People v. Bennett

PEEK, J.

Defendant Robert Stewart appeals from a judgment convicting him of the crimes of burglary and grand theft. The record reveals that he and one Kenneth Bennett were jointly charged with the commission of said crimes and in addition the crime of concealing stolen property, by an information filed by the District Attorney of Lassen County on August 10, 1948. After the trial court denied their motion to set aside the information, pleas of not guilty were entered. Stewart moved for a separate trial which motion also was denied by the trial court. The case then proceeded to trial before a jury which returned a verdict finding defendant Bennett guilty of all three crimes and defendant Stewart guilty of burglary and grand theft but not guilty of concealing stolen property as alleged in the information. Stewart was sentenced on each crime for the term prescribed by law, the sentences to run concurrently.

Stewart now attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, alleging in this regard that the only evidence of his guilt is the testimony of his codefendant which he asserts was not corroborated as required by Penal Code, section 1111. By such contention he overlooks evidence contained in the record other than that of the testimony of his codefendant. Such evidence discloses that a Mr. Glenn was the owner of a summer cabin at Eagle Lake in Lassen County which he had closed in the fall of 1947. When he returned in May, 1948, he found that many items of furniture and other personal property were missing which, he testified, had a total value in excess of $200. An investigation by the sheriff resulted in the detention of the defendants, each of whom made a written statement, subsequently received in evidence, in which each defendant admitted going to the cabin, removing the property and selling it, but each claimed to be working as the employee of the other. A furniture dealer testified that

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he had purchased certain of the property from both defendants, giving his cheek payable to appellant in payment therefor. The sheriff testified that he found certain of the property in appellant’s home. It is readily apparent from the mere narration of the foregoing evidence that the requirement of Penal Code, section 1111, that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated “by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense,” is amply satisfied. The required corroboration does not have to be supplied by direct evidence.