Verga v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

Opinion

SCOTLAND, P. J.

The question presented in this workers’ compensation proceeding is whether the disdainful reactions of a supervisor and coworkers to an employee’s mistreatment of them constitute “actual events of employment” for which the employee can obtain workers’ compensation benefits for the psychological stress that the employee experiences because of those disdainful reactions to her inappropriate conduct.

The answer requires an interpretation of section 3208.3, subdivision (b)(1) of the Labor Code, which states: “In order to establish that a psychiatric injury is compensable, an employee shall demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that actual events of employment were predominant as to all causes combined of the psychiatric injury.” (Further section references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise specified.)

The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the WCAB) concluded that Rosemary Verga was not entitled to compensation for psychiatric injury while employed by United Airlines. According to Verga, her psychiatric injury was the result of harassment and persecution by her supervisor and coworkers. However, the WCAB found “the true fact remains that [Verga] was not actually subject to harassment or persecution, she instead brought upon herself the disdain of her co-workers” because Verga was “a difficult person to get along with”; she was impolite, unpleasant, and coworkers “never knew

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when [she] might get upset.” The WCAB held: “That disdain is not an actual event of employment” within the meaning of the statute.

We issued a writ of review and shall now affirm the WCAB order. As we will explain, substantial evidence supports the WCAB’s factual findings that Verga’s supervisor and coworkers did not persecute or harass her; instead, it was Verga who caused the stressful work environment by being rude, inflexible, easily upset, and demeaning toward other employees. That Verga subjectively misperceived as harassment the disdainful reaction of her coworkers to Verga’s mistreatment of them did not entitle her to workers’ compensation benefits for psychiatric injury. This is so because in enacting section 3208.3, subdivision (b)(1), the Legislature disapproved a ruling permitting such benefits based on an employee’s subjective misperception that the employment was stressful. In order to limit such claims for psychiatric injury, due to their proliferation and potential for abuse, the Legislature “established] a new and higher threshold of compensability for psychiatric injury” (§ 3208.3, subd. (c)) by requiring the claimant to demonstrate that “actual events of employment” were the “predominant” cause of the alleged psychiatric injury (§ 3208.3, subd. (b)(1)). This change in the statutory scheme constituted an intent to require the claimant to establish objective evidence of harassment, persecution, or other such basis for alleged psychiatric injury. Verga failed to do so. Rather, the evidence established that Verga was the predominant cause of her psychiatric injury because her inappropriate conduct toward coworkers created their disdain toward her. Although the workers’ compensation system generally provides benefits regardless of the fault of any party, there are limits when an employee intentionally causes his or her own injury. To allow an employee to harass coworkers and, when they respond unfavorably, to claim a stress-related injury to the employee’s psyche would increase, not reduce, workers’ compensation claims and create the potential for abuse of the system. This would be contrary to the purpose of section 3208.3, subdivision (b)(1). In sum, the disdainful reactions of coworkers to Verga’s abusive conduct toward them were neither “actual events of employment” nor the “predominant” cause of Verga’s psychiatric injury within the meaning of the statute. The predominant cause of her injury was Verga herself, through her intentional abuse of her coworkers. Thus, she is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.