Prudential Insurance v. Broadhurst

HERNDON, J. pro tem.

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The determinative question pre sented on this appeal is whether it must be held as a matter of law that by the terms of a property settlement agreement respondent, the divorced wife of an insured, effectively waived

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her right to receive, as beneficiary, the proceeds of a policy of insurance on the life of her former husband.

In this interpleader action brought by the insurance carrier, the tripartite contest over the policy proceeds was waged in the trial court by (1) respondent, the former wife of the insured, who was the named primary beneficiary, (2) appellant, the administratrix of the insured’s estate, and (3) Sherry Lee Chapman, respondent’s minor daughter, who was the named secondary beneficiary. Upon findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to respondent, the trial court held that her right to take as beneficiary was not foreclosed by the provisions of the property settlement agreement and rendered judgment accordingly. The administratrix of the insured’s estate has appealed from the judgment and from an order denying her motion for a different judgment.

Richard Broadhurst, the deceased, was the insured under a life insurance policy issued in January, 1946. His then wife Adna was named primary beneficiary. His marriage to Adna having been dissolved by divorce, he executed a change of beneficiary form dated January 19, 1948, naming his father as primary beneficiary. On February 17, 1951, insured was married to Inez, the respondent here. On June 14, 1952, the insured executed a change of beneficiary form naming respondent primary beneficiary and his father secondary beneficiary. A few weeks later, Inez and the insured separated. Thereafter, on December 1, 1952, insured executed a third change of beneficiary form, redesignating respondent as primary beneficiary and naming her minor daughter Sherry as secondary beneficiary.

The insured and respondent entered into a property settlement agreement dated March 2, 1953, which was approved in an interlocutory divorce decree dated April 3, 1953. The preamble to the agreement refers to the pendency of the divorce suit and contains the following recital: “Whereas it is the mutual desire of the parties to settle and adjust now and forever all property rights and all rights, obligations and duties so far as is within their power so to do arising out of or founded upon the marital relationship or otherwise, and to waive all rights, duties and privileges not herein expressly reserved in favor of either and against the other existing prior to and on the date hereof, so that henceforth all rights, duties, privileges, obligations and liabilities of the parties hereto shall be exclusively based upon and determined by the terms of this agreement.”