McWane v. Hetherton

McCOMB, J.

From a judgment in favor of respondent on (a) appellant Me Wane’s complaint and (b) respondent’s cross-complaint, after trial before the court without a jury in an action to recover damages which resulted from injuries received in an automobile accident, appellants appeal.

The evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to respondent, the essential facts are:

On the afternoon of December 31, 1939, respondent was driving an automobile in a southerly direction on Normandie Avenue just north of where it intersects with 110th Street in

[510]

the city of Los Angeles. Respondent extended her left arm

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when approaching the intersection indicating that she intended to make a left turn into 110th Street. As she commenced to turn easterly into 110th Street, she noticed a car owned by appellant Me Wane and being operated by appellant Fitzpatrick traveling in a northerly direction on Normandie Avenue approximately 600 feet south of the intersection. The car in which appellants were riding was traveling about sixty miles an hour and weaving to some extent as it proceeded along the avenue.

Respondent immediately stopped her car leaving the left fender projecting into the east half of Normandie Avenue approximately one and one-half feet. There remained approximately thirteen and one-half feet between the front of respondent’s automobile and the easterly curb line of Normandie Avenue. Thereafter the left front fender of appellants’ car struck the left front fender of respondent’s car, as a result of which respondent received injuries to her person and property in the amount of $3,336.24.

Appellants rely for reversal of the judgment on these propositions :

First: There is no substantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding that appellants’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.

Second: Respondent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.

Both of the foregoing propositions are untenable. An examination of the record discloses that there was presented to the trial judge direct evidence of eye witnesses in conformity with each and every fact set forth above. From these facts the trial judge may reasonably have believed that respondent acted as a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances would have acted in immediately stopping her car when she saw the automobile in which appellants were driving approaching her at a speed of approximately sixty miles an hour and, weaving in its course along Normandie Avenue ; also that appellants, in failing to perceive the car in which respondent was riding and by failing to drive to the east of respondent’s car or to stop before hitting her car, did not act as a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would have acted, and they were therefore negligent and such negli