In Re Harper

California Court of Appeal Nov 12, 1936 No. Crim. 1536Published

Before: Pullen

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Holding. The court held that in an extradition proceeding, the judiciary's role is limited to determining if the petitioner is substantially charged with a crime by the demanding state, rather than adjudicating the petitioner's actual guilt or innocence.

Issues

Whether the petitioner was substantially charged with a crime under the laws of the demanding state.
Whether the court should inquire into the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding regarding extradition.

Disposition. Writ discharged and petitioner remanded.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Our function is to determine whether or not petitioner is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding state.”

“We do not need to inquire into the facts constituting the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.”

“Finding, therefore, as we do, that petitioner has been legally charged with a crime recognized by the laws of the state of Oregon, the writ must be discharged”

[447]

PULLEN, P. J.

Petitioner here, in the state of Oregon, was charged with the crime of attempting to obtain property by false pretenses, and in order to avoid prosecution fled from Oregon to California. He was arrested in the county of Del Norte upon the request of the executive authority of Oregon, and the Governor of this state directed that petitioner be delivered into the custody of a representative of the state of Oregon and returned for trial. He now seeks his release by this writ of

habeas corpus

and as ground thereof asserts first, that the allegations in support of the demand for extradition do not state facts sufficient to show the commission of any crime, for the reason that the check which was the basis of the charge, was never presented for payment to the bank on which it was drawn, and secondly, that petitioner was guilty of nothing more than a preparation to commit a crime.

The answer to these contentions is adverse to appellant. It is not necessary in order to prove the fictitious or forged character of the check by evidence that it was presented to the bank and returned unpaid, for the testimony of the officers of the bank that the maker of the' check had no account with the bank upon which the check was drawn is

prima facie

evidence of the fictitious character of the check

(People

Menne,

4 Cal. App. (2d) 91 [41 Pac. (2d) 383];

People

Sheridan,

136 Cal. App. 675 [29 Pac. (2d) 464]), and as to the second point that the petitioner was guilty of merely a preparation to commit a crime it appears that petitioner undertook to purchase a car from the complaining witness, gave him in payment thereof the check in question and was prevented from actually driving the car away because owing to the lateness of the hour it was impossible to get a license from the proper authorities to operate the car. This shows more than mere preparation to commit the act. Petitioner had done everything that he was called upon to do, as far as the complaining witness was concerned, to consummate the crime.

In Re Harper

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PULLEN, P. J.

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