Pandazos v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.

[326]

Opinion

JACKSON, J.

*

Facts

Following reversal of a judgment entered after a jury trial of this medical malpractice action, petitioner filed a peremptory challenge to the original trial judge, David Schacter, under the pertinent provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.

1

Judge Schacter honored the peremptory challenge and transferred the case to respondent court, the supervising judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court’s Northwest District, for reassignment. Real parties interpreted the language

“trial court’s decision”

in the 1985 amendment to mean that a party could exercise its right to file a peremptory challenge following a reversal on appeal only if the first trial was a court trial. Adopting real parties’ argument, respondent court rejected the peremptory challenge because “the appeal was from a jury verdict.” Respondent court then reassigned the case to Judge Schacter. This petition followed.

Discussion

When interpreting the meaning of a statute, “[w]e look first to the language selected by the Legislature and only review legislative history materials when there is ambiguity in the statute.”

(Union Bank

v.

Superior Court

(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 584 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653].) Although we are of the view that the 1985 amendment clearly and unequivocally affords a party the right to file a peremptory challenge to the original trial judge after the reversal of a judgment or order on appeal, regardless of whether the judgment originated from a judge’s decision or a jury verdict, we will assume for the purpose of this discussion that there is some ambiguity in the language on which the parties focus here,

“trial court’s decision.”