Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich

VALLÉE, J.

Two appeals are pending in this nonjury case from a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $2,350. Plaintiff appeals upon the judgment-roll. Defendant appeals upon a settled statement pursuant to rule 7(b), Rules on Appeal.

Plaintiff commenced the action on August 14, 1946. The first cause of action sought recovery of the reasonable value of work and services performed by plaintiff for defendant from July, 1935, to April, 1946, in maintaining a home for defendant and their son, “cooking for him, washing defendant’s clothes, and performing the entire household services for defendant,” during all of which period she “believed that she was the legal wife of defendant.” The second cause of action sought recovery of contributions made by plaintiff to the household expenses from January 17, 1943, to June 13, 1945, consisting of earnings received by plaintiff while employed in a defense plant and during the period she believed she was defendant’s lawful wife. Defendant answered, denying generally all allegations of the complaint and alleging, as an affirmative defense, that the causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 337, 339.) He also alleged, as additional affirmative defenses, that the services rendered by plaintiff in his behalf were voluntarily rendered without any agreement or understanding that she would be compensated therefor; and that plaintiff had been fully compensated for all services rendered by her in his behalf.

The settled statement reveals the following facts: The parties were married in Los Angeles on March 18, 1921. One child, a daughter, was born, the issue of this marriage. Subsequently defendant (as plaintiff) filed an action for divorce in Los Angeles County. An interlocutory decree was granted the husband and entered on March 18, 1932. On September 6, 1933, without the husband’s knowledge or request, his attorney had a final decree of divorce entered. Subsequent to the entry of the interlocutory decree and several months prior to the entering of the final decree, and thereafter, defendant continually sought a reconciliation with his wife. They

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became reconciled in July of 1935. Both parties testified that before the reconciliation occurred defendant informed plaintiff that no final decree had been entered. Defendant testified that he so believed and so informed plaintiff. The parties then took a trip to Reno, Nevada, the Pacific Northwest, and on their return stopped at Merced, California. While there, defendant made inquiry of the county clerk concerning the remarriage of the parties. He was informed that since no final decree had been entered in the divorce action no remarriage was necessary. This information defendant imparted to plaintiff. Thereafter, on April 23, 1936, a son was born to the parties. As an aftermath of domestic difficulties which arose between them, plaintiff, on August 1, 1945, consulted her attorneys about a divorce. On August 10, 1945, she was informed by them that the court records disclosed the entry of a final decree of divorce on September 6, 1933. Plaintiff testified that she would not have lived with defendant if she had not believed that she was his wife. The parties remained separated from August 1, 1945, until October 1, 1945, when the plaintiff, upon the promise of defendant that he would remarry her if she would return to him, again became reconciled. They again separated on April 1, 1946. Prom July, 1935, on, defendant owned a half interest, as a partner, in Economy Plumbing Company. During the periods from July, 1935, to August, 1945, and from October, 1945, to April, 1946, plaintiff performed the usual household duties of a wife, excepting that during the period from January 17, 1943, until June 13, 1945, she worked in a defense plant. During this latter period she did not render to defendant the same amount of household services as she had when she was not employed, but during this period she contributed all of her salary, $172.50 a month, to the household expenses. It was agreed between the parties that plaintiff would contribute her salary to the living expenses and the money saved by defendant thereby would be put into war bonds for their mutual benefit. Plaintiff testified that during the period she worked defendant told her he was able to save and had bought $11,000 worth of war bonds; that she saw two books among his personal effects indicating that he had $11,000 worth of war bonds. During a short period of time after the reconciliation the parties lived on Isabel Street on some property owned by plaintiff’s mother. The property was about to be foreclosed and defendant paid off the encumbrances, advanced other monies for the care and maintenance of the property,