Sylve v. Riley

[25]

Opinion

KING, J.

San Francisco’s rent control ordinance allows a landlord to evict a tenant to permit a designated relative to occupy the premises, but specifies no time limit within which that occupancy shall commence, Under the facts in this case, we hold that the question of when the former tenant discovered or should have discovered the relative never occupied the premises, so as to trigger the running of the statute of limitations for bringing a wrongful eviction action, is a question of fact which precludes the entry of summary judgment.

Audrey Sylve appeals from an order dismissing her wrongful eviction action after summary judgment in favor of landlords Lenora and Homer Riley, averring the action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

On or about May 3, 1988, Sylve received a 30-day notice to terminate tenancy alleging the Rileys sought to recover possession “in good faith, without ulterior reasons, and with honest intent, for the use and occupancy as the principal residence of the landlord’s son and daughter-in-law for a period of at least 12 continuous months,” in accordance with section 37.9, subdivision (a)(8), of San Francisco’s rent stabilization and arbitration ordinance (S.F. Admin. Code, ch. 37). In a conditional order for entry of unlawful detainer judgment pursuant to stipulation, dated December 6, 1988, Sylve specifically reserved the right to sue the Rileys should their son and daughter-in-law not in fact move in. She vacated the premises on or about December 27. An amended order for stipulation for entry of unlawful detainer judgment, filed March 24, 1989, contained the same reservation of the right to sue.

In May 1989, Sylve noticed that her former apartment appeared to be vacant. In January 1990, when it still appeared vacant, she concluded the reasons stated in her eviction notice had been false. On December 31, 1990, Sylve filed a complaint against the Rileys for violation of the rent ordinance, negligence and fraud. On November 13, 1991, the Rileys filed a motion for summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) on the grounds the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On November 26, they filed a cross-complaint alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and trespass. After a hearing, the trial court granted the summary judgment motion. The judgment of dismissal entered on January 30, 1992, was not appealable because the cross-complaint was still pending.