Estate of Strong

California Supreme Court Dec 20, 1937 No. L. A. 15933Published

Before: Shenk

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Holding. The court held that an executrix may appeal in her individual capacity despite a representative designation in the notice of appeal, that inheritance taxes on contingent remainders are payable from the trust corpus, and that a legacy is not defeated by the conversion of securities into real property through foreclosure during administration.

Issues

Whether an executrix may appeal a decree of distribution in her individual capacity despite her representative title in the notice of appeal.
Whether inheritance taxes on contingent remainders should be paid from the trust corpus or deducted from a legatee's cash legacy.
Whether a legacy conditioned on the existence of securities is defeated when those securities are converted into real property via foreclosure during estate administration.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The notice merely appends opposite her name a designation which indicates that she is the executrix, but it does not necessarily state that she prosecutes such appeal as executrix. Such designation may be considered as mere descriptio personae”

“The court was therefore not in error in ordering that Alice L. Lacey be reimbursed for the amount of the tax on the contingent interest deducted from the cash legacy bequeathed to her.”

“It is well recognized that a sale of real estate in administration proceedings will not, for purposes of distribution, effect a conversion of the proceeds therefrom into personal property.”

SHENK, J.

Strong, as executrix of the last will and testament of Alice B. Strong, deceased, filed her second

[391]

account and petition for distribution of the entire estate of the decedent with the exception of sufficient funds to pay-balances due on account of inheritance and estate taxes, attorneys’ fees, and commissions. The court entered its decree of final distribution. This decree provided that Alice L. Lacey, one of the legatees, should be reimbursed for the inheritance tax of $103.71 on the contingent remainder devised to her, which amount had been deducted by the executrix from her cash legacy. The court also decreed that Georgia Lacey Burns was entitled to payment of a legacy of $5,000 provided by clause seven of the will, and designated certain properties out of which said legacy should bo paid. From these two specified portions of the decree of distribution “Hattie Strong, executrix of the estate of Alice B. Strong”, has appealed.

Hattie Strong is a surviving sister of the decedent and the residuary legatee under her will. The respondents urge that Hattie Strong, as executrix, is not a proper party to appeal from the decree of distribution.

(Estate of Murphy,

145 Cal. 464, 467 [78 Pac. 960];

Estate of Babb,

200 Cal. 252, 255 [252 Pac. 1039].)

We may assume that if, as such executrix, Hattie Strong had appealed, her appeal should be dismissed. But the notice of appeal does not necessarily preclude the propriety of considering the appeal as having been taken by her as an individual. The notice merely appends opposite her name a designation which indicates that she is the executrix, but it does not necessarily state that she prosecutes such appeal as executrix. Such designation may be considered as mere

descriptio personae (Burling

Thompkins,

77 Cal. 257 [19 Pac. 429];

Scott

Estate of Strong

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SHENK, J.

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