Stratton v. Superior Court

California Supreme Court Mar 25, 1935 No. L. A. 15018Published

Before: Langdon

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Holding. The court held that a Municipal Court lacks the statutory authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 396 to transfer a case to the Superior Court unless a counterclaim or cross-complaint exceeding the Municipal Court's jurisdiction is formally pleaded within the Municipal Court action. The mere introduction of a separate Superior Court case file at trial does not satisfy the statutory requirement for such a transfer.

Issues

Whether a Municipal Court may transfer a case to the Superior Court under Code of Civil Procedure section 396 based on evidence introduced at trial rather than formal pleadings.
Whether a complaint filed in a separate Superior Court action constitutes a 'counterclaim' within the meaning of section 396 for the purpose of triggering a transfer from a Municipal Court.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It should be obvious that a “counterclaim” means there not merely the cause of action itself, but that cause of action pleaded by the defendant in his answer as a counterclaim.”

“We are unable to construe the statute to provide that a complaint in the Superior Court should be deemed a counterclaim in an action in the Municipal Court”

[695]

LANGDON, J.

This is a proceeding by Cora L. and G. W. Stratton, petitioners, to review an order of the Superior Court annulling an order of the Municipal Court.

In December, 1933, Arthur Pinover brought an action in the Municipal Court against Cora L. and G. W. Stratton, for the sum of $1288.87 alleged to be due under a contract executed August 30, 1932. The defendants filed an answer and counterclaim for $1455. Subsequently, on January 25, 1934, the Strattons commenced an action against Pinover in the Superior Court, seeking recovery of $15,304 as damages for fraud in the inducement of the said contract, and also praying for the $1455 sought in the counterclaim filed in the first action. Petitioners allege that all of the claims of the parties in each action arose out of the same transaction, that involving the contract of August 30, 1932.

On February 17, 1934, the Strattons made a motion in the Superior Court to restrain the action in the Municipal Court. This was denied.

When the first action came to trial in the Municipal Court, the Strattons, defendants therein, offered in evidence the file of the Superior Court action, and moved to transfer the case to the Superior Court on the ground that the Superior Court action constituted a counterclaim in the Municipal Court action, and was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Municipal Court, on February 26, 1934, granted the motion and certified the ease to the Superior Court.

On March 23, 1934, in the Superior Court, Pinover moved to retransfer the cause to the Municipal Court, and the motion was denied in the law and motion department, without prejudice.

On April 20, 1934, Pinover made another motion to re-transfer the cause, this time in the calendar department. The motion was granted, and the order of the Superior Court was thereupon made transferring the matter back to the Municipal Court. It is this order which petitioners seek to have annulled.

The main contention of petitioners is based upon the provisions of section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a new section enacted in 1933, which reads in part as follows: “If an action or proceeding is commenced in a court which has jurisdiction of the subject-matter thereof as determined

Stratton v. Superior Court

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LANGDON, J.

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