People v. Morris

DRAPEAU, J.

By an information containing twelve counts, defendant was charged with the crimes of forgery and grand theft; also with three prior convictions of felonies for which he had served terms of imprisonment in state prisons.

Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charge; admitted the priors, waived a jury trial, and submitted his case in part on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, subject to the introduction of further evidence.

The trial court found defendant “not guilty” as to count 12, and found him “guilty” as charged in counts 1 to 11, inclusive. Thereafter, his motion for new trial and his application for probation were denied, and he was sentenced to state prison, the sentences on the several counts to run concurrently with each other and with the unexpired portion of the sentence from which he was on parole.

This appeal is from the order denying the motion for new trial, and from the judgment of conviction of the crime of forgery, as charged in counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11, and of the crime of grand theft, as charged in counts 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the information.

It is here contended that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment, it being particularly urged that there is insufficient corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice Presson.

By means of six checks, appellant and his alleged accomplice Presson abstracted $3,100 from the account of one Saul Sugar in the Bank of America, and $100 from the account of Frank C. Holscher in the same bank.

[314]

These two men knew each other in San' Quentin. Presson had completed his term of imprisonment, and appellant was on parole when they met in Los Angeles during the summer of 1951.

Mr. Presson was subpoenaed as a witness herein, having previously pleaded guilty to one count of forgery in a prosecution against him. He testified that sometime in August, 1951, he saw appellant who spoke to him about forging some checks. The plan was that appellant should do the writing and Presson should pass the checks. The proceeds were to be split 75 per cent to appellant and 25 per cent to Presson. Presson operated under the name of Clyde B. Thomas. He “bought” general identification, which included a driver’s license, a draft card and a social security card bearing that name. All of the checks in question were drawn to the order of Clyde B. Thomas and Presson endorsed that name on the back of each. He identified all six cheeks at the trial, and testified that he received them from appellant, cashed them at the bank and split the proceeds with appellant.