In Re Rodney
Before: Epstein
Synopsis
[Opinion certified for partial publication.*]
Opinion
EPSTEIN, Acting P. J.
Alfred Rodney was convicted of three sex of
fenses. He was sentenced to consecutive terms under Penal Code section 667.6.
1
Rodney petitioned this court, arguing that his sentence was improper because his offenses constituted a single transaction and because he had not suffered a previous conviction for violation of section 220.
In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that a defendant may be sentenced to consecutive terms under section 667.6, subdivision (d) even though the defendant had not suffered a previous violent sex crime conviction, as long as the other requirements of the subdivision are satisfied. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we conclude the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the oral copulation and rape were committed on “separate occasions,” but did not support the conclusion that the digital penetration was committed on a “separate occasion.”
Factual and Procedural Summary
*
Discussion
I*
II
Rodney also argues an issue of statutory construction: is section 667.6, subdivision (d) triggered only if a defendant previously suffered a
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conviction for violation of section 220?
2
Section 667.6, subdivision (d) provides: “A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for each violation of
Section 220, other than an assault with intent to commit mayhem, provided that the person has been convicted previously of violating Section 220 for an offense other than an assault with intent to commit mayhem,
paragraph (2), (3), (6), or (7) of subdivision (a) of Section 261, paragraph (1), (4), or (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 262, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, subdivision (a) of Section 289, of committing sodomy in violation of subdivision (k) of Section 286, of committing oral copulation in violation of subdivision (k) of Section 288a, or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.” (Italics added.)
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