Glasser v. Municipal Court

DORAN, J.

In an ordinance adopted by the board of supervisors of Los Angeles County,

it is

declared to be a misdemeanor to solicit in any manner or for any purpose in any building owned or operated by the county of Los Angeles (sec. 1, Ordinance No. 2292, N. S., County of Los Angeles), whether within the unincorporated or incorporated territory of said county.

In a complaint filed in the Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles it was alleged that respondent Louis Glasser solicited “bail bond business” in the Hall of Justice, a building owned and operated by the county of Los Angeles and within the corporate limits of the city of Los Angeles, in violation of the above ordinance. A jury was unable to agree as to the guilt of the defendant, respondent herein, and the cause was set down for trial at a later date. Thereafter, and before the second trial of said action, defendant Glasser obtained an alternative writ of prohibition from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. After a hearing on the return of the writ, said court entered its judgment declaring the above ordinance unconstitutional, from which judgment the Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles prosecutes the appeal herein.

[457]

At the outset it should be noted that the Constitution provides that superior courts shall have appellate jurisdiction in such cases arising in municipal and justices’ and other inferior courts in their respective counties as may be prescribed by law. The Constitution also provides for the creation of appellate departments of the superior court in any county wherein municipal courts are established. (Art. VI, sec. 5, Constitution of California, Ann. (Mason 1933), p. 904.) The county of Los Angeles has created such an appellate department of the superior court, and three judges of the superior court of said county have been designated according to law to preside over said appellate department.

The alternative writ of prohibition was issued by one of the judges of the appellate department of said court, and the writ was made returnable in the department of the court presided over by the three judges of said appellate department. The judgment from which the appeal herein is taken was signed by the three judges as judges of the superior court; that is to say, that although the appellate department of said superior court, as such appellate department, was without jurisdiction to issue the alternative writ, nevertheless there is nothing in the law which prevents three judges of the superior court from hearing and determining issues raised by an 'alternative writ of prohibition and the demurrer or answer thereto. It should be noted, also, that had the defendant Glasser been convicted, and had he appealed to the appellate department of the superior court, the determination by that court of the questions raised on such appeal would be final. Thus, the same three judges of the superior court who preside over the appellate department of said superior court determined, in this instance, through the instrumentality of a proceeding in prohibition, the same question which could have been raised by an appeal from the judgment of the municipal court. The vital distinction between the two methods of procedure is obvious,—an appeal lies from the judgment of the superior court in the prohibition proceedings, whereas the judgment of the appellate department of the superior court would be final.