People v. Munoz

Opinion

CROSBY J.

When we transferred this matter from the appellate department of the superior court, the issue concerned the impact of Proposition 8’s “Truth-in-Evidence” provision (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)) on the statutory exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in speed traps.

1

(Veh. Code, §§ 40803-40805.) The Legislature overwhelmingly

2

answered that question in the meantime with the passage of Vehicle Code section 40808.

3

(Stats. 1992, ch. 538, § 2.) It provides, “Subdivision (d) of Section 28 of Article I of the California Constitution shall not be construed as abrogating the evidentiary provisions of this article.”

[1192]

Now, the issue is whether the new statute should be applied to cases pending before its passage.

4

We hold that it should.

Although the general rule is that statutes are to be given prospective effect only, they will be applied retrospectively where the Legislature clearly so intended

(Andrus

v.

Municipal Court

(1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045-1049 [192 Cal.Rptr. 341]) or where the Legislature has merely elucidated existing law.

5

(Bradley

v.

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.

(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 404, 409 [260 Cal.Rptr. 470].) The new statute can meet either test: Because it operates as of the time of trial rather than of the violation, the statute does apply to pending cases. And it also states the legislative interpretation of Proposition 8 vis-á-vis speed traps. The Legislature’s interpretation of the Constitution is, of course, entitled to deference in the courts.