People v. Williams

California Court of Appeal Sep 29, 1949 No. Crim 2609Published

Before: Goodell

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Holding. The court held that an initial order suspending a sentence is equivalent to an order granting probation, which does not constitute a final judgment; therefore, the subsequent sentencing of the defendant did not violate double jeopardy.

Issues

Whether a court's initial pronouncement of a suspended sentence constitutes a final judgment.
Whether a subsequent sentence imposed after a continuance for probation proceedings violates the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“An order suspending sentence is, in legal effect, “the equivalent of an order granting probation””

“The courts have repeatedly held that “Probation is not a judgment””

“It follows that the judgment of November 28, 1947, was the only judgment in the case.”

GOODELL, J.

This appeal is from an order of May 31, 1949, denying appellant’s motion to annul a judgment entered on November 28,1947.

The ground of the motion was that the court rendered judgment at a hearing on October 31, 1947, and then, on November 28, 1947, rendered a second judgment which was void and in excess of jurisdiction, and which placed defendant in double jeopardy.

Appellant was charged with burglary and pleaded guilty ■ in the municipal court. On October 31, 1947, on arraignment in the superior court for judgment, when his counsel urged

“a

suspended county jail sentence,” a discussion ensued between court, counsel and defendant respecting prior convictions, wherein counsel further urged that if his client “could be saved from going back on an additional felony sentence it would at least cut down some of the time.” A police inspector testified that defendant had admitted “to us that he had been over there three or four times,” whereupon defendant conceded three priors. The inspector gave the details of this burglary—the entry of a store at night, unarmed, and nothing taken. The court then ruled it to be second degree burglary and made the following statement which appellant claims was the pronouncement of judgment: ‘ ‘ It will be the judgment of the law and the sentence of the Court that the defendant be confined to the county jail for a period of one year, said sentence to be suspended on condition he be turned over to the state authorities as a parole violator. ’ ’

After disposing of other matters the court returned to this case. The inspector was recalled (without further oath) and defendant was confronted with five felonies from the record which the inspector had produced. When the assistant district attorney stated there had not been time to check on the complete record defense counsel said “Well, we will be glad to have a continuance . . . except the statutory period insists on five days.” Defendant then admitted four priors.

After further discussion of the current offense (including defendant’s grudge against the owner of the store) and the time served on his last conviction, the court said “We are

[779]

People v. Williams

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GOODELL, J.

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