People v. Viers

Opinion

WALLIN, J.

David Wayne Viers appeals his conviction for transportation of a controlled substance and possession of a concealed weapon, contending his motion to suppress evidence was improperly denied. We affirm.

Detectives Shovlin and Peterson received information possible narcotics activity was taking place at the Roadway Inn. The motel manager informed them two separate rooms were receiving numerous phone calls and visitors. These rooms had been rented by the same person under two different names, and were paid for in cash daily for four days.

The detectives saw a Camaro and Mustang parked outside the rooms. After seeing two individuals go in and out of both rooms, the detectives parked across the street and watched. About an hour later Viers and a woman left the room, got into the Mustang and drove away. The officers called for assistance, believing narcotics activity was occurring. They followed the Mustang and noticed the registration was expired. They had Officer Seda, who answered their call for assistance, stop the Mustang for the registration violation.

Detective Peterson followed Officer Seda to the driver’s side of the car while Detective Shovlin approached the passenger side. They saw Viers move his hands around in the back seat while they were approaching. Eventually, the officers saw and seized a loaded gun. A consent search yielded methamphetamine. Sometime after the stop, the officers discovered Viers was on probation.

Viers asserts the stop was an unlawful pretext stop mandating exclusion of the evidence. However, as part of his plea in the case in which he was on probation, Viers specifically waived his Fourth Amendment rights and agreed “to submit [his] person and property ... to search and seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement or probation officer

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with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, or reasonable suspicion.” That waiver and agreement is dispositive of his pretext claim.

A probationer who consents to a warrantless search has “no reasonable expectation of traditional Fourth Amendment protection.”