In Re Whitaker

Opinion

POCHE, J.

Today, we take one small step to eliminate an obvious waste of judicial resources. We hold that Fred A. Whitaker comes within the statutory definitions of a vexatious litigant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b); statutory references hereafter are to this code.) We further hold that Whitaker, not having been deterred by numerous determinations to the same effect by the Alameda Superior Court, shall henceforth be required to obtain the permission of the presiding judge or justice for any court of this state in which he proposes to commence any litigation.

This matter arose when we began work on Whitaker’s latest appeal

(Whitaker

v.

Department of Social Services of Alameda County,

A055479). That action ended in the trial court with a dismissal after Whitaker failed to furnish security as required by an order declaring him a vexatious litigant. Our attention was first drawn by the fact that the primary emphasis of Whitaker’s briefs was a challenge to the constitutionality of the vexatious litigant statutes, an argument identical to one rejected by this court in an unrelated appeal only last year.

(Whitaker

v.

Bay Area Rapid Transit District

(Apr. 23, 1991) A049779 [nonpub. opn.].) We also noted that the respondent on Whitaker’s latest appeal specifically requested issuance of a so-called “prefiling order” authorized by section 391.7, and first used by an appellate court in

In re Luckett

(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 107 [283 Cal.Rptr. 312], Following the procedure pioneered by Division Three of the Fourth District in

Luckett,

we issued an order to Whitaker to show cause why the relief requested by respondent should not be granted. The matter was set for a hearing, at which time Whitaker appeared and submitted arguments.

One of the statutory definitions of a vexatious litigant is “a person who . . . [i]n the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced,

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