Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission

GIBSON, C.J.

Allen Roberson, while employed at Fidler’s Manufacturing Co., Inc., sustained an injury to his left hand which caused permanent disability of 40 per cent, for which he received normal workmen’s compensation benefits. He had a previous permanent disability which, added to his industrial injury, resulted in a permanent disability rating of 60% per cent. Since the combined effect was a permanent disability of less than 70 per cent, Roberson was not eligible for benefits from the Subsequent Injuries Fund.

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The Industrial Accident Commission awarded Roberson $130 for medical costs incurred in his

unsuccessful

effort to prove his claim against the Fund, and in this proceeding the Fund seeks to annul that award.

The sole issue presented is whether under section 4600 of the Labor Code, construed in the light of the 1959 amendment of that section, certain specified costs may be awarded an unsuccessful claimant against the Fund. Section 4600 provides in part (words deleted by the 1959 amendment are crossed out and words added by that amendment are italicized): “In accordance with the rules of practice and procedure of the commission, the employee . . . shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably, actually, and necessarily incurred for X-rays, laboratory fees, and medical reports,

and medical testimony

required to successfully prove a contested claim.

The reasonableness of and necessity for incurring such expenses to prove a contested claim shall be determined with respect to the time when such expenses were actually incurred. Expenses of medical testimony shall be presumed reasonable if

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in conformity with the fee schedule charges provided for impartial medical experts appointed by the commission.”

Prior to 1959 the section clearly provided that only a

successful

claimant was entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred for medical services. In the section as amended the word “successfully” was deleted. Where the amendment of a statute consists of the deletion of an express provision, the presumption is that a substantial change in the law ivas intended.