Department of Veterans Affairs v. Board of Supervisors

EDMONDS, J.

By the present original proceeding, the Department of Veterans Affairs of California, one of the petitioners in

Eisley

v.

Mohan, ante,

p. 637 [192 P.2d 5], has presented substantially the same question as was decided in that case. The department here seeks a writ of mandate

[658]

to compel the board of supervisors to cancel an assessment on real property owned by it subject to a contract of conditional sale made with Murray Hill, a veteran entitled to tax exemption.

The petition alleges that certain real property was assessed for the fiscal year 1946-47 to one Sven Meyer, the holder of the legal title on March 1, 1946. The Veterans Welfare Board acquired the land by deed dated March 2, 1946. Three weeks later the board contracted to sell the property to Hill and his wife, who now occupy the premises. On August 5, 1946, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the successor of the Veterans Welfare Board, filed with the Board of Supervisors of San Joaquin County a petition which included detailed information concerning the title to the property. Upon the ground of ownership by a state agency, the department demanded that the realty taxes for 1946-47 be canceled pursuant to sections 4986 and 4986.4 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. After the respondent board refused to comply with- the demand and to cancel the tax, the department instituted the present proceeding.

The department contends that, under the facts pleaded, the applicable statutes require the cancellation of the assessment upon the property for taxes of the fiscal year 1946-47, although the land was acquired by the public agency after the tax lien attached. Mandamus is the proper remedy, says the petitioner, because the courts have become more liberal in allowing that remedy to be invoked when the question is of statewide concern and the controversy concerns the construction of a general state statute. It is also asserted that the remedy at law is inadequate and not “capable of directly affording and enforcing the relief sought.”

By way of return to the alternative writ issued in response to the department’s petition, the respondent board demurred upon the ground that the facts pleaded are not “sufficient to constitute a cause of action nor to authorize the issuance of either an alternative or peremptory writ of mandate. ’ ’,.