of the interview, Raines stated that he
intentionally inserted two fingers into the Child's vagina to restrain the Child when he
lost his temper due to the difficulty of changing the Child's diaper while she was moving
around. At the conclusion of the interview, the police detective arrested Raines.
A search of the home where Raines was caring for the Child revealed — among
other things — a blood stain on the mattress where the Child's diaper was changed, a
bloody sheet from that bed that Raines admitted putting in the outside trash can before
going to the hospital with the Child, and blood stains on the floor of the bedroom.
Raines was charged with one count of committing a lewd act upon a child under
the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)), with the further allegation for sentencing purposes under
section 288, subdivision (i)(1) that he personally inflicted bodily harm, and further
allegations for sentencing purposes under the One Strike law that he personally inflicted
bodily harm on a victim under 14 years of age and personally inflicted great bodily injury
(§ 667.61, subds. (a), (c), (d)(6) & (7)). Raines was also charged with one count of
felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)).
5
At trial, two of Raines's female relatives (Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2), who were
both 17 years old at the time of trial, testified that they were sexually molested by Raines
when they were approximately three and four years old and Raines was an adult.
Girl No. 1 testified that when she was approximately three years old, Raines
walked into the room, exposed his penis to her, and asked whether she wanted to touch it
and whether he could touch her. She poked at Raines's penis and then ran out of the
room after he tried to touch her crotch. According to Girl No. 1, she disclosed the
incident to her parents shortly after it occurred. Girl No. 1's mother testified at trial that
she learned of the incident shortly after it happened but decided not to take any action
against Raines after she spoke with him and he contended it was a misunderstanding.
Girl No. 2 testified that when she was approximately four years old Raines came
into her bedroom and asked her if she would touch his body parts and have sex with him.
She did not understand the question and said "Yes." Raines pulled down his pants and
got on top of her. It hurt her and she said "Ow," after which Raines stopped and left the
room. Girl No. 2 remembered bleeding from her vagina onto her legs. According to the
testimony of Girl No. 2 and of her mother, Girl No. 2 disclosed the molestation to her
mother when she was approximately 13 years old, at which time her mother did not take
any action against Raines.
The jury found Raines guilty on both counts and further found the bodily injury
allegations to be true. The trial court sentenced Raines to prison for a term of 25 years to
life.
6
II
DISCUSSION
A. Admission into Evidence of Raines's Statements Made During the Third Police Interview
Raines contends that the statements he made during the third police interview —
which took place at approximately 8:00 a.m. on October 18 — should not have been
admitted at trial because he was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to that interview.
1. Applicable Law
The general rule excluding statements obtained in violation of Miranda is well
established. "Miranda . . . , supra, 384 U.S. 436, and its progeny protect the privilege
against self-incrimination by precluding suspects from being subjected to custodial
interrogation unless and until they have knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to
remain silent, to have an attorney present, and, if indigent, to have counsel appointed."
(People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384.) Statements obtained in violation of
Miranda are generally inadmissible to establish guilt. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th
405, 440.)
2. Because He Made No Objection at Trial, Raines Has Forfeited His Appellate Argument That His Statements During the Third Police Interview Should Not Have Been Admitted into Evidence
An evidentiary objection at trial is a prerequisite to obtaining reversal of a
judgment based on the erroneous admission of evidence. As our Supreme Court has
explained, " 'Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be reversed
because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a
7
motion to strike it was "timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of
the objection." Pursuant to this statute, " 'we have consistently held that the "defendant's
failure to make a timely and specific objection" on the ground asserted on appeal makes
that ground not cognizable.' " ' " (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 116.) "Miranda-
based claims are governed by this rule. 'The general rule is that a defendant must make a
specific objection on Miranda grounds at the trial level in order to raise a Miranda claim
on appeal.' " (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 854.)3
Here, Raines made no objection at trial to the admission of his statements during
the third police interview. Accordingly, Raines may not pursue an appeal based on the
contention that the statements he made during the third police interview were erroneously
admitted into evidence in violation of Miranda.
3. Raines Has Not Established Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Raines argues that if the Miranda issue has not been preserved for appeal due to
defense counsel's failure to object in the trial court, the judgment should be reversed
because he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
"Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the
3 Although Raines contends that we have the discretion to consider an argument made for the first time on appeal, that principle does not apply here because the asserted ground for reversal is the purportedly erroneous admission of evidence to which there was no objection at trial. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [an appellate court is barred from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party "when the issue involves the admission (Evid. Code, § 353) or exclusion (id., § 354) of evidence"].)
8
assistance of counsel." (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.) A defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to show: (1) counsel's
performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; Ledesma, at pp. 216, 218.)
Prejudice is shown when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." (Strickland, at p. 694.)
Further, as important here, "[r]eviewing courts reverse convictions on direct
appeal on the ground of incompetence of counsel only if the record on appeal
demonstrates there could be no rational tactical purpose for counsel's omissions."
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 442; see also People v. Anderson (2001) 25
Cal.4th 543, 569.) "In the usual case, where counsel's trial tactics or strategic reasons for
challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance
of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel's acts or
decision whether to object to the admission of evidence is 'inherently tactical,' and a
failure to object will rarely reflect deficient performance by counsel." (People v.
Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1335.)
Here, because there could have been a tactical reason for defense counsel's failure
to object to the admission of Raines's statements made during the third police interview,
9
the record on direct appeal is insufficient to establish that defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance. One plausible reason for defense counsel's failure to object to the
admission of the statements Raines made during the third police interview could be that
defense counsel believed it would be useful to have the jury hear the explanation for the
Child's injuries offered by Raines in that interview. Indeed, in the third police interview
Raines provided a more plausible non-sexual explanation for the injuries than his
previous claims that the Child was injured while falling off the bed or in the shower.
During closing argument, defense counsel focused on Raines's statements made during
the third police interview, arguing that Raines's explanation for the Child's injuries was
reasonable, and based on that explanation, although Raines may have committed child
abuse as charged under count 2, he did not have the sexual intent necessary to support a
finding of guilt on the lewd act count.4 Because we cannot say that there was "no
conceivable reason for counsel's acts or omissions," Raines has not established
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 926.)
4 During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Raines's version of events as stated in the third police interview was a reasonable explanation for the Child's injuries. "There's nothing unreasonable about what Mr. Raines said happened here. . . . His version of events, while they came at the end, . . . it's not unreasonable." Defense counsel stated, "Another reasonable explanation for that [injury] is exactly what you heard Mr. Raines say after he was broken down by all the officers. Of fingers going in and fingers pushing down. And the law tells you that you have to accept the one that points to innocence." As defense counsel explained to the jury, "That's what count 2 is. That Mr. Raines, for whatever terrible reasons that we're not here to figure out, abused [the Child] and hurt her physically. But they can't prove it to you that it was done sexually."
10
In addition, the factual record is undeveloped regarding the circumstances of the
third police interview. Witnesses at trial were not questioned about whether Raines was
reminded of his Miranda rights prior to the beginning of the recorded portion of the third
police interview. Further, counsel's questioning did not explore the issue of whether
Raines was in police custody during the third police interview, and thus it is unclear
whether the interview qualified as a custodial interrogation under Miranda. (See People
v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1167 [" 'An interrogation is custodial, for purposes of
requiring advisements under Miranda, when "a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" ' " with "the pertinent
question being whether the person was formally arrested or subject to a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest"].) Therefore, it is
possible that defense counsel had information about the circumstances of the third police
interview that are not apparent from the undeveloped factual record — such as that
Raines was reminded of his Miranda rights or was not in police custody — which
reasonably could explain counsel's failure to argue for the exclusion of Raines's
statements. " ' "[If] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to
act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation," the
claim on appeal must be rejected.' [Citations.] A claim of ineffective assistance in such a
case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding." (People v. Mendoza
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.) In this case, because the factual record
concerning the circumstances of the third police interview is not adequately developed,
11
this direct appeal is not the appropriate forum for evaluating Raines's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
B. Raines's Challenge to the Admission of the Testimony Concerning the Molestation of Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2 Is Without Merit
We next consider Raines's argument that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of the molestation of Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2.
1. Raines's Challenge to the Constitutionality of Evidence Code Section 1108
We first consider Raines's constitutional challenge to the evidentiary provision
under which the trial court admitted evidence of Raines's sexual abuse of Girl No. 1 and
Girl No. 2.
The evidence was admitted under Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a),
which states: "In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense,
evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made
inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section
352."5
5 Evidence Code section 1101 addresses the exclusion of evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.
12
Raines contends that the trial court improperly relied on Evidence Code section
1108 for the admission of evidence in this action because section 1108 violates
constitutional principles of due process and equal protection.6
We reject the due process argument because our Supreme Court has decided that
Evidence Code section 1108 does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to due
process (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 916 (Falsetta)), and we are required to
follow that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.)
We also reject the argument that Evidence Code section 1108 violates Raines's
constitutional right to equal protection. Although our Supreme Court has not expressly
ruled on the equal protection argument, a well-reasoned intermediate appellate court
opinion has rejected it (People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 182-184), and our
Supreme Court has cited that decision with approval. As our Supreme Court has
explained, "Fitch . . . rejected the defendant's equal protection challenge, concluding that
the Legislature reasonably could create an exception to the propensity rule for sex
offenses, because of their serious nature, and because they are usually committed secretly
and result in trials that are largely credibility contests." (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 918; see also People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1312 [observing that
"the Supreme Court in Falsetta appeared to indicate its agreement with the Fitch court's
6 As Raines recognizes, prior courts have rejected constitutional challenges to Evidence Code section 1108, but he raises the argument primarily to preserve it for a later federal post-conviction review.
13
equal protection holding"].) We follow Fitch in concluding that Evidence Code section
1108 does not infringe upon Raines's constitutional right to equal protection. (See People
on Evid. Code, § 1108 "[f]or the reasons best expressed in Fitch, which were endorsed in
Falsetta"].)
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Exclude the Evidence of Other Sexual Offenses Under Evidence Code Section 352
Raines next contends that, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the trial court
should have granted his motion in limine to exclude evidence of his sexual molestation of
Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2.
Evidence Code section 352 allows the trial court, in its discretion, to "exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Ibid.)
"We apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial
court's ruling under Evidence Code section 352." (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th
1100, 1121.) "We will not find that a court abuses its discretion in admitting . . . other
sexual acts evidence unless its ruling ' "falls outside the bounds of reason[,]" ' " and "the
court has exercised its discretion in a manner that has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice." (People v. Miramontes (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th at 1085, 1098 (Miramontes).)
"The weighing process under Evidence Code section 352 'depends upon the trial
court's consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case, rather than upon the
14
mechanical application of automatic rules.' " (Miramontes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1097.) When considering whether to exclude evidence of another sexual offense under
Evidence Code section 352, "trial judges must consider such factors as its nature,
relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the
likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its
similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on
the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less
prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the
defendant's other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details
surrounding the offense." (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) "[T]he probative value
of 'other crimes' evidence is increased by the relative similarity between the charged and
uncharged offenses, the close proximity in time of the offenses, and the independent
sources of evidence (the victims) in each offense," and "the prejudicial impact of the
evidence is reduced if the uncharged offenses resulted in actual convictions and a prison
term, ensuring that the jury would not be tempted to convict the defendant simply to
punish him for the other offenses, and that the jury's attention would not be diverted by
having to make a separate determination whether defendant committed the other
offenses." (Ibid., italics deleted.) Further, in evaluating whether to admit evidence of
other sexual offenses, the court should consider " 'whether "[t]he testimony describing
defendant's uncharged acts . . . was no stronger and no more inflammatory than the
testimony concerning the charged offenses." ' " (Miramontes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1097.) " ' "The 'prejudice' referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence
15
which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against defendant as an individual and
which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, 'prejudicial' is not
synonymous with 'damaging.' " ' " (Id. at p. 1098.)
As an initial matter, we observe that the evidence of Raines's molestation of Girl
No. 1 and Girl No. 2 was highly probative on a central factual dispute in this case, which
was whether Raines injured the Child with his fingers after losing his temper or injured
her when he had sexual intercourse with her. "[U]ncharged prior offenses that are very
similar in nature to the charged crime logically will have more probative value in proving
propensity to commit the charged offense." (People v. Hernandez (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 953, 966; see also Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917 ["the relative
similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses" increases the probative value].)
Here, the incidents involving Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2 were both very similar to the
incident involving the Child in that they both involved intentional sexual conduct with
very young girls in which Raines used his penis and either touched or attempted to touch
the girls' genitals. There were even further similarities between this case and the incident
involving Girl No. 2 in that Raines had sexual intercourse with Girl No. 2 and injured her
in the same way that the Child was injured, causing bleeding from her vagina. Therefore,
the earlier incidents were highly probative of whether Raines acted in conformity with his
16
prior conduct by engaging in intentional sexual acts with young girls rather than injuring
the Child through non-sexual contact as he claimed.7
Despite the highly probative nature of the evidence, Raines contends that it should
have been excluded because it was unreliable due to certain inconsistencies in the
descriptions given by the girls over time as they spoke to different people about the
abuse. Raines contends that "[t]he trial testimony of [the mother], [Girl No. 1], and [Girl
No. 2] . . . differed significantly on important facts. It also differed from what they told
[an investigating police officer in this case] during her forensic interviews. This showed
the testimony to be unreliable, and rendered the differing stories confusing."8
As we have noted, one factor a trial court may consider in determining whether to
exclude evidence of a prior sexual offense under Evidence Code section 352 is "the
degree of certainty of its commission." (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.) In the
circumstances of this case, we do not believe that the inconsistencies and vagueness in
the girls' testimony renders the testimony so unreliable that it should have been excluded.
7 Raines also specifically challenges the trial court's admission of the testimony of the girls' mother, claiming that "[a]t the least [the mother's] testimony should have been excluded under [Evidence Code] section 352 because it added nothing to the testimony of [Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2]." We disagree. The mother's testimony was relevant because she was an adult at the time the incidents occurred, she was able to corroborate the girls' sometimes vague memories from when they were much younger, and her testimony that the girls disclosed the molestation to her several years ago bolstered the girls' credibility.
8 Raines is referring to inconsistencies in some of the details that the girls gave at different times, such as in statements to their mother, to the police investigator or at trial. The differences concerned details such as whether the molestation occurred on a bed or on the floor, whether the girl was holding a doll when Raines entered her room and whether the girl was asleep during the molestation.
17
As Raines acknowledges, "the inconsistent and confusi[ng] evidence in this case was
likely due to the victims' young ages when the abuse occurred." Raines targeted very
young girls for sexual molestation, which meant that the victims would likely have
relatively vague memories as a result of their young age at the time of the abuse. The
trial court reasonably could conclude that the girls' young ages at the time they were
victimized provides a reasonable explanation for any inconsistencies. The trial court
could also reasonably conclude that it would be unjust to allow Raines to benefit from the
fact that his victims were too young to have precise memories of the abuse. Given the
highly probative nature of the girls' testimony, the trial court was well within its
discretion to decide that any prejudice due to its unreliability was outweighed by the
probative value of the evidence.9
Raines also argues that the incidents involving Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2 were too
remote in time to be probative. "No specific time limits have been established for
determining when an uncharged offense is so remote as to be inadmissible[,]" and
"substantial similarities between the prior and the charged offenses" may serve to
"balance out the remoteness of the prior offenses." (People v. Branch (2001) 91
9 We note also that the evidence of Raines's sexual abuse of Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2 was no more inflammatory than the facts of the instant offense, as Raines's physical contact with Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2 was no more intrusive than his contact with the Child, and the injuries to Girl No. 1 and Girl No. 2, if any, were less serious than the injury to the Child. Therefore, the trial court's consideration of " 'whether "[t]he testimony describing defendant's uncharged acts . . . was no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses" ' " (Miramontes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1097) would reasonably have weighed in favor of admitting the evidence. 18
Cal.App.4th 274, 284-285.) As described at trial, the incidents occurred approximately
12 years before the Child was injured. Courts have held that a time gap of even longer
than 12 years is not too remote in time when the evidence is otherwise probative. (See
Waples, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395 [20 years]; People v. Frazier (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 30, 41 [15 or 16 years].) The trial court reasonably could decide that due to
the close factual similarities between the prior incidents and the current offense, the
evidence of the earlier incidents was not unduly prejudicial merely because they occurred
12 years before.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence
Code section 352 by allowing the introduction of evidence that Raines molested Girl
No. 1 and Girl No. 2.
B. Raines's Challenge to His Sentence
1. Raines's Challenge to Trial Court's Imposition and Staying of Additional Prison Terms for Count 1
The trial court sentenced Raines to a term of 25 years to life on count 1.
Specifically, Raines was sentenced pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (a) —
commonly known as the "One Strike law" — which provides for a sentence of 25 years
to life when a defendant is convicted of an enumerated sexual offense (including, as
relevant here, violation of § 288, subd. (a)) and the People plead and prove one or more
specified aggravating circumstances (§ 667.61, subd. (b)). Here, the jury made a true
finding on two such aggravating circumstances, namely that Raines personally inflicted
19
bodily harm on a victim under 14 years of age and that he personally inflicted great
bodily injury. (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6) & (7).)
Although Raines does not dispute that a sentence of 25 years to life is the correct
sentence for him to be serving under the One Strike law, he takes issue with the trial
court's process for arriving at that sentence, in which it imposed and stayed additional
prison terms for count 1. Raines asks us to remand this case so that the trial court can
correct its error and issue an amended abstract of judgment.
As an initial matter, we describe the trial court's approach to sentencing Raines for
his conviction in count 1 for committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subds. (a),
(i)(1)).
First, during the sentencing hearing, before addressing the One Strike law, the trial
court explained that it was imposing a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for
Raines's conviction on count 1 pursuant to section 288, subdivision (i)(1), which provides
for that sentence when the defendant has personally inflicted bodily harm in committing a
lewd act against a child.10 The trial court then stayed the sentence of life with the
possibility of parole pursuant to section 654.
Next, turning to the sentence indicated in the One Strike law, the trial court
imposed two terms of 25 years to life, corresponding to each of the two aggravating
10 Section 288, subdivision (i)(1) provides for a sentence of life with the possibility of parole if a defendant guilty of committing a lewd action against a child under section 288, subdivision (a) has been found to have personally inflicted bodily harm upon the victim.
20
circumstances that the jury found to be true (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(6) & (7)). It stayed the
first of those 25-year-to-life terms and ordered Raines to serve the second term.11 In
accordance with the trial court's pronouncement at sentencing, the abstract of judgment
states (1) the sentence imposed pursuant to section 288, subdivisions (a) and (i)(1) is
stayed; (2) one of the 25-year-to-life terms imposed under the One Strike law is stayed;
and (3) the term to be served is the other 25-year-to-life term imposed under the One
Strike law. The abstract of judgment also lists the sentences imposed under the One
Strike Law as "Enhancement."
Raines contends that according to the approach required by statute, (1) the trial
court should not have imposed and stayed the life with the possibility of parole sentence
imposed under section 288, subdivision (i)(1); and (2) the trial court should not have
imposed and stayed the second 25-year-to-life sentence imposed under the One Strike
law. Instead, according to Raines, his sentence for count 1 should simply reflect a single
25-year-to-life sentence imposed pursuant to the One Strike law. Raines also takes issue
with the abstract of judgment's description of the sentence imposed under the One Strike
law as an "Enhancement."
The Attorney General agrees that the trial court's approach was incorrect and that
the judgment should be amended to reflect a single 25-year-to-life term for count 1. As
we will explain, we agree with the parties.
11 The trial court also stayed the 11-year sentence imposed for count 2 under section 654.
21
We begin with the principle that the One Strike law is an alternative sentencing
scheme, not an enhancement. "[T]he One Strike law does not establish an enhancement,
but 'sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain enumerated sex
crimes' when a defendant commits one of those crimes under specified circumstances."
(People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 118.) Under the One Strike law, the trial court
is required to impose the sentence specified under that sentencing scheme "unless another
provision of law provides for a greater penalty." (§ 667.61, subd. (f).)
Because the One Strike law is an alternative sentencing scheme under which the
harsher penalty is to be imposed instead of the penalty specified by other provisions of
law, the trial court improperly sentenced Raines under both section 288,
subdivision (i)(1) and the One Strike law. As the One Strike law provides for the greater
penalty of 25 years to life (§ 667.61, subd. (a)), the trial court should have imposed only
that sentence. There was no legal basis for the trial court to impose and then stay the
sentence specified in section 288, subdivision (i)(1).12
Next, the One Strike law does not provide for the imposition of two sentences of
25 years to life for the same count when the jury makes a true finding as to two
aggravating circumstances. Section 667.61, subdivision (f) states that "if any additional
circumstance or circumstances specified in subdivision (d) or (e) [i.e., aggravating
circumstances] have been pled and proved, the minimum number of circumstances shall
12 As the penalty required by the One Strike law is not an enhancement, the trial court further erred by listing the sentence under the One Strike law as an "Enhancement" on the abstract of judgment. 22
be used as the basis for imposing the term provided in subdivision (a) . . . and any other
additional circumstance or circumstances shall be used to impose any punishment or
enhancement authorized under any other provision of law." (§ 667.61, subd. (f), italics
added.) Because the additional circumstances are used to impose punishment under any
other provision of law, the statute does not authorize the use of additional circumstances
to impose a second 25-year-to-life term for the same count under the One Strike law.
Both parties agree that the reasonable approach under the One Strike law when the jury
has made a true finding on additional circumstances that are not needed to meet the
requirement for the imposition of a 25-year-to-life term pursuant to section 667.61,
subdivision (a) is for the true finding on the additional circumstance to simply remain on
the record as an additional unimposed special allegation found true by the jury.
We will remand this matter to the trial court with directions that it correct the
abstract of judgment with respect to count 1 to reflect a single 25-year-to-life term
imposed under the One Strike law, and the true finding on the additional circumstance
shall remain on the record as an additional unimposed special allegation found true by the
jury.
2. Raines's Challenge to the "ICNA Fee"
During sentencing, the trial court stated that it was imposing a "$60 ICNA fee."
The abstract of judgment refers to a $60 "Criminal Conviction Assessment . . . per
[Government Code section] 70373."
Raines contends that the $60 fee was not properly imposed because the trial court
referred to it as an "ICNA fee" at sentencing instead of referencing Government Code
23
section 70373. Raines does not contend that the $60 fee required by Government Code
section 70373 was unauthorized in this case. He merely takes issue with the trial court's
description of the fee at the sentencing hearing.
We reject Raines's argument. Government Code section 70371.5 establishes the
"Immediate and Critical Needs Account" (ICNA) of the State Court Facilities
Construction Fund. The ICNA is funded by a criminal conviction assessment fee, as
mandated in Government Code section 70373. (Gov. Code, § 70373, subds. (a)(1), (d).)
The criminal conviction assessment fee is imposed for every criminal conviction "in the
amount of thirty dollars ($30) for each misdemeanor or felony" to "ensure and maintain
adequate funding for court facilities." (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1).) These
assessments are then transferred for deposit into the ICNA. (Gov. Code, § 70373,
subd. (d).)
With this statutory background in mind, it is clear to us — and should have been
clear to experienced trial counsel — that the trial court's reference to an "ICNA fee" was
a short-hand way of referring to the fee authorized and required by Government Code
section 70373.
There is no indication in the record that anyone present during the sentencing
hearing was unclear about the fee that the trial court referred to as the "ICNA fee."
However, if defense counsel was unclear about what the trial court was referring to as the
"ICNA fee," it was his burden to ask for clarification during the sentencing hearing. He
did not, and thus Raines may not complain on appeal about the trial court's description of
the fee. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [if counsel does not ask for
24
clarification and correction as to the trial court's statement of reasons for sentencing
choices, the issue is waived on appeal as long as sentence is not unauthorized].)
As the $60 fee was authorized by Government Code section 70373 and defense
counsel did not object to the trial court's description of the fee at sentencing, Raines's
contention that the trial court erred is without merit.
DISPOSITION
We remand this matter to the trial court with directions that it correct the abstract
of judgment with respect to count 1 to reflect a single 25-year-to-life sentence imposed
under 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c) and (d), and that it forward a copy of the amended
abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other