Pierce v. Standow

DOOLING, J.

Defendant Laila Standow appeals from the judgment against her based upon the collision of an automobile of which she was a coowner with, a parked automobile while her automobile was being driven by her 17-year-old son Tommy. The case was tried without a jury and the judgment against appellant is based upon the findings of the court that at the time of the accident the automobile-was being driven by her minor son with her implied consent and permission and that she had knowledge that he was an incompetent driver and had no license to drive.

The sole ground urged on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support these findings. The evidence shows that appellant and her son were both attending a trade school. The son finished his classes from one-half to one hour before the mother and each morning when they arrived at the school the mother gave the keys of the car to her son. Mother and son both testified that the mother had on several occasions forbidden the son to drive the automobile and that the only purpose of her giving him the keys was to permit him to open

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the car door and sit in the car while he was free from classes.

Appellant concedes in her closing brief “that the trial court could and did disbelieve the testimony of appellant and her son,” but she argues that “disbelief of such testimony would not furnish or supply affirmative evidence to the contrary. ’ ’

This argument assumes that from the mother’s habitual practice of giving the car keys to her son the trial court could not reasonably infer her implied consent to his driving the automobile. It is well settled that a trial judge or jury may disbelieve direct evidence and rely on circumstantial evidence to support a finding.

(Gray

v.

Southern Pacific Co.,

23 Cal.2d 632, 641 [145 P.2d 561];

Scott

v.

Burke,

39 Cal.2d 388, 398 [247 P.2d 313] ;